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Chapter I
Introduction
Operations is the part of an organization that is responsible for creating and/or delivering
the organization’s products and services (Slack and Lewis 2015, p. 2). To accomplish
this task, operations has to oversee and improve a large variety of different processes that
span the entire value chain; including the design, procurement, production, delivery, and
recovery of the products and services sold. It is beyond dispute that managing all these
processes is a complex and challenging endeavor, and that any form of mismanagement
may result in adverse outcomes that have a detrimental impact on the organization’s
profits. Yet, even though the coordination of all the different functions that operations
is concerned with is by itself already an intricate mission, there is one feature of many
real-life scenarios that substantially complicates operations management: the presence
of uncertainties.
When uncertainty—be it on the supply, demand, or product side—enters the equa-
tion, then organizations cannot simply plan for how to proceed with their operations in
the future, but instead they have to foresee all the different possible futures and create
contingency plans for each of them (Van Mieghem and Allon 2015, p. 115). Clearly, this
is an utmost daring—if not impossible—task and therefore, operations management has
traditionally been concerned with simplifying this task by eliminating the root causes
of the issue; that is, operations management also focusses on reducing uncertainties.
This view that operations should reduce, or at least control, the organization’s sup-
ply, demand and product uncertainties is well established, and accordingly, managers
in practice routinely deal with operational risk management (Van Mieghem and Allon
2015, p. 369).
However, combatting uncertainties is not always an organization’s most prudent
strategy; in particular when the organization deals with innovative products. As the
famous US physicist Brain Randolph Greene once noted: “Exploring the unknown re-
quires tolerating uncertainty” (Greene 2006). In other words, uncertainty and risk are
the mainsprings of innovation, and when engaging with innovative products, operations
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management—although going against its very nature—has to embrace uncertainty. Even
more so since access to innovation is a key source of competitive advantage in many in-
dustries. As a result, operations has to find entirely different ways to manage innovative
products as compared to standard products, where risk reduction is a primary concern.
And uncovering these paths is at the heart of this thesis. More specifically, the following
chapters investigate how operations should manage the procurement (Chapters II and
III) and design (Chapter IV) of innovative products.
Chapters II and III are concerned with the design and management of so-called in-
novation or procurement contests, which have established themselves as a predominant
purchasing mechanism for innovative products in practice (Cabral et al. 2006). The key
benefit of using procurement contests as compared to bilateral contracting for research
and development (R&D) is that a contest is an informationally very parsimonious mech-
anism that also spurs substantial innovation efforts in a firm’s supplier base and allows
for an ex post selection of the best innovation (Terwiesch and Xu 2008). Yet, to reap
all these benefits contest holders need to correctly setup their contests and also manage
the contest wisely as it unfolds.
How to manage an ongoing innovation contest is the key focus of Chapter II. In
particular, Chapter II analyzes how feedback—the most practical form of in-contest
interventions—from the contest holder to the contest participants can help in improving
contest outcomes, and it also establishes optimal information structures for a contest
holder’s feedback policy. Specifically, the analysis identifies when, and when not, to give
feedback as well as which type of feedback to give: public (which all participants can
observe) or private (which only the focal participant can observe). The results uncover
a nontrivial relationship between contest characteristics and optimal feedback choices.
Additionally, Chapter II also examines whether the contest holder should mandate in-
terim feedback or instead allow participants to seek feedback at their own discretion,
and discusses how changing the granularity of feedback information affects its value
to participants.
In contrast to Chapter II, Chapter III concentrates on a contest holder’s design
choices before the start of the contest. For rather simple innovations the question of
successful contest design has received considerable attention in the academic literature
(see, e.g., Taylor 1995, Moldovanu and Sela 2001, Terwiesch and Xu 2008), and as a
result, scholars have gathered a sound understanding of how to conceptualize such con-
tests. Unfortunately, many of these findings do not immediately transfer to contests
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that aim to source technologically complex products that consist of multiple interacting
components. For such complex innovations, a central question for the buying firm is
whether to procure the full product from a single supplier, or whether to buy the indi-
vidual components from different suppliers. The analysis presented in Chapter III shows
that the answer to this question depends on the magnitude of innovation that is required
to develop the different components as well as the characteristics of the supplier base.
Based on these findings, Chapter III provides managerial advice regarding the optimal
contest format, and it also highlights which suppliers should be invited to participate in
such procurement contests, and which not.
Chapter IV departs from the preceding chapters by considering how a firm should
manage its internal new product development efforts, instead of procuring innovations
only from external parties. In doing so, the analysis presented in this chapter examines
how a firm should operationalize its design testing efforts. It is well known that design
testing is an integral part of nearly all new product development initiatives because
it enables firms to identify the best designs for their new products. Test results are
usually collected by (teams of) experts, who must be incentivized not only to exert
effort in testing the designs but also to report their findings truthfully. Motivated by
this widespread challenge, Chapter IV addresses the following questions: How should a
firm set up its design-testing process so that (i) the experts are adequately incentivized
and, more importantly, (ii) the best design alternative is the one most likely to be
selected? The presented analysis identifies the firm’s optimal testing strategy and the
optimal incentive structures; it also reveals how, exactly, delegation distorts a firm’s
testing process.
Taken together the findings presented in this thesis should be viewed as being two
sides of the same coin. To retain their competitive edge and to improve their market po-
sition, firms have to constantly tap into new and innovative products. Such innovations
can come either from outside parties—in which case procurement contests are an effec-
tive way of gaining access to these innovations—or they may be developed internally.
Both ways of sourcing innovation are frequently used in reality, but unfortunately, both
of them also introduce very challenging problems to a firm’s operations management. It
is the goal of this thesis to provide managerial solutions for some of the most pressing
issues that managers face when trying to gain access to innovation—be it from external
sources or from an internal R&D department.
3
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Chapter II
Feedback in Innovation Contests
with Ju¨rgen Mihm1
2.1 Introduction
Firms have increasingly found it necessary to source their innovation from beyond their
own boundaries (Chesbrough 2003). They often do not have, in house, the expertise
needed to solve all the challenges that arise as a result of their ever more complex research
and development (R&D) activities. Yet success often eludes innovation initiatives that
involve outside parties; much depends on the suitability of the firm’s sourcing mechanism.
One mechanism that has garnered widespread interest is the innovation contest. In
organizing such a contest, the firm specifies its goals at the outset (and often the metric
by which it measures goal achievement) and promises an award to the solver who best
fulfills those goals; at the end of the contest, the award is granted to the solver(s) with the
best solution(s). The contest mechanism offers two key benefits: (i) it offers considerable
flexibility in that the firm can choose a different set of participants for each contest; and
(ii) it equips the firm with powerful incentives, since contestants compete fiercely to win
the contest holder’s approval and thus the award.
In light of these potential benefits, contests have been widely studied in the context
of innovation and also in many other settings (Lazear and Rosen 1981, Moldovanu and
Sela 2001, Siegel 2009, Ales et al. 2016). One consequence of this research interest is
that a theory of contests has emerged. This theory focuses on how a contest holder can
use different aspects of contest design to optimize the intensity of competition among
contestants, thereby maximizing the effort exerted by contestants and, by extension,
1The research presented in this chapter is based on the paper “Sourcing Innovation: On Feedback in
Contests”, coauthored with Ju¨rgen Mihm, which has been accepted for publication in Management
Science.
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the contest’s effectiveness at providing incentives. The theory of contests has offered
solutions for such diverse problems as optimal award structures (Ales et al. 2017), the
optimal number of participants (Taylor 1995, Terwiesch and Xu 2008), and the optimal
way of nesting contests within contests (Moldovanu and Sela 2006).
However, current theory has some gaps with respect to certain critical aspects. We
highlight these gaps by considering Kaggle, an Internet platform that provides firms
with the infrastructure for hosting contests on data-driven problems. When setting up
such a contest, the firm must define its rules of engagement: the relevant metric (usually,
out-of-sample accuracy of the predictions) and the reward(s) offered. After the contest
announcement, data scientists compete against each other in developing—at their own
expense of time and money—algorithms that perform the required task. The group of
scientists that ultimately provides the best-performing algorithm wins the prize. So in
those respects, Kaggle’s approach follows the general template of a contest. In one
respect, however, it adds a fundamentally new feature: During the competition, data
scientists enter preliminary versions of their code and receive feedback on how well it
performs (usually in terms of how accurate its predictions are). Furthermore, Kaggle
not only provides this performance feedback to the team itself but also maintains a
public “leader board” so that each team (or individual participant) can observe its own
performance relative to all competing submissions.
Thus Kaggle can be viewed as exemplifying a central question, faced by many
contest organizers in practice, that has received but cursory attention in the academic
literature: the question of optimal feedback (for notable exceptions, see Aoyagi 2010,
Ederer 2010, Marinovic 2015). Performance feedback is a means by which the firm can
systematically affect the amount of information held by each contestant—in particular,
information about own and rivals’ competitiveness—and thereby influence contestant
behavior during the rest of the contest. Put differently, the firm can augment or diminish
incentives by redistributing information and in this way can manipulate the contest’s
competitiveness. The question that then arises is: How, exactly, should a contest holder
influence the information structure during a contest so that contestants are optimally
incentivized?
Any comprehensive investigation of this issue must provide answers to the following
three questions, which together constitute a feedback policy’s information structure.
(i) Which solvers should receive the feedback information? (ii) Who should decide
6
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which solvers receive feedback? (iii) What should be the information content of the
performance feedback?
The importance of the first question rests on the fact that a contest holder can
freely choose the recipients of feedback. More specifically, the firm may retain all infor-
mation about the contest’s competitiveness (no feedback), it may inform solvers about
their respective individual performance but not about the performance of others (pri-
vate feedback), or it may provide information about the performance of all contestants
(public feedback). These information structures naturally induce different levels of com-
petition and hence provide contestants with different incentives. However, it is not clear
which policy is most appropriate for which situation. Real-world contest holders have
experimented extensively with different forms. The default mode for Kaggle is to al-
low all contestants to observe each contestant’s performance feedback. In contrast, the
European Union (EU)—which regulates all major infrastructure, architectural design,
and civil engineering contests organized within its jurisdiction—introduced in 2004 the
“competitive dialogue procedure” (EU 2004) for the specific purpose of establishing a
private feedback channel between contest holder and contestants. In 2010, 9% of the
EU’s entire public procurement budget was spent via this contest mechanism. The use
of private feedback has proven so effective that, in 2016, the World Bank introduced a
similar mechanism in its procurement regulations (World Bank 2016).2
With regard to the second question, it can be either the firm or a contestant who
initiates feedback and hence a redistribution of information. In particular, the contest
holder might mandate feedback or might simply provide a feedback option. In the latter
case, contestants may strategically withhold their performance information to influence
the contest’s information structure. Should the contest holder allow for such strategic
behavior? Again, companies have devised different approaches. Kaggle, for instance,
often (though not always) makes feedback voluntary, whereas performance feedback is
mandatory in any contest subject to the EU’s competitive dialogue procedure.
The third question focuses on the accuracy of performance feedback. Clearly, any
information about contestants’ relative competitiveness will affect their incentives and
thus their behavior. But should the firm divulge all of its available information or only
some of it? Kaggle issues exact rankings of contestants’ performance (i.e., their re-
2Of course, for public institutions such as the EU or the World Bank, the choice of feedback policy will
likely depend also on transparency and compliance rules and thus involve more than pure efficiency
considerations.
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spective prediction accuracy). Yet the annual European Social Innovation Competition,
which solicits ideas for building an inclusive economy, tends to provide less fine-grained
(and thus merely “indicative”) feedback.
In practice, the informational impact of different feedback policies is key to design-
ing a successful contest; hence it is imperative for the contest-staging firm to answer
each of those three questions. Yet the existing academic literature leaves them largely
unanswered by implicitly restricting attention to the role of feedback that is public,
mandatory, and fully informative (Aoyagi 2010, Ederer 2010) or at best to a specific
form of public, mandatory, and noisy feedback (Marinovic 2015). Thus that literature
covers too few of feedback’s dimensions and options within dimensions to have much
relevance for most practical settings. Furthermore, it concentrates exclusively on firms
interested in promoting the average performance of their solvers. In innovation settings,
however, firms are more likely to be interested in the best performance. We contribute to
the literature on contests by offering a more complete and practically relevant descrip-
tion of how feedback can be used in contests—whether to improve average performance
or to obtain the best performance. In so doing, we consolidate the most relevant feed-
back policies observed in practice within a broad framework and thereby deepen our
theoretical understanding of when and how to use them.
The answers we find to our three guiding questions are as follows. First, and
most importantly, contest organizers (and researchers) cannot neglect private feedback.
Whereas public feedback always dominates in average-performance settings, a contin-
gency arises for contests that seek to elicit the best performance: private (resp. public)
feedback is optimal for contests with high (resp. low) uncertainty. This finding is in
stark contrast to the existing literature’s view, based on comparing only the cases of
public and no feedback, that the feedback’s role is the same for routine projects as for
highly innovative projects. Second, public feedback may be underused when it is volun-
tary. Contestants always seek performance feedback under a private-feedback policy but
never do so under a public-feedback policy, and inducing contestants via monetary incen-
tives to ask for public feedback yields suboptimal results. Third, concerning the effect of
information granularity on the value of feedback, we find no evidence that strategically
hiding information—either by reducing the information content of feedback (e.g., provid-
ing rank-only feedback rather than detailed performance feedback) or by promulgating
noise—can be used to improve contest outcomes.
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2.2 Related Literature
The question of how best to motivate innovation and creativity is a central topic of
academic inquiry (see, e.g., Erat and Krishnan 2012, Ederer and Manso 2013, Bockstedt
et al. 2015, Erat and Gneezy 2016). Contests as a mechanism for eliciting innovation
opportunities have become a focal point of attention, figuring prominently in both the
economics and the operations management literatures. In the classification of Taylor
(1995), this broad literature examines two different types of contests: (i) innovation
races, in which contestants try to achieve a pre-defined and verifiable performance target
(see e.g., Bimpikis et al. 2016, Halac et al. 2016); and (ii) innovation contests for solving
open-ended problems, in which the firm cannot specify performance targets ex ante and
rather tries to induce the best solution.
Our work falls into the second category because the assumption of a pre-defined
performance target would be antithetical to our main goal: exploring how feedback can
incentivize contestants to achieve optimal output on a given schedule. The literature on
contests (in the narrow sense) was initiated by seminal research of Lazear and Rosen
(1981), Green and Stokey (1983), and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983). Over the last decades,
these contests have become an accepted paradigm in the study of settings that include
lobbying, litigation, military conflict, sports, education, and of course R&D management
(for an overview of applications, see Konrad 2009). The extant literature has addressed
many contest design issues. Prominent among these is whether or not the contest should
be open for everybody to enter; a larger number of entrants yields a larger number
of trials (Terwiesch and Xu 2008), but restricting access increases the effort exerted
by individual solvers (Taylor 1995, Fullerton and McAfee 1999, Moldovanu and Sela
2001).3 Bid caps have been studied as a means of limiting access to a contest (Gavious
et al. 2002), and so have more advanced mechanisms such as holding an auction for
the right to participate (Fullerton and McAfee 1999). Another prominent issue is the
optimal award structure (Che and Gale 2003, Siegel 2009, 2010), which depends on
such contingencies as the solvers’ respective cost functions (Moldovanu and Sela 2001),
performance uncertainty (Ales et al. 2017), and whether the firm seeks the best solution
or only to improve the average solution (Moldovanu and Sela 2006). Another major
issue is the contest’s temporal structure. Should the contest designer hold a single,
3This generalization is countered by Ales et al. (2016) and Ko¨rpeog˘lu and Cho (2017), who give
examples of contests for which individual solution efforts are increasing in the number of competitors.
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overarching contest or rather a series of smaller, “cascading” contests?—see Moldovanu
and Sela (2006) for a discussion. Finally, the literature has also analyzed more dynamic
contest formats such as elimination and round-robin contests (Yu¨cesan 2013) as well as
repeated contests between the same contestants (Konrad and Kovenock 2009).
All of these models presume that the contest holder is relatively passive during the
course of the contest. However, recently, scholarly attention has been shifting toward the
actions that a contest holder could take as the contest unfolds (see, e.g., Gu¨rtler et al.
2013). The most prominent of these actions is providing (or not) interim performance
feedback.
The literature on feedback in contests is sparse.4 Although generally acknowledged
to be the first in this area, the paper by Yildirim (2005) does not address feedback per se
and focuses instead on information disclosure as a strategic choice made by solvers. Ger-
shkov and Perry (2009) are likewise not primarily concerned with feedback as we under-
stand it here; rather, these authors focus on optimally aggregating scores by combining
intermediate and final reviews when the review process itself is noisy. However, there are
four papers that do address feedback during contests in a more narrow sense. Goltsman
and Mukherjee (2011) explore a setting in which solvers compete for a single prize by
fulfilling two tasks at which each solver can either fail or succeed. Closer to our work,
Aoyagi (2010), Ederer (2010), and Marinovic (2015) examine settings in which a firm
provides feedback to solvers who have to make continuous effort choices.
It is noteworthy that past work on feedback in contests has yielded only prelimi-
nary answers to some aspects of the three foundational questions that shape any feedback
policy’s information structure. First, all extant research restricts its attention to public
feedback and neglects the class of private feedback (which is ubiquitous in practice);
hence broader comparisons of different feedback policies have not been made. We solve
the challenging case of private feedback and find nontrivial contingencies accounting
for when private, public, or no feedback is preferable. Our results confirm the im-
portance of private feedback for highly innovative settings and hence challenge extant
research. As an aside, our analysis of private feedback contributes to the mathemati-
cal theory of contests by devising—to the best of our knowledge—the first closed-form
solution of a stochastic contest with asymmetric private information. Second, previous
research has considered only mandatory feedback. In other words, it implicitly assumes
4In the following we concentrate on theoretical work, but it is worth mentioning also the stream of
empirical studies (see e.g., Gross 2017, Wooten and Ulrich 2017).
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that solvers must provide the contest holder with intermediate solutions on which they
receive feedback—an assumption often violated in practice. We examine all types of
feedback with respect to mandatory versus voluntary feedback and establish the circum-
stances under which a firm should (or should not) make feedback mandatory. We also
investigate the role that intermediate prizes designed to induce voluntary feedback play
in this regard. Third, the existing literature simply presumes that the contest holder
divulges all available information to contestants; the only exception is Marinovic (2015),
who considers a specific form of noisy feedback. Yet feedback may in fact convey less
fine-grained information, so we explore the effects of reducing the amount of feedback
information conveyed. Finally, the contest literature on feedback has attended solely to
the average performance of solvers. We answer each of the three central questions not
only for a contest holder aiming to improve average performance but also for one looking
for the best possible performance—a goal more typical of innovation settings. We show
that the optimality of feedback policies hinges on this distinction.
2.3 Model Setup
Let us describe in more detail the characteristics of a typical innovation contest in terms
of both the firm and the solvers so as to establish our base model (voluntary feedback
and reduced information feedback are treated in Sections 2.6 and 2.7, respectively). The
firm understands its own preference structure well enough that, when presented with
a solution, the firm can express how much it values that solution. However, the firm
cannot know the effort level expended by a solver in achieving a given performance
because the link between performance and effort has a stochastic component. In con-
trast, each solver knows how much effort he expends and also realizes that expected
performance increases with effort. Yet solvers still experience uncertainty about how,
exactly, effort links to performance. In addition, solvers are uncertain about the firm’s
preference structure and so, even after devising a solution, they cannot truly evaluate
their performance. This latter uncertainty reflects that, for any true innovation, the firm
cannot fully specify ex ante what criteria it values or how they should be weighted.
These modeling requirements are typical for any innovation and R&D setting, and they
place the foundation of our model squarely in the contest literature with stochastic ef-
11
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Figure 2.1.: Structure of the Innovation Contest with Feedback.
  
fort consequences which postulates a stochastic link between solvers’ actions and contest
outcomes (Taylor 1995, Fullerton and McAfee 1999, Ales et al. 2016).
Finally, as a means of dynamically influencing the solvers’ effort provision in the
course of a contest, the firm may (partially) resolve the solvers’ uncertainty about their
performance by transmitting interim performance feedback. We classify such feedback
as public, private, or no feedback. The firm employs whichever feedback policy opti-
mizes the contest’s intended outcome—the highest average performance or best possible
performance.
Formal Description of the Base Model.
In order to create a parsimonious model that nonetheless captures the essence of the
scenario just outlined, we consider a firm that hosts a dynamic innovation contest over
two rounds, t ∈ {1, 2}, with two risk-neutral solvers, i and j.5 The primitives of the
contest are common knowledge; its structure is depicted in Figure 2.1.
The process begins when the firm publicly announces the contest, the fixed award A
for which the two solvers compete, and its feedback policy. In order to concentrate on the
role of feedback (and to minimize technical complexity), we treat A > 0 as a parameter.
Our decision variable for the firm at this stage is whether and, if so, how to give feedback.
The firm may choose to give no feedback at all, to offer public feedback (i.e., both solvers
5For notational simplicity, we explicitly define only the parameters for solver i; an identical set applies
to solver j.
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receive the same information about their own and their competitor’s performance), or
to provide private feedback (i.e., solver i receives feedback on his own performance but
not on the performance of solver j, and vice versa).
Next, solver i expends effort ei1 ≥ 06 at private cost ce2i1, where c > 0. He finds an
initial solution of value vi1 = keei1 + ζi1; here ke > 0 is the sensitivity of effort and ζi1
is a random shock that follows a uniform distribution, ζi1 ∼ Uniform(−a/2, a/2) with
a > 0.
After the first round, each solver hands in his solution and the firm perfectly ob-
serves vi1. However, solver i’s effort is unobservable to the firm (and also to solver j);
hence the firm cannot determine whether a high solution value stems from high effort,
a large random shock, or both. In contrast, solver i knows how much effort he has in-
vested; but since he cannot observe the realization of ζi1, he is uncertain about the true
performance of his solution. To address that uncertainty, the firm provides interim per-
formance feedback in accordance with its own policies. As is customary in the fledgling
research field of feedback in contests, we assume that feedback is pre-committed, truthful
and accurate (Aoyagi 2010, Ederer 2010)—although the “accurate feedback” assumption
is relaxed in Section 2.7. It is clear that, in the absence of pre-committed truthfulness
(i.e., if feedback does not convey a somewhat informative signal in a Bayesian sense),
feedback is utterly meaningless. It is easy to prove that the firm would have a strong
incentive to provide only feedback that maximizes future efforts irrespective of actual
performance; naturally, each solver would anticipate this manipulation and discard the
received information as uninformative.
Upon observing the firm’s feedback, solver i updates his belief about the realization
of first-round performances v1 = (vi1, vj1) in accordance with Bayesian rationality. Then,
solver i expends additional solution effort ei2 ≥ 0 and submits his final solution vi2 =
vi1 + keei2 + ζi2, where ζi2 is again a random shock that follows the same distributional
assumptions as in the first round. Random shocks are independent and identically
distributed across solvers and rounds. For notational simplicity we define ∆ζt = ζit− ζjt
as the difference between the random shocks in round t with associated probability
density function g∆ζt .
6An effort of 0 should be interpreted as the normalized minimal effort necessary to participate in the
contest.
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Finally, after receiving the final solutions, the firm announces the contest winner by
choosing the highest-value solution. Thus solver i wins if vi2 > vj2 (ties can be broken
by invoking any rule).
Model Implications.
A firm will naturally seek to employ the feedback policy that maximizes its expected
profits. The relevant profit function is Πbest = E[max{vi2, vj2}]−A if the firm is interested
in the performance of the best solution only, or Πavg = E[vi2 + vj2]/2 − A if the firm
wishes to maximize the average performance of both solvers.
Whereas the firm—whatever its profit function—is interested in the solvers’ absolute
performance, each solver’s sole interest is in winning the contest. The utility that solver i
receives from winning is A −∑t ce2it; losing the contest yields a utility of −∑t ce2it.
Hence solver i’s expected utility of participating in the contest is ui = A · P(vi2 >
vj2) −
∑
t ce
2
it (we assume his outside option to be 0), and the effort he invests in the
contest is determined by maximizing his expected utility.7
We are concerned with Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of the contest. To avoid
unnecessary technical complications during the analysis, we assume that κ ≡ (a2c)/
(Ak2e) > 1. For technical reasons, similar assumptions on the contest’s inherent perfor-
mance uncertainty are made in practically the entire literature on contests (see, e.g.,
Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983, Aoyagi 2010, Ederer 2010). Clearly, κ increases in the vari-
ance of the random noise and the costs of effort, and it decreases in the size of the award
and the effort sensitivity. Thus, with a higher κ, improvement effort is more expensive
and the solution performance becomes more stochastic.
2.4 Solvers’ Solution Efforts
In this section we analyze, for our base model, the solvers’ solution efforts under each
feedback policy. We can do so without specifying the firm’s objectives because—given a
particular feedback policy—the solvers’ strategies are independent of whether the firm’s
7Note that an outside option of zero ensures that a solver always participates in the contest because
zero effort already guarantees him a nonnegative expected utility and in equilibrium his utility
cannot be worse.
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aim is to improve average performance or rather to attain the best performance. Each
solver simply tries to win the contest.
We start by re-establishing familiar results in the context of our model, characteriz-
ing solvers’ equilibrium efforts in the absence of feedback as a benchmark (Section 2.4.1);
next we describe how providing public feedback affects the solution efforts of solvers (Sec-
tion 2.4.2). In this section’s main contribution, we then determine equilibrium levels of
solution effort under a private-feedback policy (Section 2.4.3). Throughout the text,
initial managerial implications are discussed in passing; however, our systematic com-
parison of feedback policies is deferred until Section 2.5. All mathematical derivations
are presented in Appendix A.
2.4.1. No Feedback
In the benchmark case of no feedback, the firm does not provide any interim performance
information to the solvers. As a result, each solver’s two-stage effort choice problem
reduces to a simultaneous, single-stage utility maximization problem.
Proposition 2.1. The unique PBE under a no-feedback policy is symmetric, with
eno1 = e
no
2 =
Ake
3ac
. (2.1)
Proposition 2.1 parallels previous results of Taylor (1995), Fullerton and McAfee
(1999), and Ales et al. (2016). Since neither solver receives any interim performance
information and since the costs of effort are convex, it follows that solution efforts are
identical across rounds. Moreover, because solvers are symmetric at the start of the
contest, they always choose the same effort in equilibrium; hence they do not try to
leapfrog each other. So under a no-feedback policy, it is the contest’s inherent perfor-
mance uncertainty that ultimately determines the contest winner.
It is instructive at this juncture to examine how our key contextual parameters
affect a solver’s solution efforts. As one would expect, those efforts are increasing in the
size of the award (A) and in the effort sensitivity (ke) but are decreasing in the costs
of effort (c) and in the uncertainty involved (a). Thus, a solver exerts relatively more
effort if effort becomes relatively more rewarding (i.e., if A/c increases) and/or if effort
becomes relatively more important (i.e., if ke/a increases).
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2.4.2. Public Feedback
Next we study the implications of public feedback. In this case, after submitting his
initial solution, each solver learns his own as well as his competitor’s first-round per-
formance. That is, public feedback perfectly reveals the solvers’ first-round performance
difference before the start of the second round, at which point solvers are therefore no
longer symmetric.
Proposition 2.2. The unique PBE under a public-feedback policy is symmetric, with
epub1 = E∆ζ1 [e
pub
2 (∆ζ1)] =
Ake
3ac
, (2.2)
epub2 (∆ζ1) =
Ake
2a2c
(a− |∆ζ1|). (2.3)
Mirroring Aoyagi (2010) and Ederer (2010), Proposition 2.2 has two main impli-
cations. First, it shows that each solver cares only about his relative performance and
completely disregards the absolute performance information embedded in public feed-
back. Specifically: if the solvers’ first-round performance difference is small (i.e., the
contest is competitive), then second-round efforts are substantial and the solvers fight
hard to win the contest; but if the first-round performance difference is sizable, then
solvers reduce their solution efforts because the contest is de facto decided. Second,
despite being asymmetric in the second round, both solvers expend the same amount of
effort. In other words, the first-round leader pursues a simple blocking strategy: he tries
to keep the follower at a distance but without trying to increase the performance gap.
At the same time, the follower tries to not fall farther behind but without attempting to
close the gap. The follower just relies on a large positive second-round shock to reverse
his fortune.
2.4.3. Private Feedback
We have just shown that, under a public-feedback policy, solvers set their second-round
solution efforts as a function of their relative first-round performance. Yet that solver
strategy is not viable under private feedback, since each solver receives information only
about his own performance. Thus, only absolute performance information can affect a
solver’s solution effort.
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The absence of relative performance information fundamentally affects the contest’s
information structure. Whereas solvers always possess symmetric and consistent beliefs
under no and public feedback, private feedback introduces an asymmetric and incon-
sistent belief structure which allows for the solvers’ assessments of their chances to win
to not be “coherent”. Suppose, for example, that each solver receives the information
that he performed extremely well in the first round. Then both solvers believe that
their respective chances of winning are much greater than 50%, although in reality those
chances are merely 50%. And in contrast with the public-feedback scenario, solvers are
never entirely certain whether they are ahead or behind their competitor. It is this
asymmetric belief structure that drives asymmetric equilibrium solution efforts.
Proposition 2.3. The unique PBE under a private-feedback policy is symmetric, with
epri1 = Eζi1 [e
pri
2 (ζi1)], (2.4)
epri2 (ζi1) =

−a+ζi1ke + 2aκke ln
(
2
√
γ2
3γ1
sin
(
1
3 sin
−1 (√3γ1γ2 a(1+12κ)+6ζi14γ2 ))) if ζi1 ∈ [−a2 , γ3x2 − aκ],
− ζi1ke + aκke ln
(
ζ+aκ
γ3
)
if ζi1 ∈ [γ3x2 − aκ, γ3y2 − aκ],
− ζi1ke + 2aκke ln
( 3√z(ζi1)
6 − 2 γ2γ1 13√z(ζi1)
)
if ζi1 ∈ [γ3y2 − aκ, a2 ].
(2.5)
Here z(ζi1) = 12[−9(a(1/6 − 2κ) − ζi1) + (12γ32/γ1 + 81(a(1/6 − 2κ) − ζi1)2)1/2]/γ1.
The constants are defined as γ1 = p(ny − x)/(3nx2o), γ2 = py(n3x + y)/(nxo), and
γ3 = p(n
2x2+y2)/(2x2o), where m = (1−6κ)/(1+6κ), n = e1/(2κ), o = 3y2−n2x2+4n3xy,
and p = a(1 + 6κ) and where x ∈ [e−1/(4κ), e−(1−1/κ)/(4κ)] and y ∈ [e1/(4κ), e(1+1/κ)/(4κ)] are
the unique solutions to the following system of equations:
mn2x4 − 4mn3x3y − 3(m+ n2)x2y2 − 4n−1xy3 + y4 = 0, (2.6)
1− 6κ2
κ(1 + 6κ)
+m ln(y)− ln(x) + n
2x4 + 8n3x3y + 9(1 + n2)x2y2 + 8n−1xy3 + y4
6x2(3y2 − n2x2 + 4n3xy) = 0.
(2.7)
This proposition presents—to the best of our knowledge—the first solution of a
contest with asymmetric private information but it is rather unwieldy; we offer a more
tractable approximation in Corollary 2.1. Our numerical analyses indicate that the
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Figure 2.2.: Equilibrium Second-Round Effort under Private Feedback.
Notes: The functions are based on the following set of parameters: A = 1, a = 1, ke = 1,
c = 1.01.
corollary yields an exceptionally good approximation even for low κ, which makes it a
good starting point for reflecting on Proposition 2.3.
Corollary 2.1. Define γ˜3 = a(1 + 6κ)e
(κ−1)/(2κ2)/(2(1 + 2e1/κ)), and let
e˜2(ζi1) = −ζi1
ke
+
aκ
ke
ln(ζi1 + aκ)− aκ
ke
ln(γ˜3). (2.8)
Then limκ→∞ e
pri
2 (ζi1)− e˜2(ζi1) = 0 for all ζi1.
Figure 2.2 plots the equilibrium effort functions epri1 and e
pri
2 (ζi1) for different first-
round shocks. The graph makes salient that Proposition 2.3 provides striking managerial
insights for those staging innovation contests. First, as before, each solver splits his
expected solution effort equally between the two rounds. That is: in expectation, the first
and second round contribute equally to a solver’s overall performance. Second, a solver’s
second-round effort epri2 (ζi1) is not monotonically increasing in ζi1. In fact, e
pri
2 (ζi1) has an
inverted U-shape; it increases with ζi1 for ζi1 ≤ 0 but decreases with ζi1 for ζi1 > 0. Thus
solvers with a moderate first-round performance (i.e., ζi1 = 0) exert substantial efforts in
the second round, whereas solvers with a very high or very low first-round performance
reduce their second-round efforts. The reason is that a moderately performing solver
perceives the contest as being competitive whereas exceptionally good- or ill-performing
solvers perceive the contest as more or less decided. Most importantly, however, unlike
the public-feedback scenario, under private feedback the bad solvers reduce their efforts
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to a greater extent than do the good solvers; formally, epri2 (−ζi1) < epri2 (ζi1) for all ζi1 > 0
(observe the asymmetry in Figure 2.2). This finding stems from the absence of relative
performance information. A solver with a high first-round shock can never be certain
that he is ahead, so he invests more effort to maintain his chances of winning in case
the competitor is equally strong—even though that is unlikely. Hence, private feedback
induces well-performing solvers to invest relatively more effort; it makes them relatively
more risk averse. This asymmetric response to feedback is the central feature that
distinguishes private from public feedback.
But does this mean that less fortunate solvers can leapfrog better solvers by in-
creasing their second-round efforts? The answer is No. To see this, note that solver i’s
final performance vprii2 is increasing in ζi1. That is: the more fortunate a solver is in the
first round (i.e., the higher his shock ζi1), the better he performs in the contest. More
interestingly, this intuitive result also sheds light on the strategic behavior of solvers. In
equilibrium, no solver ever allows a less fortunate solver (i.e., one with a lower first-round
shock) to overtake him in the second round through effort alone. So once a solver has
fallen behind his competitor after the first round, he needs a good random shock in the
second round in order to win the contest.
2.5 The Optimal Feedback Policy
Having characterized the solvers’ equilibrium solution efforts under the different feedback
policies, we are now ready to answer our main research question: Which feedback policy
is the best for each of the two stipulated objectives? We first discuss the optimal feedback
policy for maximizing average performance (Section 2.5.1); we then shift our focus to
maximizing the performance of the best solution (Section 2.5.2).
2.5.1. Maximizing Solvers’ Average Performance
Since the firm must set the feedback policy at the outset of the contest and since solvers
are ex ante symmetric, it follows that Πavg = E[vi2 + vj2]/2− A = E
[∑
i,t eit
]
/2− A =
E
[∑
t eit
] − A. That is, maximizing average performance is equivalent to maximizing
the sum of a solver’s (ex ante) expected first- and second-round equilibrium efforts.
Proposition 2.4 compares the expected first- and second-round effort choices of a solver
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as well as the firm’s expected profits for the cases of no feedback, public feedback, and
private feedback.
Proposition 2.4. The following statements hold:
(i) epri1 < e
pub
1 = e
no
1 ;
(ii) Eζi1 [e
pri
2 (ζi1)] < E∆ζ1 [e
pub
2 (∆ζ1)] = e
no
2 ;
(iii) Πpriavg < Π
pub
avg = Π
no
avg.
The first noteworthy result of Proposition 2.4 is that, in each round, the ex ante
expected effort of each solver is identical under a no-feedback and a public-feedback
policy. This result can be explained by public feedback having two opposed effects on
a solver’s second-round effort choice. On the one hand, if the revealed first-round per-
formance difference is low (|∆ζ1| < a/3), then each solver understands that the contest
is highly competitive and is motivated thereby to expend more effort than under a no-
feedback policy. On the other hand, if the performance difference is large (|∆ζ1| > a/3),
then solvers are discouraged from investing effort because they believe that the contest
is practically decided. In equilibrium, these countervailing effects of motivation and
de-motivation offset each other; thus, E∆ζ1 [e
pub
2 (∆ζ1)] = e
no
2 . Clearly, when deciding
on his first-round solution effort, each solver anticipates this balance between motiva-
tion and de-motivation effects and therefore chooses to exert the same effort as under a
no-feedback policy: epub1 = e
no
1 .
In contrast, the announcement of private feedback reduces the willingness of solvers
to expend solution effort as compared with both the no-feedback and public-feedback
policies. Two different effects are responsible for this result. First, much as under a
public-feedback policy, private feedback can motivate a solver to expend more effort
than in the no-feedback case if his first-round performance was middling.8 However,
this motivation effect is much less pronounced for private than for public feedback.
To see why, recall that the motivation effect of public feedback is strongest when the
firm communicates a small performance difference. Under private feedback, the firm
never releases relative performance information and so each solver can (and will) form
only a belief about the performance difference. Yet given the inherent randomness of
performance, each solver knows that his competitor is unlikely to have achieved the
8This happens if and only if −aκ(1 + W0(−γ3e−1+1/(3κ2)/(aκ))) < ζi1 < −aκ(1 +
W−1(−γ3e−1+1/(3κ2)/(aκ))), where W0 (resp. W−1) is the upper (resp. lower) branch of the Lambert
W function.
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same performance. For this reason, solvers respond only moderately to the motivation
effect of private feedback.
Second, private feedback has a strong de-motivating effect on relatively low-performing
solvers. As Figure 2.2 illustrates, solvers with a bad first-round performance exert less
effort in the second round than do solvers with a good first-round showing. Put dif-
ferently, the anticipated performance gap between bad and good solvers widens in the
second round because of these asymmetric effort choices. As a result, we observe a phe-
nomenon that does not arise under a public-feedback regime—namely, a solver with a
relatively bad first-round performance realizes that he may face a competitor that he
can never beat. Hence the set of potential competitors against whom the focal solver
can win becomes smaller and so he begins to shirk. In short: private feedback reduces
the contest’s competitiveness, which in turn leads solvers to reduce their effort.
This phenomenon also has a strong effect on a solver’s effort in the first round. Since
effort in the second round is reduced, solvers refrain from wasting effort in the first round;
that is why epri1 < e
pub
1 . Thus the mere pre-announcement of private interim performance
feedback has a negative effect on the solvers’ expected behavior. This “strategic” effect
is not observed in a public-feedback contest.
In sum: since maximizing the solvers’ average performance is equivalent to max-
imizing the solvers’ average effort provision, it follows that a private-feedback policy
always generates the lowest expected profits for the firm. It is therefore optimal for the
firm to choose either a no-feedback or a public-feedback policy. And whereas the firm is
indifferent between these two policies, solvers strictly prefer a no-feedback policy.
2.5.2. Finding the Best Solution
In practice, most innovation contests are designed to elicit one exceptional solution that
promises significant value upon implementation. In this case, the firm focuses not on
maximizing the solvers’ average performance but rather on maximizing the performance
of the best solution; that is, the firm maximizes Πbest = E[max{vi2, vj2}]− A. Proposi-
tion 2.5 establishes that, for certain types of innovation contests, private feedback is the
optimal policy.
Proposition 2.5. (i) Πpubbest = Π
no
best.
(ii) There exists a κ > 1 such that Πpubbest > Π
pri
best for all κ < κ.
(iii) There exists a κ <∞ such that Πpribest > Πpubbest for all κ > κ.
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Irrespective of whether the firm is interested in the solvers’ average or best perfor-
mance, employing a public-feedback policy generates the same expected profits as does
a no-feedback policy. This result reflects the identity of expected efforts under these two
feedback policies.
The key result of Proposition 2.5 is that public (resp., private) feedback is optimal if
κ < κ (resp., if κ > κ).9 To better understand this result, recall that κ = (a/ke)
2/(A/c).
The numerator is a measure of how uncertain the contest is; if a is large and ke is low, then
effort does not play a large role in winning the contest and hence uncertainty dominates.
The denominator is a measure of profitability; if the prize is large and the cost is low,
then profitability is high. Overall, κ is a measure of how uncertain one unit of gain is for
each of the solvers and thus it is a normalized measure of contest uncertainty. Hence, we
use κ to denote performance uncertainty. Proposition 2.5 implies that, for innovation
contests in which effort is more important than uncertainty (i.e., when κ < κ), public
feedback is optimal. In contrast, for innovation contests with substantial performance
uncertainty (κ > κ), private feedback outperforms public feedback.
Yet how can this result be explained—especially since, according to Proposition
2.4(iii), private feedback induces lower average performance than public feedback (or
no feedback)? We can answer this question by considering Figure 2.3, which compares
solver i’s expected second-round effort conditional on his first-round shock ζi1 under a
private-feedback (solid line) and a public-feedback (dashed line) policy. The figure’s left
(resp. right) panel shows the functions for low (resp. high) performance uncertainty κ.
Two key observations can be made here. First, comparing the solid and the dashed
lines plotted in each panel reveals that public feedback induces a larger effort than does
private feedback for most first-round shocks; this result is consistent with our finding
that private feedback induces a lower ex ante expected effort than does public feedback.
Comparing the two panels reveals also that, for low performance uncertainty κ, the
reduction in average effort under private feedback is much greater than for high κ.
Second, for top-performing solvers (i.e., solvers with a high first-round shock), private
feedback increases effort provision: the solid line surpasses the dashed line for sufficiently
high ζi1. This finding captures the need of top performers to protect their good position
9The complexity of the equilibrium emerging under a private-feedback policy makes it difficult to find
the dominant strategy for κ ≤ κ ≤ κ. However, numerical simulations indicate that κ = κ; hence
there exists a unique threshold for κ above which a private-feedback policy maximizes the firm’s
expected profits.
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Figure 2.3.: Ex ante Expected Second-Round Efforts under Private and Pub-
lic Feedback.
Notes: The graphs compare solver i’s (expected) equilibrium second-round effort conditional
on ζi1 under private feedback (solid line; e
pri
2 (ζi1), as stated in Proposition 2.3) and under
public feedback (dashed line; Eζj1 [e
pub
2 (∆ζ1)], with e
pub
2 (∆ζ1) as in Proposition 2.2); we take
the expectation over ζj1 in the public-feedback case in order to make it directly comparable
to the private-feedback case. In the left panel, performance uncertainty is low (κ = 1.01); in
the right panel, performance uncertainty is high (κ = 4). The vertical dotted line marks the
unique intersection point of the two curves. Parameters are: A = 1, a = 1, and ke = 1 (both
panels); c = 1.01 (left panel); and c = 4 (right panel).
more determinedly under private than under public feedback owing to the lack of relative
performance information. Moreover, Figure 2.3 shows that the fraction of solvers for
whom private feedback increases their effort is small under low performance uncertainty
but is large under high performance uncertainty.
Of course, it is exactly these top performers in whom the firm is interested when
maximizing the performance of the best solution. So when using private feedback, the
firm faces a non-trivial trade-off. On the one hand, private feedback reduces the solvers’
average effort provision; on the other hand, it encourages greater effort from the best
solvers. Thus the optimal feedback policy is the one that best balances the average
effort provision against the likelihood that a top-performing solver participates in the
contest. Consider the left panel of Figure 2.3. For low κ, the decline in average effort
under private feedback is relatively pronounced while the likelihood of a top-performing
solver (i.e., a solver with a first-round shock to the right of the dotted vertical line)
participating in the contest is relatively low. As a result, public feedback dominates
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private feedback. In contrast, the right panel shows that the decline in average effort is
much less pronounced for high κ. Furthermore, the chances that a solver exerts more
effort under private than public feedback are much greater (i.e., the solid line crosses
over the dashed line much farther to the left). In this case, then, private feedback is the
optimal feedback policy.
This finding—that the optimal feedback policy is tightly linked to the relative im-
portance of effort and uncertainty—has not been addressed in the extant literature and
it has two immediate managerial implications. First, when setting up an innovation
contest, it is crucial that the firm identifies the extent to which a solver’s performance
depends on stochasticity. For instance, there is seldom much uncertainty associated
with contests that seek to foster incremental innovation. In such contests, the hosting
firm should provide public feedback. However, private feedback is the preferred choice
for ideation contests that aim to develop novel concepts, new ideas, or breakthrough
research (all of which are associated with high levels of uncertainty). Even more, our
results concern communications between solvers: whenever the effort–performance link
becomes tenuous, idea exchange between solvers becomes detrimental to firm goals and
so the firm should minimize any form of communication between competing solvers. Sec-
ond, if performance uncertainty is substantial then a firm should not focus on improving
the average second-round effort; instead, it should choose a feedback mechanism that
“pampers” potential first-round top performers—even if in realization such top perform-
ers may not be present in the contest.
From the social welfare standpoint, Proposition 2.5 (in conjunction with Proposi-
tion 2.4) provides another important result for contests that are inherently uncertain: the
private-feedback policy is not only optimal for the firm but can also be socially efficient.
More precisely: apart from maximizing the firm’s expected profits, a private-feedback
policy also allows solvers to reduce their expected efforts. As a consequence, both the
firm and the solvers may well prefer private feedback to either public or no feedback in
settings characterized by high performance uncertainty.
2.6 Voluntary Feedback
So far we have assumed that the firm, by dictating the type of feedback, also obliges
solvers to submit intermediate solutions. Those intermediate solutions are the firm’s
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vehicle for providing solvers with interim performance feedback. In reality, however,
instead of enforcing intermediate submissions, a contest holder may also simply offer
an option for feedback. In such cases, feedback is voluntary and it is each solver’s
deliberate choice whether or not to seek feedback. Clearly, a solver will only do so if he
sees a significant benefit in submitting his intermediate solution. We now explore how
different potential benefits affect a solver’s decision.
For concreteness, we extend our base model (as depicted in Figure 2.1) by allowing
each solver to decide—after his first-round efforts—whether or not to submit an interim
solution. The firm then follows its announced feedback policy and provides the solvers
with accurate feedback on any submitted solutions. That is, if feedback is private then
solver i receives feedback on vi1 only if he has submitted his solution beforehand; under
a public-feedback policy, solver i can receive feedback on vj1 also—but only if solver j
has submitted his interim solution. The following proposition characterizes the solvers’
equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 2.6. (i) Under a public-feedback policy, no solver voluntarily discloses his
first-round solution in equilibrium.
(ii) Under a private-feedback policy, each solver submits his first-round solution in
equilibrium.
The key insight here is that a solver’s behavior as regards submitting interim so-
lutions depends critically on the contest holder’s feedback policy. It is intuitive that
under a private-feedback policy, each solver always seeks feedback as there are no neg-
ative externalities from requesting feedback. Without disclosing any information to his
competitors, each solver receives more refined information on his performance, allowing
him to optimally adjust his second-round efforts. In contrast, under a public-feedback
policy, solvers refrain from submitting their interim solutions because the threat of an
escalation of effort provision outweighs any potential benefits. More precisely, public
feedback introduces a relative benchmark that induces solvers to invest exceptionally
high effort levels if the contest is competitive. However, such bold effort choices are
utterly futile because each solver invests the same amount of effort in equilibrium, and
therefore the chances of winning are unaffected. Instead, it is only the costs of effort
that skyrocket.
The same logic continues to hold when accounting for another potential benefit of
feedback: the reduction of uncertainty in the second round. In fact, as Proposition 2.2
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indicates, the problem of effort escalation becomes even stronger because with a lower
performance uncertainty (i.e., a lower a) equilibrium efforts are becoming even higher.
We conclude that whereas pure information incentives are strong enough for a solver
to reveal his first-round performance under private feedback, they are insufficient under
a public-feedback policy. Thus to further strengthen the solvers’ incentives the firm may
need to resort to monetary incentives by granting a so-called “milestone” award to the
solver with the best first-round solution. It is evident that such financial prospectives
will—if large enough—induce each solver to submit his intermediate solution. However,
as the next proposition shows, this is never in the firm’s interest.
Proposition 2.7. Under a public feedback policy, it is never optimal for the firm to
grant a milestone award.
The higher the milestone award the more the firm shifts the solvers’ incentives
away from winning the overall contest towards winning the first round. As a result, the
introduction of a milestone award drastically dilutes a solver’s second-round incentives,
and thus his equilibrium efforts. Per se, however, the firm is not interested in these
intermediate submissions, but it only cares about the final solution qualities. Thus, the
higher the milestone award the more misaligned are the firm’s and the solvers’ objectives.
This is why the firm strictly prefers to not grant any milestone awards.
In conclusion, we have shown that in the absence of monetary rewards, submitting
interim solutions and populating a publicly available leader board are not decisions that
a rational solver would make. It is thus an important alley for future empirical research
to investigate why, in practice, many solvers are nonetheless eager to share their solution
quality with competitors.
2.7 Partial Information Feedback
Until now we have assumed that if the firm provides feedback then this feedback is
perfect; in other words, the firm always reveals fully accurate information on the solvers’
performance. However, the firm may either prefer or (for practical reasons) be required
to provide only partial feedback. Two canonical cases are practically relevant. First,
the firm may provide information that is less detailed—for example, by publishing the
solvers’ rankings but no specific information about their performance. Second, the firm’s
performance feedback may be disturbed by some level of noise.
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2.7.1. Rank-Only Feedback
We first consider the case in which the firm reduces the granularity of feedback by pro-
viding only information on the solvers’ ranking in the contest. Before delving into the
details, it is important to recognize that such rank-only feedback cannot be conceptu-
alized as private information; revealing a rank is inherently public feedback. It is not
material for a solver which other solver holds which rank, but rather that one of the
other solvers holds each of the ranks above or below him.
As compared with a public-feedback policy, rank-only feedback may change solver
behavior in two ways. When first-round performances are extremely close, providing
rank-only feedback reduces competition because the “blurriness” of the rank informa-
tion leaves none of the solvers fully aware of how close the competition actually is.
When first-round performances instead vary widely, rank information results in solvers
underestimating their relative performance difference and so induces them to exert more
second-round effort than actually required by the situation. Our next proposition com-
pares the relative strength of these effects.
Proposition 2.8. The unique PBE under a rank-only feedback policy is identical to the
unique PBE under a no-feedback policy. In particular, er1 = e
no
1 and e
r
2 = e
no
2 .
Proposition 2.8 holds a surprise. In comparison with a no-feedback policy, providing
rank-only feedback has no effect on the equilibrium behavior of solvers; that is, solvers
completely ignore their respective rankings. This outcome is in stark contrast to the
fate of accurate performance feedback, which is always used by solvers to adjust their
second-round behavior. The implications for practice are striking. If a contest holder
wants its feedback to influence the second-round efforts of solvers, then this feedback
must include information about each solver’s actual performance; rank-only feedback
will not have the desired effect.
2.7.2. Feedback with Noise
Next we analyze the implications of noisy feedback, which are important for a firm that
cannot (or prefers not to) guarantee perfectly accurate feedback. Consider again the case
of Kaggle. Some contest holders provide interim performance feedback by using only a
sample of the full data set on which to test the solvers’ algorithms; this approach helps
prevent overfitting of the data during the contest. However, the final ranking is based
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not on that sample but rather on the full data set. So from the solvers’ perspective, the
interim performance feedback is not entirely accurate: it is disturbed by noise.
Two questions arise. First, does the introduction of noise change the balance be-
tween no feedback, public feedback, and private feedback? Second, how does noisy
feedback compare to entirely accurate feedback? Is it possible for the firm to benefit
from introducing noise into the feedback mechanism? Here we set out to start answer-
ing these questions.
Treating all the possible facets of noise is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead,
we investigate a simple example of noisy feedback that nonetheless captures the essence
of masking a solver’s true performance. More specifically, we assume that the firm gives
perfectly accurate feedback with publicly known probability q, and with probability 1−q
it transmits absolutely uninformative feedback (i.e., white noise).
Proposition 2.9. (i) Under a public-feedback policy, the firm’s expected profits Πpubavg
and Πpubbest are invariant with respect to q.
(ii) For any fixed q > 0, there exists a κ <∞ such that Πpribest > Πpubbest for all κ > κ.
Part (i) of this proposition establishes that, under a public-feedback policy, noise
does not affect the firm’s expected profits in terms of either average performance or best
performance. The implication is that, under a public-feedback policy, contest holders
cannot use noise strategically to improve contest outcomes. In contrast, noise does affect
the firm’s profits under a private-feedback policy; however, exact analytical expressions
are difficult to derive. Yet our numerical studies reveal that profits are monotonic in q:
for small κ, a no-feedback policy (i.e., q = 0) maximizes the firm’s profits; for large κ,
accurate private feedback (i.e., q = 1) is optimal. It seems once again that noise cannot
be deployed strategically to improve contest outcomes.
Combining Proposition 2.9(i) for public feedback and part (ii) for private feedback
indicates that our results about the preferability of different feedback types are robust
to the introduction of noise. That is, noise does not impact the ranking of the different
feedback policies and hence the selection of a feedback policy should not be affected by
the accuracy of the feedback.
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2.8 Robustness and Extensions
We explored the sensitivity of our conceptual results to key modeling choices. Our re-
sults are exceptionally robust to changes in those assumptions, as we summarize in this
section.
Solver asymmetry. Across solvers, the distribution of random shocks may be asym-
metric. Two possible sources of such asymmetry are differences in mean and differences
in variance; the former (resp., latter) signifies inherent differences in solvers’ capabilities
(resp., innovation processes). A closed-form analysis of an extended model establishes
that our results are robust to both sources of asymmetry; moreover, it seems that our
assumption of solver symmetry is actually conservative with respect to the true value of
private feedback.
Alternative feedback policy. Another form of partial information feedback is to in-
form solvers only of whether (or not) they have surpassed a certain performance thresh-
old. Our formal investigation of such a threshold feedback policy shows that it can never
improve on the performance of a fully informative policy—in accordance with our results
in Section 2.7.
Cost of effort. For some contests, solvers may be more concerned with their total
expended effort than with their respective individual efforts in each round. In such cases,
a more appropriate cost-of-effort function would be c(ei1 + ei2)
2. We can demonstrate
analytically that allowing for effort interaction effects between the two rounds does not
alter our results in any meaningful way.
Performance uncertainty. Depending on the contest’s particular context and the
innovation process of solvers, random shocks can follow a multitude of distribution func-
tions. After conducting a large number of numerical experiments with normal and beta
distributions, we can report that our results are robust.
2.9 Conclusions
Contests are a frequently used mechanism for providing incentives when companies and
government agencies source innovation. Prize competitions organized via the Internet (as
hosted by Kaggle) are contests, and so are sourcing efforts organized via the European
Union’s “competitive dialogue procedure” and many of the approaches taken by private
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companies to source custom-engineered innovations. Feedback has been extensively used
in practice to improve both the efficiency and the efficacy of contests. However, a
rigorous understanding of when and how to provide which kind of feedback—and of
when to refrain from giving feedback—is rather limited. The primary goal of this paper
is to begin building a more comprehensive understanding of feedback in contests.
Our main contribution consists of charting a practically relevant landscape—one
that determines how feedback can be used in contests—by addressing three questions
that together define a feedback policy’s information structure: Who receives the feedback
information? Who decides about which contestants receive feedback? What should be
the information content of the performance feedback that is given? Answering these
questions allows us to analyze many forms of feedback that actually are used in contests
and to prescribe beneficial policies for a wealth of settings. In doing so we build new
insights and challenge existing ones.
It is remarkable that—almost irrespective of whether feedback is voluntary and of
whether feedback includes all or only some of the available information—firms need only
focus on two straightforward factors when choosing whom to provide with any feedback:
the contest objective (average versus best performance) and the contest’s inherent per-
formance uncertainty. If the firm is concerned about the solvers’ average performance,
then either no feedback or public feedback is preferable to private feedback. The same
preference obtains if the firm is interested in the best performance, provided that per-
formance uncertainty is low. However, private feedback is the optimal choice if the firm
seeks the best possible performance and performance uncertainty is high. Hence, private
feedback is most suitable for innovation settings.
Our findings have immediate managerial implications. Contest holders that aim to
raise the overall effort level among all solvers should refrain from giving private feedback;
thus, if performance information is released then it should be made public. Incremental
innovation contests likewise do not benefit from private feedback; for such contests, the
relatively low performance uncertainty makes public feedback the preferred policy. In
contrast, contests looking for breakthrough innovation (e.g., completely new algorith-
mic solutions, novel engineering concepts, any problem that requires the exploration of
uncharted territories) should rely solely on private feedback.
As for who should decide on whether feedback is provided, one must bear in mind
that voluntary feedback can function only if the solvers have an incentive to seek it. Gen-
erally speaking, that incentive may be of two different forms: an informational advantage
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or a monetary reward. As regards informational advantages, solvers always (resp. never)
ask for feedback under a private-feedback (resp. public-feedback) policy. That is, the in-
formational advantage outweighs the informational cost with private but not with public
feedback. Monetary rewards intended to induce feedback-seeking behavior do work, but
they are never optimal from the firm’s perspective.
Our results on voluntary public feedback have consequences for practice. If the
contest holder anticipates benefits from having solvers share information about their
performance, then it should find ways to make such feedback mandatory and not leave
feedback up to the solver. Under private feedback, however, the opposite is true. Since
in this case the solvers will always ask for feedback, contest holders should offer feedback
only if they truly want to provide it. Intermediate prizes are never advisable—that is,
from an incentive perspective.
Finally, if the feedback recipients have been identified and if the choice of voluntary
or mandatory feedback has been made, then there remains the question of how gran-
ular the feedback should be. There is no evidence—in the cases examined here—that
reducing feedback granularity and/or accuracy benefits the contest holder. Even more
interestingly, we show that feedback lacking specific performance-related information
(e.g., rank-only feedback) will likely be disregarded by solvers and thus fail to achieve
its intended effect.
One aspect that must be considered when interpreting our results is that we did
not explicitly incorporate the cost of providing feedback. We made this choice for two
reasons. First, in nearly all practical cases the cost differences among no feedback,
public feedback, and private feedback are small compared with the benefits of providing
tailored incentives to solvers (in our Kaggle and EU examples, the cost of giving feedback
is negligible when compared with the potential benefits of an optimal feedback policy).
Second, including such costs would be trivial, both technically and conceptually, because
adding a cost term to the firm’s profits has no effect on the equilibrium analysis. Decision
makers can simply subtract the cost differences between feedback policies from their
respective benefit differences (as derived in this paper) to determine the overall trade-off.
Our model has limitations that should be mentioned. In order to maintain tractabil-
ity and develop a parsimonious model, we made some assumptions about the purpose of
contests; in particular, we focus on the incentive effects of feedback in contests. However,
feedback may be used also to guide solvers in terms of where to direct their search efforts.
Understanding this directional aspect of contest feedback requires an approach that dif-
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fers fundamentally from ours and is a promising avenue for future research. Another
limitation is our focus on a contest’s rational motivation effects, which are amenable
to game-theoretic analysis. Yet real-world contests may also effect their outcomes by
way of psychological inducements. Within the game-theoretically rational framework we
consider only two competing solvers; this assumption ensures tractability but also in-
troduces symmetries that may be absent in contests with three or more solvers. Hence,
there is no guarantee that our results hold for more than two players; thus our results
should be interpreted with some caution for large contests. Finally, we assume an addi-
tive performance relation between effort and uncertainty. This approach can be viewed
as a first-order Taylor approximation of a more general relationship, and adding higher-
order terms could capture additional effects—for example, an increase in uncertainty
with greater solution efforts.
Previous research on contests has not broadly explored the repercussions of many
practically relevant feedback policies. The aim and principal contribution of this paper
is to fill several critical gaps in the literature and to build a deeper understanding of
feedback in contests. It is only by considering the many variants and aspects of feedback
that managers can reasonably hope to make the contest mechanism—a method often
relied upon in practice for sourcing innovation—more efficient and effective.
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Chapter III
How to Procure Complex
Innovation
with Zhi Chen and Ju¨rgen Mihm1
3.1 Introduction
Access to innovative products is a key source of competitive advantage in many indus-
tries (Pisano 2015). Traditionally, firms guaranteed themselves such access by pursuing
internal research and development (R&D) projects and by making substantial invest-
ments into new product development. More recently, however, firms have extensively
tapped into an alternative source of innovation: their suppliers (Cabral et al. 2006). One
industry that stands out in demonstrating how effective such a use of suppliers as source
for innovation can be is the automotive industry. Consider—as a prime example—the
recent advances in the area of automotive lighting systems.
Since its inception in 1898, when the Electric Vehicle Company of Hartford in-
troduced the first electric headlamps for its Columbia Electric Car, electric lighting
systems have become the unquestioned standard for automotive lighting systems. Over
the course of the last century, the initial tungsten filament technology was replaced by
two major innovations—the introduction of Halogen lighting in 1962 and high-intensity
discharge lamps (also known as Xenon lamps) in 1991. These new technologies led to
great improvements in driver and traffic safety, but did not spur much further innova-
tion. It is only with the more recent introduction of LED headlamps in 2003 by Hella—a
leading automotive supplier—that automotive lighting systems have seen a drastic ac-
1The research presented in this chapter is based on a paper entitled “Sourcing Complex Innovation:
Integrated System or Individual Components?”, coauthored with Zhi Chen and Ju¨rgen Mihm.
33
III. How to Procure Complex Innovation
celeration in innovation, and most of these innovations were introduced not by the car
manufacturers themselves but by their suppliers.
But why are today’s automotive suppliers developing new technologies at an ever
more rapid pace? One major reason is a shift in the car manufacturers’ procurement
process for complex innovations such as an automotive lighting system. Instead of re-
lying on direct contracting with one of their suppliers, car manufacturers nowadays
frequently organize so-called procurement or innovation contests to simultaneously gain
access to the innovation capabilities of their full supplier base. In hosting such a pro-
curement contest, car manufacturers only announce the minimum specifications for the
innovation to be developed, but detail development rests in the responsibility of each
individual supplier participating in the contest. The promised award—typically a sup-
ply contract for the winning design—incentivizes the suppliers to engage in development
activities and makes them present their solutions to the car manufacturer. The car
manufacturer—after evaluating all submitted designs—can then ex post select the best
design alternative, and award the supply contract accordingly. The advantages of using
a procurement contest are evident: Not only is a procurement contest an informationally
very parsimonious purchasing mechanism, but it also induces high innovation efforts in
the car manufacturer’s supplier base and it allows for an ex post selection of the best
product alternative (Rogerson 1989). Yet to fully reap all these benefits it is imperative
for a car manufacturer to carefully design the setup of his procurement contests. This
is the key challenge that we study in this paper.
Most notably, procurement contests should be tailored towards the properties of
the desired product and the structure of the supplier base. With regard to the product
characteristics, a central feature of complex innovations is that they are made of multiple
components that only together form the full product (or in engineering terminology,
the integrated system). Consider again our example of an automotive lighting system.
Broadly speaking, such lighting systems consist of two components: a light module,
which is part of the car’s exterior design and is responsible for the light emission; and an
electronic control module, which steers the different functionalities of the light module.
In the face of such a complex—or multi-component—innovation, a central question for
any car manufacturer is whether to buy the full product from a single supplier, or whether
to source the different components from different suppliers. In the former case, the car
manufacturer hosts a system contest and requires suppliers to submit full products,
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whereas in the latter case, the car manufacturer hosts a separate component contest for
each individual component.
Answering the question of when to prefer which contest format (system vs. com-
ponent contest) is at the very heart of our research. We conjecture that many different
dimensions—both on the product as well as the supplier side—will have an impact on
a car manufacturer’s optimal choice. One of the key influence factors is certainly the
magnitude of innovation that is required to develop each of the components, and hence
the integrated system. Specifically, are both components rather incremental innovations
or is one of them—or even both—radically new? And what is the technological relation-
ship between the components? That is, are the components technological substitutes
or complements? Besides these product-level features, other important aspects relate
to the size of the supplier base, the degree of heterogeneity in the supplier base as well
as the level of performance correlation exhibited by each supplier. In other words, how
many suppliers can participate in the procurement contest, are there structural per-
formance differences among the suppliers, and is a supplier who is good at developing
one component (e.g., the light module) also likely to be good at developing the other
component (e.g., the control module), or not?
In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model that takes all these factors into
account, and we investigate how the individual factors impact the optimality of either
contest format (system or component contest). In doing so, we also shed light on the
optimal properties of a contest holder’s supplier base, and we study which kind of sup-
pliers the contest holder should invite to participate in the different contest formats.
Our detailed contributions are as follows.
First, we show that a firm should use a system contest if all product components
are merely incremental innovations and the firm’s supplier base is relatively small. In
all other cases—that is, if at least one component demands radical innovation or the
firm has access to a large supplier base—the firm should opt for hosting a separate
procurement contest for each individual component. For incremental innovation it is
the firm’s key ambition to provide significant incentives for development effort, and
since a system contest offers the highest stakes (i.e., the biggest supply contract) it
is the firm’s preferred option in less innovative environments. However, the benefits
of high effort incentives may be overshadowed if controlling and managing uncertainty
moves to the firm’s center of attention—a situation that arises naturally in the presence
of radical innovation or when the supplier base is large. As an interesting side result
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we find that these general guidelines are independent of the technological relationship
between components as well as the level of heterogeneity and performance correlation
in the supplier base.
Second, we finely delineate how the firm should organize its supplier base, and we
also identify which suppliers should be invited to participate in the different contest
formats. A couple of managerial rules emerge: First, the firm should work towards a
relatively homogeneous supplier base as any form of performance handicaps deters effort
incentives, both for relatively strong as well as relatively weak suppliers. Second, when
hosting component contests the firm benefits from inviting the same set of suppliers to
the individual contests, instead of inviting different sets of suppliers, and these bene-
fits are largest when components are technological complements. Third, in a system
contest, the firm’s optimal choice of suppliers depends on the innovativeness of the de-
sired product. For incremental innovations the firm should seek for suppliers that exhibit
only minor levels of performance correlation across components, whereas the firm should
strive for higher performance correlation when radical innovation is involved.
Finally, we also investigate how systematic differences in performance correlation
across the different contest formats affect our structural results. We find that all our
results are fully robust to such differences, with one notable exception. If the magnitude
of performance correlation in a system contest is substantially larger than in a component
contest, then a system contest is optimal even when the full product requires radical
innovation. The reason for this finding is that with large differences in performance
correlation between system and component contests, a system contest allows the firm to
more effectively exploit the large uncertainties associated with radical innovation, which
otherwise is the key strength of a component contest.
3.2 Related Literature
The design of effective procurement mechanisms has been a longstanding concern in
the academic literature (Vickrey 1961, Rob 1986, Laffont and Tirole 1993, Elmaghraby
2000, Beil 2010). It is beyond dispute among scholars and practitioners alike that any
successful procurement policy must be tailored to the properties of the desired product.
As outlined in Cabral et al. (2006), one product feature that is of paramount importance
when selecting the right procurement policy is the degree of innovativeness. In practice,
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products can be broadly divided into two categories: standard products that are well-
specified and exhibit only minor performance uncertainties; and innovative products
that have yet to be developed and whose final performance is thus merely a speculation.
Most of the existing procurement literature has concentrated on devising optimal
procurement mechanisms for standard products (see, e.g., Che 1993, Cachon and Zhang
2006, Chen 2007, Wan and Beil 2009, Hu et al. 2013, and references therein). Since
the specifications of these products—and thus their performance—are known before the
procurement process is initiated, buyers aim to find the supplier who can deliver the
product most efficiently, and extant research has investigated many such dimensions
of efficiency. More precisely, most of the early literature has primarily concentrated
on how to lower procurement costs (Rob 1986, Dasgupta and Spulber 1990); however,
subsequent work has accounted for such diverse factors as integrating product quality
(Che 1993, Beil and Wein 2003) and delivery lead-time (Cachon and Zhang 2006) into
the procurement process, reducing transportation costs (Chen et al. 2005, Kostamis
et al. 2009), engaging in supplier qualification (Wan and Beil 2009, Wan et al. 2012),
improving supplier reliability (Yang et al. 2009, Chaturvedi and Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz
2011, Yang et al. 2012), anticipating future changes in competitive structures (Li and
Debo 2009), building a stable supplier base in the long run (Chaturvedi et al. 2014), and
motivating suppliers to invest in cost-reduction efforts (Arozamena and Cantillon 2004,
Li 2013, Li and Wan 2016).
All these papers—albeit investigating very different dimensions of procurement
efficiency—agree in their proclamation of auctions as the preferred procurement mecha-
nism. In fact, since its inception by Vickrey (1961) auction theory has become the focal
mechanism in procurement theory, and over the course of time, classical auction models
have been enriched to include the peculiarities of many different operational settings
(see, e.g., Beil and Wein 2003, Kostamis et al. 2009, Wan and Beil 2009). However,
when procuring an innovative product neither the buyer nor the suppliers can envision
the final product’s true performance at the outset of the procurement process. As a
result it is impossible for a supplier to credibly quote his product’s future performance,
let alone that the buyer can identify ex ante (i.e., before product development) which
supplier will deliver the best product. As a result the use of traditional auction formats
is prohibitive for innovative goods, and hence buyers have to resort to alternative pro-
curement mechanisms. Both in theory and practice it is the contest mechanism that
has proven most effective for sourcing innovative products (Lichtenberg 1988, Rogerson
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1989, Elmaghraby 2000, Scotchmer 2004, Cabral et al. 2006). The key advantage of
hosting a procurement contest is its ease of practical implementation. In a procurement
(or innovation) contest, the buyer only sets a prize and a time deadline at the outset
of the contest, and after the deadline awards the prize to the contestant that submitted
the best product (Taylor 1995). In particular, there is no need that the performance of
the submitted products be verifiable, since the buyer has no incentives to manipulate
the outcome of the contest given that he has to pay the award to one of the contestants.
As a result, contests are not only easily implementable, they are also informatively
parsimonious (Cabral et al. 2006).
Inspired by these benefits of contests, a wealth of research has evolved around the
question of how to effectively design and manage innovation contests. Building on the
pioneering work of Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983) and Nalebuff
and Stiglitz (1983), the contest literature provides rich insights into such fundamental
contest design issues as the design of optimal award schemes (Che and Gale 2003, Ales
et al. 2017), the restriction of access to the contest (Taylor 1995, Moldovanu and Sela
2001, Terwiesch and Xu 2008), or how to manage the contest as it unfolds (Aoyagi 2010,
Mihm and Schlapp 2017). Taken together, the above mentioned papers have led to a
coherent theory of how to source a single innovative product via contests. In this paper,
however, we are interested in how a buyer should design a procurement contest when
simultaneously sourcing multiple heterogeneous, but dependent products. To the best
of our knowledge, this question has not been addressed in prior work.2
In particular, we make the following contributions to the theory of procurement and
contests. First, we demonstrate how different formats of procurement contests can be
used to source complex innovative products that consist of multiple components, and we
show how the choice of contest format is governed by the level of innovation required and
the size of the supplier base. Also, by considering the technological interactions between
the individual components we are able to answer the above questions for a large variety
of different products commonly found in practice.
2It is worth mentioning that the literature on multi-object auctions is concerned with a similar question,
but only for standard products (see, e.g., Armstrong 2000, Palfrey 1983, Elmaghraby and Keskinocak
2004, Hausch 1986, Avery and Hendershott 2000). As an immediate implication, the tradeoffs
governing the buyer’s choice of procurement format are substantially different. Most notably, for
innovative products the buyer seeks to balance development effort incentives with performance
uncertainty considerations—two aspects that are absent in procurement auctions for standard goods.
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As our second key contribution we shed light on the ideal characteristics of a buyer’s
supplier base when hosting procurement contests. Besides the mere size of the supplier
base, we also consider more subtle factors such as performance correlation across different
component development projects and the heterogeneity of the supplier base, and we
analyze how the optimal supplier base depends on the characteristics of the complex
innovation to be procured.
3.3 The Model
Consider a firm (from hereon “the buyer”) organizing a procurement contest among
n ≥ 2 suppliers with the goal of buying an innovative product that consists of two
components j ∈ {1, 2}. The buyer can choose between two different contest formats to
source the product: a system contest, and a component contest. In a system contest
the buyer asks the suppliers to submit solutions for the full product (i.e., the integrated
system) and promises an award A > 0 to the supplier that delivers the product with
the best performance. On the contrary, in a component contest, the buyer holds a
separate contest for each of the two components, and offers an award A1 = pA (resp.
A2 = (1− p)A) to the supplier that delivers the best performing component j = 1 (resp.
j = 2), with p ∈ [0, 1].
The goal of the buyer is to maximize the performance S of the product to be pro-
cured. Since the full product consists of two components, its performance depends on
two key attributes: (i) the individual performance of each component, and (ii) the tech-
nological relationship t : R2 → R between the two components. Specifically, in line with
extant research, we consider that—depending on the practical context—components can
be either technological substitutes or complements (see, e.g., Bhaskaran and Krishnan
2009, Roels 2014, Gurvich and Van Mieghem 2015, and references therein). In the for-
mer case the buyer can trade off the two components’ individual performances, and the
performance of the integrated system is simply the sum of the individual components’
performances; i.e., t(x, y) = x+ y. To the contrary, in the latter case both components
are essential for the performance of the integrated system, and total performance is thus
the minimum of the two components’ performances; i.e., t(x, y) = min{x, y}.
To answer our research questions, it is imperative to express the performance of
the full product S as a function of the chosen contest format and the technological
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Table 3.1.: Performance of the Integrated System.
System contest Component contest
Tech. substitutes Ssyssub = maxi{vi1 + vi2} Scposub = maxi{vi1}+ maxi{vi2}
Tech. complements Ssyscml = maxi{min{vi1, vi2}} Scpocml = min{maxi{vi1},maxi{vi2}}
relationship between the two individual components. We achieve this by introducing
the variable vij which denotes the performance of component j ∈ {1, 2} as developed by
supplier i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In a system contest, each supplier i submits an integrated system
with performance Si = t(vi1, vi2), and the buyer eventually procures the product with
the highest performance; that is, Ssys = maxi{Si}. In a component contest, however, the
buyer procures the two best components vˆ1 = maxi{vi1} and vˆ2 = maxi{vi2} individually,
and the performance of the full product is then Scpo = t(vˆ1, vˆ2). Table 3.1 summarizes
the performance of the integrated system as a function of the contest format and the
technological relationship between the components. We now elaborate in more detail on
our model setup.
3.3.1. Sequence of Events
The procurement process begins when the buyer publicly announces the contest format
(i.e., system or component contest), the total award A, and in the case of a component
contest the prize split p. To focus on the buyer’s choice of contest format (and to simplify
the mathematical exposition), we treat the total award A as a parameter. As such, the
buyer’s primary decisions are which contest format to choose, and, if applicable, how to
divide the total award between the two different component contests (i.e., the prize split
p).
After the buyer’s public contest announcement, each supplier i ∈ {1, . . . , n} decides
whether to participate in any of the offered contests. When participating, supplier i
invests an unobservable solution effort eij ≥ 0 to develop component j ∈ {1, 2} at pri-
vate costs c(eij), where c is a twice continuously differentiable, increasing, and strictly
convex function with c(0) = 0 and c′(0) = 0. The performance of component j as de-
veloped by supplier i is given by vij = r(eij) + ζij, where r(·) captures the deterministic
effort-performance relationship and ζij represents a stochastic performance component.
We assume that r is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and concave
function with r(0) = 0 and limx→∞ c′(x)/r′(x) =∞. The realization of ζij is unobserv-
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Figure 3.1.: Sequence of Events.
able to all suppliers and the buyer. For each supplier i, ζi = (ζi1, ζi2) follows a bivariate
Normal distribution with marginal distributions ζi1 ∼ N(0, σ2) and ζi2 ∼ N(0, k2σ2)
and correlation ρ ≥ 0, where σ > 0 and k ≥ 1. We assume that ζi is independent across
suppliers.
Finally, after receiving the suppliers’ submissions, the buyer evaluates their perfor-
mances and awards the pre-announced prize to the supplier with the best performance.
In particular, in a system contest, supplier i wins prize A if t(vi1, vi2) > t(vl1, vl2) for all
l 6= i. Analogously, in component contest j, supplier i wins prize Aj if vij > vlj for all
l 6= i. In all cases, ties can be broken by invoking an arbitrary rule. All primitives of
the model are common knowledge and Figure 3.1 summarizes the sequence of events.
3.3.2. Model Implications
The buyer’s goal is to maximize the expected performance of the best integrated system
that can be built based on the suppliers’ submissions; i.e., Π = E[S], where S is as
displayed in Table 3.1. In contrast to the buyer, the suppliers are not concerned with
the absolute performance of their submissions, but instead they are only interested
in their relative performance as compared to their competitors. More precisely, each
supplier’s primary interest is to win any of the contests that he participates in. In
a system contest, supplier i gains a utility of Ui = A − c(ei1) − c(ei2) if he wins the
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contest, and Ui = −c(ei1) − c(ei2) if he loses the contest. Similarly, in a component
contest, supplier i’s utility from winning component contest j is Uij = Aj − c(eij), and
losing leads to a utility of Uij = −c(eij). We normalize the utility of each supplier’s
outside option to zero, which implies that all suppliers find it worthwhile to participate
in any of the offered contests. Additionally, in Section 3.6 we extend our base model
to account for heterogeneities in the suppliers’ award valuations. Specifically, we later
consider scenarios in which each supplier i receives a different utility αiA, αi ∈ (0, 1],
from winning an award of size A.
We are interested in symmetric pure-strategy perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the
different contest formats. For such equilibria to exist, we need to invoke two additional
technical assumptions.
Assumption 3.1. For components that are technological substitutes (resp. comple-
ments), we assume that σ > σsub (resp. σ > σcml), where σsub (resp. σcml) is the
smallest σ such that for all σ > σsub (resp. σ > σcml) supplier i’s expected utility func-
tion has a unique maximum for any contest format given that the other supplier’s play
e−i,j = xjI for all j ∈ {1, 2}, where xj ≥ 0 and I is a vector of ones.
In a nutshell, Assumption 3.1 requires that the performance uncertainty involved
in any of the contest formats must be sufficiently large—a condition that is typically
true for innovative products. In addition, it is a common assumption used throughout
the entire contest literature (see, e.g., Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983, Aoyagi 2010, Ales
et al. 2017, Mihm and Schlapp 2017). To better understand the intuition behind this
assumption suppose to the contrary that performance uncertainty would be negligible.
Then any infinitesimally small additional amount of effort by a supplier would lead to
almost sure winning of the contest, and as a result, no pure-strategy equilibrium could
exist. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that the thresholds σsub and σcml always
exist because each supplier’s utility function becomes strictly concave for large enough
σ.3
Assumption 3.2. 3r′′(x)/r′(x) < (c′′′(x)r′(x)−c′(x)r′′′(x))/(c′′(x)r′(x)−c′(x)r′′(x)) for
all x ≥ 0.
3In fact, when deriving more explicit sufficient conditions for the existence of pure-strategy equilibria,
papers in the contest literature typically focus on verifying concavity of a supplier’s utility function
(Aoyagi 2010, Ales et al. 2017).
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Although Assumption 3.2 looks unwieldy, it has an important managerial interpre-
tation. Specifically, it ensures that the buyer is actually interested in procuring both
components. Without this condition in place, the buyer could find it optimal to buy only
one component, and—at the end of the procurement process—be left with an incomplete
product. We discard such a situation from further consideration as it does not mirror the
practical situations that we are interested in. To gain further intuition for Assumption
3.2 note that a sufficient condition for it to hold is c′′′(x)/c′(x) ≥ r′′′(x)/r′(x) for all
x ≥ 0. That is, each supplier’s marginal cost of effort—compared to the marginal return
on effort—must increase sufficiently quickly. In other words, Assumption 3.2 precludes
situations in which a supplier’s cost-return-ratio improves overly strong as he invests
more effort. Furthermore, besides its managerial relevance, Assumption 3.2 is also tech-
nically only mildly restrictive as many standard functional relationships for r and c that
are used in the contest literature satisfy this condition (such as, e.g., polynomial or
logarithmic r, and polynomial or exponential c).
3.4 The Optimal Contest Format
In this section we characterize the buyer’s optimal choice of contest format, assuming
that each supplier’s performance shocks ζi1 and ζi2 are independent across components
(i.e., ρ = 0). The study of correlated performance shocks is deferred to Section 3.5.
Focussing, for now, on independent performance shocks allows us to clearly elicit how
the two main contextual parameters of our model setup affect the buyer’s choice of con-
test format: (i) the magnitude of innovation involved in developing each component as
measured by σ; and (ii) the relative degree of innovativeness between the two compo-
nents as measured by k. We begin with establishing the optimal contest format for a
product whose components are technological substitutes (Section 3.4.1), and then move
on to characterize the optimal contest format for a product with complementary com-
ponents (Section 3.4.2). Throughout, to facilitate readability and to concentrate on the
managerial implications of our analysis, we do not present any mathematical derivations
in the main body of the manuscript. The technically interested reader is referred to
Appendices B.2 and B.3, where we provide closed form derivations of all equilibrium
results.
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3.4.1. Technological Substitutes
To answer the question of which contest format is superior for the buyer, it is imperative
to understand the main benefits of the different contest formats and how these benefits
are affected by the absolute magnitude of innovation required (i.e., σ) and the relative
degree of innovativeness between components (i.e., k). Recall that the performance of
component j as developed by supplier i, vij, depends on both the supplier’s development
effort eij as well as a technological shock ζij. The optimal contest format is thus the
one that best allows the buyer to incentivize significant development efforts while at
the same time offering him a chance to hedge against harmful technological shocks. A
system contest is particularly strong in the former attribute as the monetary stakes in
this contest format are highest and hence effort incentives are largest. In contrast, a
component contest allows the buyer to choose (and combine) ex post the two best com-
ponents and thus provides an excellent hedge against high technological uncertainties as
found in many innovation projects. How these different benefits influence the suppliers’
development efforts in the different contest formats—and how these efforts change in σ
and k—is the core of Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose components are technological substitutes.
(i) For k = 1, the unique symmetric perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium for both
system and component contest satisfies the following properties: (a) The buyer’s optimal
award split in a component contest is p∗ = 1/2; (b) esys1 = e
sys
2 > e
cpo
1 = e
cpo
2 > 0.
(ii) For k → ∞, the unique symmetric perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium for both
system and component contest satisfies the following properties: (a) The buyer’s optimal
award split in a component contest is p∗ = 1; (b) esys1 = e
sys
2 = 0 and e
cpo
1 > e
cpo
2 = 0.
Lemma 3.1(i) is concerned with situations in which both components require an
equaling level of innovation (i.e., k = 1); that is both components bear the same level
of risk during component development. In these cases, both components have ex ante
an equally strong effect on the performance of the integrated system, and this is why
both the buyer (in terms of the award split) as well as the suppliers (in terms of effort)
spread their bets equally across the two components.
To understand the intuition behind this result in more detail, consider initially
the buyer’s and the suppliers’ decisions in a component contest. The buyer seeks to
maximize the performance of the submitted components, and this is akin to maximizing
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the suppliers’ development efforts across the two component contests. Since each supplier
invests the more effort in a contest the higher the promised award is, the buyer has
to carefully balance the distribution of awards between the two different component
contests. But why is it now optimal to split the total award equally (i.e., p∗ = 1/2)?
Recall that each supplier’s marginal return on effort is decreasing, whereas his marginal
costs are increasing. It is thus most efficient for the buyer if the suppliers invest equal
efforts in each of the two component contests. And the only way for the buyer to induce
such a balanced distribution of efforts is to offer the same award in each contest. As a
result, equilibrium efforts are also identical across component contests: ecpo1 = e
cpo
2 .
A similar reasoning applies to system contests as well. Yet this time it is not the
buyer that is most interested in an efficient distribution of efforts across components
(as the buyer only cares about the integrated system’s final performance), but it is the
suppliers that try to maximize the efficiency of their effort provision. As before, for each
supplier the return on effort is diminishing whereas marginal costs are increasing, and
thus each supplier splits his efforts evenly between components: esys1 = e
sys
2 .
Finally, the result in Lemma 3.1(i) that has the strongest implications on the buyer’s
choice of contest format is the relation between equilibrium efforts in a system as com-
pared to a component contest: When components require a similar magnitude of in-
novation (i.e., k = 1), then suppliers unequivocally invest higher efforts in a system
contest. This monotonicity is noteworthy as a change from system to component con-
test introduces two diametrically opposite effects. On the one hand, the award that the
suppliers compete for is twice as high in a system contest as in each of the individual
component contests (A vs. A/2), and higher financial stakes clearly promote more effort
provision. On the other hand, each supplier encounters more uncertainty in a system
contest than in a component contest, and higher levels of risk deter the suppliers’ to
invest in development effort. Yet, Lemma 3.1(i) reveals that the first effect, which favors
an increase in effort, always dominates the latter effect for components with a similar
degree of innovativeness. Interestingly, Lemma 3.1(ii) reverses this finding when one
component requires a significantly higher level of innovation than the other component
(i.e., k →∞).
Specifically, for components with a sizeable difference in innovativeness the main
benefit of a system contest—inducing higher development efforts—is entirely absent.
This is happening because with a large k, the performance of the integrated system
is primarily determined by the performance of the more innovative (and thus riskier)
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component, and for such a component it is the technological uncertainty that ultimately
determines performance. In other words, development efforts play a subordinate role
in determining the final performance of the integrated system and therefore suppliers
refrain from incurring overly high effort costs.
To the contrary, in a component contest effort still matters. In particular, for
the less innovative component the suppliers’—and also the buyer’s—return on effort is
substantially larger than for the more innovative component, and therefore suppliers
fully dedicate their development efforts to the less innovative component. This explains
why for k → ∞, equilibrium development efforts are higher in a component than a
system contest. We are now well equipped to discuss the buyer’s optimal contest format
choice.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose components are technological substitutes. Then, the following
profit relations hold in equilibrium:
(i) There exists a threshold σsub > 0 such that if σ ∈ (σsub, σsub), there exists a
threshold ksub > 1 such that Π
sys
sub > Π
cpo
sub if k ∈ [1, ksub). Moreover, σsub → 0 as n→∞.
(ii) For any fixed σ > σsub there exists a threshold ksub < ∞ such that Πcposub > Πsyssub
if k ∈ (ksub,∞].
(iii) For any fixed k ≥ 1 there exists a threshold σsub <∞ such that Πcposub > Πsyssub if
σ ∈ (σsub,∞].
Proposition 3.1 establishes—and the left panel of Figure 3.2 visualizes—the buyer’s
optimal contest format choice for a product with substitute components, highlighting
the role that the magnitude of innovation involved plays when choosing the optimal
contest format. A couple of managerial insights abound.
First and foremost, Proposition 3.1 shows that the buyer should use a system contest
to procure the integrated system only if two conditions are simultaneously satisfied: (1)
Both components should be incremental innovations only (i.e., σ < σsub and k < ksub),
and (2) the supplier base should be relatively small (i.e., small n). If either of these
two conditions is violated—that is, if at least one component requires radical innovation
(i.e., high σ or high k) or the buyer’s supplier base is large—the buyer should opt for
a component contest and procure the components individually. The intuition for this
result is instructive. For incrementally innovative components and in the presence of a
small supplier base, it is a supplier’s development efforts that have the biggest impact
on the final product’s performance. As such, the buyer chooses the contest format
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that offers the highest effort incentives, which is a system contest. However, Lemma
3.1 has shown that these effort incentives deteriorate quickly when at least one of the
components requires more radical innovation. Under radical innovation—that is, when
the effort performance link becomes highly tenuous—the possibility to ex post combine
the best components—the key feature offered by a component contest—becomes more
and more valuable, and therefore the buyer implements a component contest in these
cases.
Second, Proposition 3.1 also reveals how the size of the supplier base impacts the
buyer’s contest format choice. Two forces are at work here. From a supplier’s perspec-
tive, the presence of a larger number of competitors diminishes each supplier’s chances
of winning the contest, thereby inducing each supplier to invest less effort into compo-
nent development. From the buyer’s perspective, the probability that a single supplier
develops the best two components drastically shrinks as n increases, and simultaneously,
chances rise that for each of the components one of the suppliers will develop an excep-
tionally good component. Taken together, these implications of a larger supplier base
lead the buyer to implement a component contest when n is sufficiently large, irrespec-
tive of the level of innovation involved in component development. As a side note, this
finding also implies that the buyer should not always choose the contest format that
promises the highest supplier efforts.
From a practical perspective, Proposition 3.1 gives clear advice. When the buyer
has access to a large supplier base, which is oftentimes the case in crowdsourcing en-
vironments, then a separate contest should be dedicated to each required component.
However, for very complex technological products like automotive lighting systems, buy-
ers can typically tap into only a handful of suppliers, and in these situations, it is the
level of innovation that ultimately determines whether a system or component contest
should be used.
3.4.2. Technological Complements
In the previous section, we have established which contest format is optimal for a buyer
wishing to procure a product whose components are technological substitutes. At this
point, it is then still an open question whether the particular form of the technological
relationship between the individual components affects our results—and thus our man-
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Figure 3.2.: The Optimal Contest Format.
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Notes: The buyer’s optimal choice of contest format for technological substitutes (left panel)
and technological complements (right panel). The buyer prefers a component contest in the
white area (region C), and a system contest in the light gray area (region S). No pure strategy
equilibrium exists in the dark gray area (region N). The parameters are: r(x) = x, c(x) = x2,
n = 2, A = 1.
agerial recommendations—or not. Answering this question is the primary purpose of
this section.
As a starting point for our discussion, suppose that the buyer hosts a component
contest—i.e., a separate contest for each component—and consider a supplier participat-
ing in at least one of these contests. In each contest, regardless of whether the supplier
participates in both or only one contest, the supplier entirely focuses on developing the
best component for this contest, without worrying about how this component may con-
tribute to the overall performance of the integrated system. Put differently, the use of a
component contest induces the suppliers to consider each component in isolation, and as
a result, it is irrelevant for their effort choices whether the components are technological
substitutes or complements. Clearly, this is not true for a system contest. The following
Lemma compares the suppliers’ equilibrium efforts between a system and a component
contest for different levels of absolute and relative innovation.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose components are technological complements.
(i) For k = 1, there exists a symmetric perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium for both
system and component contest that satisfies the following properties: (a) The buyer’s
optimal award split in a component contest is p∗ = 1/2; (b) esys1 = e
sys
2 > e
cpo
1 = e
cpo
2 > 0.
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(ii) For k → ∞, the unique symmetric perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium for both
system and component contest satisfies the following properties: (a) The buyer’s optimal
award split in a component contest is p∗ = 1; (b) ecpo1 > e
sys
1 > e
cpo
2 = e
sys
2 = 0.
Lemma 3.2 reveals that many of our observations for substitute components immedi-
ately transfer to the case of technological complements. To be concrete, for components
that demand an equaling level of innovation (i.e., k = 1) it remains true that the buyer
and the suppliers split their investments equally across both components, and that the
suppliers always invest more development effort in a system contest. At the same time,
however, Lemma 3.2(ii) indicates that when one of the components requires a signifi-
cantly larger amount of innovation than the other component, then the technological
relationship between components has an impact on supplier efforts. More specifically,
even when the relative degree of innovation becomes very large (i.e., k → ∞), each
supplier continues to invest effort in the less innovative component (i.e., component 1)
during a system contest—a finding that is at odds with our findings for substitutable
components (cf. Lemma 3.1(ii)). Why is this happening? Recall that for a product with
technologically complementary components the performance of the integrated system
is the minimum of the two components’ individual performances. In other words, the
integrated system is only as good as its weakest component. Given that k is large, com-
ponent 2 is associated with a high technological uncertainty, thus making it very likely
that the development of this component results in an extreme success or a severe failure.
In the latter case effort expended into the development of component 1 is futile, but in
the former case the performance of component 1 is the limiting factor for the integrated
system’s performance. Consequently, each supplier sustains an effort investment into
component 1 in order to improve the performance of the component that is likely to be
the weakest link and to increase his chances of winning the contest.
Despite this difference between Lemmas 3.1(ii) and 3.2(ii), a key result from Section
3.4.1 remains valid irrespective of whether components are technological substitutes or
complements: when the relative degree of innovation between components is sizeable,
then the overall effort that a supplier invests into the development of both components
is maximized under a component contest. Based on this observation, it is no longer
surprising that structurally our results regarding the buyer’s optimal contest format
choice carry over from the case of technological substitutes to the case of technological
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complements. Proposition 3.2 and the right panel of Figure 3.2 make this argument
explicit.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose components are technological complements. Then, the fol-
lowing profit relations hold in equilibrium:
(i) There exists a threshold σcml > 0 such that if σ ∈ (σcml, σcml), there exists a
threshold kcml > 1 such that Π
sys
cml > Π
cpo
cml if k ∈ [1, kcml). Moreover, σcml → 0 as
n→∞.
(ii) For any fixed σ > σcml there exists a threshold kcml <∞ such that Πcpocml > Πsyscml
if k ∈ (kcml,∞].
(iii) For any fixed k ≥ 1 there exists a threshold σcml <∞ such that Πcpocml > Πsyscml if
σ ∈ (σcml,∞].
As in the case of technological substitutes, the buyer uses a system contest when
both components require only incremental innovation and the available supplier base
is limited in size. In contrast, for products that require more radical innovation or in
situations with many potential suppliers the buyer seeks to implement a component
contest. In the latter situation, the buyer sacrifices the suppliers’ solution efforts in
favor of having the option to ex post select the best components out of a large set of
alternatives. This finding is reminiscent of traditional parallel path results as described
in, e.g., Dahan and Mendelson (2001) and Boudreau et al. (2011), but transfers them to
contests involving multiple interacting products.
From a managerial perspective, the most important finding of Proposition 3.2 is
that the buyer’s optimal choice of contest format does not depend on the technological
relationship between components. Specifically, independent of whether an integrated
system consists of technological substitutes or complements, the answer to the question
of which contest format to select depends solely on the components’ absolute and relative
level of innovation and the size of the available supplier base.
3.5 Performance Correlation
To clearly elicit the key tradeoffs immanent to a buyer’s contest format choice, we have
so far ignored the effects of performance correlation across components on both, the
suppliers’ solution efforts and the buyer’s choice of contest format. However, given that
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performance correlation between different components developed by the same supplier
is an integral aspect of many product development initiatives in reality, we now set out
to study the implications of performance correlation as represented by the parameter ρ.
For a supplier, performance correlation across development projects for different
components may arise naturally for manifold reasons. For instance, both development
projects might be overseen by the same project manager who imposes his “beauty ideals”
on both components; or the supplier might simply use similar technological approaches
to tackle the different development projects. And whereas each supplier can proactively
influence his own level of performance correlation, the buyer has no lever to directly
control the amount of correlation exhibited by each individual supplier. In other words,
from the buyer’s perspective, performance correlation is a given trait inherent to each
supplier’s development processes. Yet this does not imply that the buyer cannot in-
fluence the amount of performance correlation present in his procurement contest. To
the contrary, he can do so by, e.g, selecting which suppliers are invited to participate in
which contest. For instance, in a component contest, the buyer could decide to allow
each individual supplier to participate in only exactly one component contest, thereby
effectively breaking correlation between the two component contests. Alternatively, he
could oblige each supplier to participate in both component contests, thus introducing
a higher level of performance correlation across the two contests. Similarly, in a sys-
tem contest, the buyer could choose to invite only suppliers with a very focussed or a
more diverse technology base, thereby directly influencing the latent level of performance
correlation in his procurement mechanism.
Many options to influence the level of performance correlation in the procurement
contest abound, but just what amount of performance correlation would be optimal for
the buyer? And how is the buyer’s choice of contest format affected when system and
component contests exhibit different levels of performance correlation? Answering these
questions is the purpose of this section.
3.5.1. Performance Correlation in Component Contest
When hosting a component contest, does the buyer prefer more or less performance
correlation between the two different components? The following Proposition highlights
that the answer to this question critically depends on the technological relationship
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between the components; that is, whether components are technological substitutes or
complements.
Proposition 3.3. In equilibrium, the buyer’s expected profit from hosting a component
contest satisfies the following sensitivities:
(i) Suppose components are technological substitutes. Then, Πcposub is invariant with
respect to ρ.
(ii) Suppose components are technological complements. Then, Πcpocml increases in ρ.
The first noteworthy result of Proposition 3.3 is that in a component contest in-
volving an integrated system with substitutable components performance correlation has
no effect on the buyer’s profits. To see why, recall that in a component contest, each
supplier considers each of the two contests in isolation, and therefore his development
efforts are not affected by performance correlation. Also, the substitutable nature of
the components precludes the buyer from exploiting the benefits of correlation on the
overall level of technological uncertainty. Hence, since neither the suppliers’ efforts nor
the overall level of technological uncertainty are affected by performance correlation in
the case of technological substitutes, the buyer’s profits are invariant in ρ. This is not
true for technological complements (Proposition 3.3(ii)). As for technological substi-
tutes supplier development efforts remain unaffected by performance correlation, but
this time the buyer can exploit the effect of correlation on the overall level of technologi-
cal uncertainty in the procurement mechanism. Specifically, the higher the performance
correlation between the individual components, the more similar are their performances.
And since the integrated system is only as good as its weakest component, the buyer
benefits from higher levels of performance correlation.
Proposition 3.3 also has immediate implications for practice. A buyer always
(weakly) benefits from performance correlation in a component contest—and this find-
ing is independent of whether components are incremental or radical innovations, the
technological relationship between components, and the size of the supplier base. But
most importantly, a buyer can take simple, yet effective measures to drive up perfor-
mance correlation in his procurement contest. For instance, the buyer should always
oblige suppliers to participate in both contests, instead of limiting access to only one
contest. Similarly, the buyer should preferably invite only such suppliers that are known
to develop components with well-balanced performances, and forgo inviting suppliers
that are overly specialized on only one component.
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3.5.2. Performance Correlation in System Contest
In the preceding section, we have established that for a component contest the effect
of performance correlation on the buyer’s profits crucially depends on the technologi-
cal relationship between components. Rather surprisingly, it is not the technological
relationship that determines the sensitivity of the buyer’s profits in a system contest;
instead it is the magnitude of innovation required to develop the components as well as
the size of the supplier base that plays a vital role.
Proposition 3.4. (i) Suppose components are technological substitutes. Then, Πsyssub
increases in ρ if and only if nσ2(1 + k2 + 2kρ) ≥ 2Aη′(Aµ(n)/(nσ√1 + k2 + 2kρ)).
(ii) Suppose components are technological complements. Then, Πsyscml decreases in ρ
if k and σ are sufficiently small, and increases if k or σ are sufficiently large.
The main finding of Proposition 3.4 is as follows. For products that are made of
two incrementally innovative components (i.e., low σ and k) and for which the supplier
base is narrow (i.e., small n) the buyer prefers a low degree of performance correlation,
whereas in any other situation—that is, if at least one component is a radical innovation
or the supplier base is large—the buyer wishes to have substantial levels of performance
correlation in his procurement contest. To better understand this finding, recapitulate
that from the buyer’s perspective, the success of the procurement contest hinges on
two factors: the suppliers’ development efforts and the performance uncertainty. More
specifically, in contests involving low levels of innovation and a small supplier base it
is particularly the supplier effort that drives the performance of the final product. In
contrast, in contests involving radical innovation or a large supplier base the final prod-
uct performance is predominantly determined by the inherent technological uncertainty.
Clearly, in the former case the buyer prefers conditions that lead suppliers to engage
in high development efforts, whereas in the latter case the buyer prefers high levels of
uncertainty—and the higher the performance correlation is, the higher is the overall
technological uncertainty and the lower are the suppliers’ effort incentives.
Proposition 3.4 provides clear advice for managers overseeing the procurement of a
complex innovation that is sourced through a system contest. Whether performance cor-
relation is beneficial for the procurement mechanism, or not, depends on the magnitude
of innovation required and the size of the supplier base, but not on the technological
relationship between components. And the buyer can steer the degree of performance
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correlation in his procurement contest by inviting only those suppliers that offer the right
level of performance correlation; that is, suppliers that employ the right technologies and
that have an appropriate organizational structure.
3.5.3. Heterogeneity in Performance Correlation
We conclude our study of performance correlation by investigating how structural dif-
ferences in correlation between the different contest formats may influence the buyer’s
optimal contest format choice. To be more concrete, we would expect that in a sys-
tem contest—where each supplier develops the full product instead of only an isolated
component—performance correlation is at least as high as in a component contest (for
a given set of suppliers). To include this possibility into our model setup, we let ρsys
and ρcpo be the performance correlation in a system and component contest, respec-
tively, and we now examine how the buyer’s choice of contest format changes with
∆ρ = ρsys − ρcpo ≥ 0.
Proposition 3.5. (i) Suppose components are technological substitutes. Then the same
preference ordering between contest formats as given in Proposition 3.1 applies for any
∆ρ ≥ 0.
(ii) Suppose components are technological complements. Then: (a) For small k and
small σ, Πsyscml > Π
cpo
cml for any ∆ρ ≥ 0. (b) There exists a threshold σρ > 0 such that for
all σ ∈ (σρ,∞] there exists thresholds ∆ρ and ∆ρ, with 0 < ∆ρ < ∆ρ < 1, such that
Πcpocml > Π
sys
cml for any ∆ρ < ∆ρ and Π
sys
cml > Π
cpo
cml for any ∆ρ > ∆ρ.
The results presented in Proposition 3.5 emphasize that our initial results regard-
ing the buyer’s optimal contest format choice—as presented in Propositions 3.1 and
3.2—remain valid even when the different contest formats exhibit varying levels of per-
formance correlation. In particular, whereas a system contest is the buyer’s optimal
choice whenever both components are incremental innovations, the component contest
becomes the buyer’s preferred contest format for more innovative components. How-
ever, part (b) of Proposition 3.5(ii) shows that there is one notable exception to this
general rule: When the heterogeneity in performance correlation between system and
component contest becomes sizeable (i.e., ∆ρ > ∆ρ), then the buyer prefers a system
contest even when both components are radical innovations (i.e., large σ). But why is
this happening? Recall that for radical innovations, supplier efforts have only a minor
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influence on product performance; instead it is the technological uncertainty that pre-
dominately determines the performance of the integrated system. And with increasing
∆ρ, relative more correlation—and thus also more uncertainty—is introduced into the
system contest, whereas the component contest exhibits relatively less correlation—and
thus less uncertainty. Eventually, there exists a threshold ∆ρ beyond which the system
contest format displays a higher degree of technological uncertainty than a component
contest, and this is why the system contest becomes the optimal choice for the buyer in
the face of radically innovative components.
3.6 A Heterogeneous Supplier Base
Until now we have assumed a homogeneous supplier base in the sense that each supplier
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is endowed with an identical effort-performance tradeoff (i.e., identical r
and c across suppliers) and that all suppliers equally value the award A promised by the
buyer. Clearly, such a symmetry assumption is a simplification of reality, and to study
the impact of a heterogeneous supplier base on the buyer’s contest format choice, we
now relax the latter assumption of equal award valuations. In reality, each supplier’s
perceived value of the award A depends on the exact terms of the final procurement
contract, and different suppliers may be more or less effective in adhering to these terms,
which naturally creates asymmetries in their valuation of the contract.
To simplify the exposition we restrict our attention to a setting with two suppliers,
and we assume that supplier 1 is more effective in fulfilling the supply contract than
supplier 2. More precisely, supplier 1 receives a utility of A from winning an award
of size A, whereas supplier 2 only gains αA, with α ∈ (0, 1]. As a result of these
heterogeneous award valuations, the two suppliers invest different amounts of effort
during the procurement contest: Supplier 1, who has a higher valuation for winning
the contest, always invests more development effort than supplier 2, but both suppliers
reduce their efforts as α decreases. In other words, supplier asymmetry has a negative
impact on effort provision. But how does this negative effect influence the buyer’s choice
of contest format?
As Figure 3.3 visualizes, heterogeneity in the supplier base only has a minor im-
pact on the buyer’s preferences across contest formats. In particular, independent of
the magnitude of supplier asymmetry, the buyer implements a system contest if both
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Figure 3.3.: The Optimal Contest Format with a Heterogeneous Supplier
Base.
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45
1
1.4
1.8
2.2
0.12 0.18 0.24 0.3
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45
1
1.4
1.8
2.2
0.12 0.18 0.24 0.3
Notes: The buyer’s optimal choice of contest format for technological substitutes (left panel)
and technological complements (right panel) for different degrees of heterogeneity in award
valuations α. The buyer prefers a component contest in region C, and a system contest in
region S. No pure strategy equilibrium exists in region N. The parameters are: r(x) = x,
c(x) = x2, n = 2, A = 1.
components are incremental innovations, and chooses a component contest otherwise.
We conclude that our key structural results—as presented in Propositions 3.1, 3.2 and
3.5—seem to be fully robust to the introduction of heterogeneity into the supplier base.
As an aside, our results also indicate that a buyer should always strive for a symmetric
and well-balanced supplier base.
3.7 Conclusions
In practice, procurement contests have become a popular tool for buyers to gain access
to innovative products developed by their supplier base. Yet, tapping into the suppliers’
innovation efforts is a challenging endeavor. In particular, to fully exploit the benefits
of hosting a procurement contest, buyers need to be able to tailor their contests to
the characteristics of the products to be acquired and to their supplier base. This is
particularly true so if the desired innovation is a technologically complex product such
as an automotive lighting system. For such complex products, the most prominent
question for the buyer is whether to procure the entire system from a single supplier,
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or whether to source the product’s individual components from different suppliers. This
question is at the very heart of our research, and clearly, the answer to it also has strong
implications on how the buyer should conceptualize his procurement contest.
First, we find that a buyer should use a system contest whenever all product compo-
nents are merely incremental innovations and the firm’s supplier base is relatively small.
In contrast, in the presence of radical innovation or a large supplier base, the buyer
should choose to implement a component contest. Put differently, when deciding on the
optimal contest format managers only have to consider two dimensions: (i) the magni-
tude of innovation required for each component; and (ii) the size of the supplier base.
Relying only on these two factors significantly reduces the complexity of the managerial
decision problem in practice. Both the required level of innovation and the number of
potential suppliers are well-known to the firm, and at the same time managers need not
worry about more subtle—and less tangible—dimensions such as the exact technological
relationship between components or the degree of heterogeneity and correlation within
the supplier base.
Second, our results give clear advice on how a buyer should conceptualize his sup-
plier base in the long term, and which suppliers he should invite to the different pro-
curement contests. As a general managerial guideline, the buyer should always strive for
a relatively homogeneous supplier base; strong differences in the suppliers’ capabilities
have a severely negative effect on each supplier’s incentives to exert development efforts.
In contrast, whether the buyer prefers higher or lower levels of performance correlation
in his supplier base depends on the contest format as well as the innovativeness of the
product. It is interesting to observe that there are again only two important dimen-
sions that a firm has to consider, and both of them are again relatively easy to observe.
Our results therefore encourage managers to actively engage in the management of their
supplier base when it comes to complex innovations, because this management problem
might be less complex than perceived at first glance.
Our model has limitations that should be mentioned. To develop a parsimonious
model and maintain mathematical tractability we have made some simplifying assump-
tions regarding the characteristics of the considered products. In particular, we restrict
the number of components in the integrated system to be two, thereby disregarding
more complex or more hierarchical product architectures. We believe that incorporat-
ing hierarchical product architectures may lead to important and interesting additional
insights, and we see this as a promising avenue for future research. Also, we have consid-
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ered only the cases of perfectly substitutable and perfectly complementary components,
leaving aside the large class of products that exhibit intermediary forms of technolog-
ical relationship. Lastly, we have assumed that the buyer treats all suppliers equally.
In reality, however, the buyer may strategically handicap certain suppliers to improve
contest outcomes and to influence the evolution of his supplier base.
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Chapter IV
Managing Delegated R&D Testing
with Gerrit Schumacher1
4.1 Introduction
Scholars have long acknowledged the crucial role that design testing plays in the success
of any research and development (R&D) or new product development (NPD) initia-
tive (Simon 1969, Allen 1977, Clark and Fujimoto 1989, Wheelwright and Clark 1992,
Thomke 1998). This view is confirmed by the significant amount of time and resources
that firms invest in activities related to testing their new products. Thus the automotive
industry spent more than $100 billion (US) on R&D activities in 2015, with a large
portion of this budget dedicated to design testing (Jaruzelski and Hirsh 2016); Airbus
spent more than seven years evaluating different design options for its next-generation
A380 aircraft before deciding on the final design (The Economist 2007); and the high-
tech sector is expected to invest 40% of its information technology budget in new testing
processes—such as “virtual” testing and robotics—by 2019 (Buenen and Muthukrish-
nan 2016). These numbers indicate that firms continuously seek to improve their testing
processes, from both a technological and a managerial perspective, as a way of reducing
costs and resource consumption yet without compromising the quality of their testing
efforts.
Prior academic work has identified many aspects that bear on the efficacy of a firm’s
design-testing process—including such diverse factors as test efficiency, testing costs,
lead times, and learning effects—and thus on the firm’s optimal testing strategy (see,
e.g., Weitzman 1979, Dahan and Mendelson 2001, Loch et al. 2001, Erat and Kavadias
1The research presented in this chapter is based on a paper entitled “Delegated Testing of Design
Alternatives: The Role of Incentives and Testing Strategy”, coauthored with Gerrit Schumacher.
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2008). So far, however, one critical aspect has received only scant attention in the
literature: design testing is often delegated to self-interested experts who may pursue
their own respective agendas. It is an organizational reality in many industries that
information asymmetry between senior management and these testing experts distorts
the outcomes of a testing process (Sommer and Loch 2009, Mihm 2010, Schlapp et al.
2015). The goals of this paper are to determine (i) precisely how information asymmetry
affects a firm’s testing process and (ii) how the firm can mitigate the negative effects of
associated agency issues by devising appropriate incentive structures and an adequate
testing strategy.
One can more clearly understand the effect of information asymmetry on a firm’s
testing process by considering a wind turbine manufacturer that seeks to set up a
new “wind farm”—a grid-connected installation of multiple wind turbines—in a pre-
determined location.2 Wind farms are built to convert the wind’s kinetic energy into
electricity (Krohn et al. 2009). A wind farm is a viable (i.e., an economically rational)
contender in the production of electricity only if it satisfies three basic requirements:
“(1) produce energy, (2) survive, and (3) be cost effective” (Manwell et al. 2009, p. 505).
In fact, the “produce energy” requirement has become a moot point. Wind turbine
manufacturers can now produce a variety of wind turbine designs that have proven
their technological effectiveness through standardized testing procedures and widespread
application in practice. Moreover, technical developments are pushing modern wind
turbines closer to the theoretical efficiency limits dictated by Betz’s law3 (Burton et al.
2011, p. 63); hence current wind turbine designs are an excellent choice also for future
wind farms. Yet one crucial question remains: Which turbine design is the best choice
for a given wind farm location?
The answer to this question is closely tied to evaluating Manwell et al.’s requirements
(2) and (3). A wind farm can be cost effective and long-lived only if the wind turbines
used are technically reliable and do not result in strong negative externalities on the
environment. In other words: wind farm builders are looking for the wind turbine designs
that best match site-specific wind conditions, climatic factors, and regulatory constraints
yet have minimal effects on animal wildlife, emit little noise, and do not generate severe
2The siting of wind farms usually proceeds in close collaboration with regulatory bodies. Therefore,
wind turbine manufacturers can influence but not ultimately control decisions about where new
wind farms will be located.
3According to Betz’s law, no turbine can capture more than 59.3% of the wind’s kinetic energy.
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electromagnetic interference (Manwell et al. 2009, pp. 321ff). Unfortunately, many of
these factors are known only imperfectly ex ante, and there are no standardized testing
procedures for evaluating them (in contrast to the purely mechanical testing of the
energy produced by a particular wind turbine design). Instead, wind farm builders must
rely on teams of experts that acquire and deliver information regarding the suitability
of different wind turbine designs for a given location. Since there is no standard testing
procedure, this information acquisition process—and the interpretation of the acquired
information—is a process that creates tacit knowledge and that relies strongly on the
experts’ prior experience and knowledge, the quality of information sources, the synthesis
of implicit information, and often also on gut feeling.
As a result, it is almost impossible for a wind farm builder to assess the qual-
ity of the information on which expert recommendations are based, let alone to verify
that the experts have actually shared their knowledge (and all acquired information)
with senior management. To overcome this information asymmetry, wind farm builders
must adequately incentivize those experts to investigate design suitability in a thorough
manner and to share the test outcomes with senior management in a truthful manner.
These incentives must, of course, be aligned with the firm’s overall testing strategy (e.g.,
parallel vs. sequential testing). Hence the questions that arise are: What is the firm’s
optimal testing strategy, and what are the corresponding optimal incentive structures?
Our paper’s main contribution is development of a game-theoretic model that delivers
answers to these questions.
In particular, this study makes three main contributions to the literature. First we
show that—almost regardless of the firm’s testing strategy—the optimal compensation
schemes that adequately incentivize the experts have a surprisingly simple two-payment
structure: a success bonus; and a consolation award if an expert’s design is not chosen
for development. The optimal balance between these two payments depends on the
informational quality of an expert’s test outcomes. For rather simple designs that can be
tested with high precision, the firm should place a strong emphasis on the success bonus.
Yet designs that are more complex and subject to a less precise testing process demand
more tolerance for failure, so in these cases the firm should offer higher consolation
awards. In short, a one-size-fits-all approach to incentives is not advisable.
Second, we find that the firm’s optimal testing strategy depends primarily on two
parameters: the testing costs and the test efficiency. For low testing costs, the firm prefers
a parallel testing strategy whereby all design alternatives are tested simultaneously; for
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higher testing costs, a sequential testing approach is the firm’s preferred choice. We also
address the question of how best to conceptualize a sequential strategy under delegation;
that is, in which order should the designs be tested, and how many experts should be
hired for the testing process? Our analysis reveals that the greater the heterogeneity
in test efficiency across the design alternatives, the more experts the firm should hire.
The reason is that employing many experts makes it more difficult for any one expert
to extract high information rents—an issue that is most salient when the quality of
testing is unbalanced across designs. With regard to the optimal order in which design
alternatives should be tested, we challenge results in the literature that argue for the
optimality of “reservation price rules” (Weitzman 1979, Adam 2001, Erat and Kavadias
2008). We establish that, when there is information asymmetry, it might be better for
the firm to test less promising designs first in order to reduce agency costs.
Our third main contribution is to show that information asymmetry always results
in a suboptimal testing process; of perhaps even more importance is our finding that the
negative effect of information asymmetry is greater on parallel than on sequential testing
strategies. These results indicate that, under delegation, a parallel testing approach is
less suitable than promised by extant research (Dahan and Mendelson 2001, Loch et al.
2001). This finding likely also explains why so few parallel testing efforts are observed
in practice despite sharply reduced testing costs in recent years: firms simply want to
avoid the high agency costs associated with parallel design testing.
4.2 Related Literature
The challenges associated with managing the design process of a novel product have
been a long-standing and central concern in the NPD literature (Simon 1969, Allen
1977, Clark and Fujimoto 1989, Wheelwright and Clark 1992, Thomke 1998, Loch et al.
2001, Pich et al. 2002, Erat and Kavadias 2008, Sommer et al. 2009). In his foundational
work, Simon (1969, pp. 128f) describes the product design process “as involving, first,
the generation of alternatives and, then, the testing of these alternatives”. This view has
served as the foundation of much of the subsequent academic literature, and as such it
has triggered numerous extensions (see, e.g., Clark and Fujimoto 1991, Wheelwright and
Clark 1992, Thomke 1998, 2003). Following the seminal classification of Simon (1969),
the extant literature can be divided into two broad categories. The first group of studies
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focuses on the search dimension of product design by investigating successful strategies
for finding design alternatives. In contrast, research in the second group emphasizes
the testing dimension of product development by analyzing how best to evaluate the
performance of a given design alternative.
The literature on optimal search dates back to the pioneering work of March and
Simon (1958) and Simon (1969), who were among the first to describe organizational
problem solving as a search process. This notion of viewing the innovation process as
a search over a complex design landscape inspired the subsequent proposal of different
conceptual models to describe the underlying search spaces. The two most influential
models of search spaces are the exploration–exploitation trade-off described in March
(1991) and Manso (2011) and the NK landscape of Kauffman and Weinberger (1989)
and Kauffman (1993). Building on these conceptualizations of a search space, scholars
have extensively investigated how the efficiency of the search process—and thus the
firm’s innovation performance—changes with the complexity of the problem (Ethiraj and
Levinthal 2004, Mihm et al. 2003, Billinger et al. 2014), organizational hierarchy (Rivkin
and Siggelkow 2003, Siggelkow and Rivkin 2005, Mihm et al. 2010), team structure
(Kavadias and Sommer 2009, Girotra et al. 2010), unforeseeable uncertainties (Sommer
and Loch 2009, Sommer et al. 2009), the particular search strategy employed (Sommer
and Loch 2004, Kornish and Ulrich 2011), and competition (Oraiopoulos and Kavadias
2014). More recently, Erat and Krishnan (2012), Lewis (2012), and Ulbricht (2016)
have analyzed how delegation affects both the breadth and overall performance of a
search process. All these cited papers focus on how to discover a set of potentially
promising design alternatives, which is the quintessential first step in an innovation
process. However, we are concerned with the second step in that process: determining
the most reliable way to select the best alternative from among the candidates. As a
consequence of that different focus, the formal model we propose differs considerably
from those in the search literature.
Much closer to our work is the literature on design testing as initiated by Weitzman
(1979). In his terminology, any design alternative can be considered a “black box”, and
uncertainty about its value can be resolved only by costly testing activities. This generic
model of a testing process has become a building block for almost all research on design
testing, and it has proven itself flexible enough to accommodate two very different kinds
of testing processes: feasibility testing and selection testing.
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The primary purpose of feasibility testing is to discover whether (or not) a given
design is technologically feasible. Answering this question requires that the design in
question be repeatedly tested until there is sufficiently strong evidence either for or
against its feasibility. Prime application areas for this testing procedure include the
pharmaceutical industry, where a new molecule is tested and retested during clinical
trials to evaluate whether it reliably produces the desired effects. Research on feasibility
testing seeks to answer such questions as when in the development process to test the
design as well as how many tests to pursue and at what level of fidelity to a real-
world counterpart (see, e.g., Thomke and Bell 2001, Terwiesch and Loch 2004). In
the economics literature, the question of how to motivate an expert’s participation in
this dynamic information acquisition process has recently gained traction (Gromb and
Martimort 2007, Gerardi and Maestri 2012, Ho¨rner and Samuelson 2013), leading to
a theory of optimal incentives for feasibility testing. There are two ways in which our
paper is connected to that stream of literature. First, from previous work on feasibility
testing we borrow the insight that nearly all testing processes are imperfect and so, even
with the most thorough of testing efforts, there will still be uncertainty about a design’s
true value. Second, we answer the question of how the firm should manage delegated
testing activities when it is concerned with selection testing—the second main challenge
in design testing. Thus our work complements the extant literature and broadens our
knowledge about devising optimal incentives and strategies for delegated design testing.
In contrast to feasibility testing, which focuses on the technological feasibility of a
single design, selection testing is concerned with choosing the best alternative out of a
set of different candidate designs. For instance, as explained in the Introduction, wind
farm builders are confronted with such a selection issue when choosing a particular wind
turbine design for a new wind farm. The existing literature describes two diametrically
opposed testing strategies to tackle this issue: sequential and parallel testing. Weitzman
(1979) advocates the use of a sequential testing approach, in which the different designs
are tested in sequence and the testing process can be stopped after each design test. In
his seminal contribution, he establishes the now classical reservation price rule (a.k.a.
“Pandora’s rule”) for determining both the order in which to test the alternatives and
also when to stop testing. Adam (2001) and Erat and Kavadias (2008) study how
these results are affected by the firm’s ability to learn between design tests. In contrast
to those papers, Dahan and Mendelson (2001) promote the use of a parallel testing
approach in which all design alternatives are tested simultaneously. Loch et al. (2001)
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build on these results by directly comparing the performance of sequential and parallel
testing strategies. They find that sequential testing is preferable when design tests are
expensive and test efficiency is low whereas parallel testing is preferable when testing
processes are slow and the firm needs quick results.
It is remarkable that past work on selection testing has not considered the role
played by information asymmetry in the design of an optimal testing process—that is,
given the ubiquity of such asymmetries in practice. Our principal contribution is to
investigate how, exactly, delegation affects a firm’s optimal testing strategy; we derive
simple yet optimal incentive structures that counter the effects of information asymme-
tries. The analysis yields several new insights regarding the management of delegated
testing processes. First, our derivation of the firm’s optimal testing strategy reveals
that information asymmetry is much more detrimental to a parallel than to a sequential
testing strategy. This finding implies that, when testing is delegated, parallel strategies
are probably less effective than advertised (e.g., Dahan and Mendelson 2001, Loch et al.
2001). Second, the existing literature is silent about how to conceptualize a sequential
testing approach; that is, should the firm hire multiple experts to test the different de-
sign alternatives, or should it rather assign all testing activities to a single expert? We
show that the multi-expert approach is preferable when test efficiency varies considerably
across the design alternatives whereas the single-expert approach is preferable when test
efficiency is relatively homogeneous. As a corollary we also find that, under delegation,
the classical reservation price rules (promulgated in Weitzman 1979, Adam 2001, Erat
and Kavadias 2008) no longer generate the optimal order for testing alternative designs.
Finally, we derive the optimal incentive structures for delegated design testing, which
turn out to be extremely simple irrespective of the chosen testing strategy.
4.3 Model Setup
Consider a firm engaged in NPD; it faces the challenge of selecting one out of N ≥ 1
possible design alternatives for the new product being developed. The value that the firm
receives from choosing a certain design depends on two factors: the design’s technological
feasibility, which is uncertain at the outset and can end up being either good or bad;
and the design’s inherent economic potential. The firm’s goal is to choose and develop
the design alternative that offers the highest value upon implementation.
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At the core of our model is a testing phase in which the firm can acquire costly but
imperfect information regarding each design’s technological feasibility and, eventually,
its value. Yet the firm cannot access this information directly. Instead, it must delegate
the desired testing activities to experts who then collect information about the designs’
technological feasibility through experiments, simulations, and/or prototype building.
Each design test gives the corresponding expert more refined information about the
evaluated design’s feasibility, which enables that expert to provide a more informed rec-
ommendation vis-a`-vis the firm’s decision on whether or not to develop the focal design.
Once the firm has collected enough recommendations, it develops the most promising de-
sign alternative; if no alternative is sufficiently convincing, then the development process
may be abandoned.
In the real world, the delegated nature of this testing process gives rise to informa-
tion asymmetry between the firm and the experts. Thus it is difficult if not impossible
for the firm to verify the informational quality of an expert’s recommendation. Two
factors are responsible for this adverse situation. First, testing activities are costly for
the expert, who may therefore choose to be less diligent with respect to some tests
than others. However, firms cannot ascertain the diligence of experts because the in-
terpretation of testing outcomes relies critically on an expert’s gathering and synthesis
of information and—most notably, owing to the tacit nature of such knowledge—prior
experience. Second, experts may be reluctant to share their testing outcomes truthfully
with the firm. This form of information asymmetry captures the reality that experts
can use their recommendations strategically to influence the firm’s design choice. So in
practice, delegated design testing involves two different forms of information asymmetry:
moral hazard during the testing phase and adverse selection during the recommenda-
tion phase. It follows that the firm must offer an appropriately designed compensation
scheme if it hopes to incentivize experts to test the focal design(s) thoroughly and then
to communicate the testing outcomes truthfully. This compensation scheme, in turn,
should be carefully coordinated with the firm’s second major decision: the choice of test-
ing strategy. In particular, the firm must decide about whether the design alternatives
should be tested in parallel or in sequence, how many experts to employ, how many
design alternatives to test, and (if tested in sequence) the best order in which to test the
different designs. In the rest of this section we provide more detail on our model setup
and assumptions.
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4.3.1. Delegated Design Testing
The value Vi that the firm receives from developing design i ∈ N = {1, . . . , N} depends
on the design’s technological feasibility Θi ∈ {G,B}, its inherent economic potential
vi > 0, and the development costs K ≥ 0. We assume more specifically that, once
developed, a technologically feasible design (Θi = G) generates a value of vi−K whereas
an unfeasible design (Θi = B) results in a loss of −K. Prior to development, however,
each design’s technological feasibility is uncertain; that is, neither the firm nor the
experts know the design’s true feasibility ex ante. To simplify the presentation, we
assume also that each state is ex ante equally likely.4 Experts engage in costly testing
activities in their efforts to (partially) resolve this uncertainty. We represent the testing
activities for design i by an expert’s testing effort ei, which can be either high (ei = h)
or low (ei = l) and is not observable by the firm. An expert who engages in high-effort
testing incurs a private cost c > 0, whereas the costs of low-effort testing are normalized
to zero. Of course, the chosen testing effort affects the quality of collected information.
Formally, we model testing outcomes for each design i as an imperfect signal si ∈ {g, b},
which is received only by the expert testing design i and that indicates whether the
design is technologically feasible (si = g) or not (si = b). We denote the precision (or
quality) of this signal q(ei) because it depends on the expert’s testing effort: an expert
who exerts high effort receives a signal of quality q(ei = h) = qi ∈ (1/2, 1]; in contrast,
low effort leads to an uninformative signal q(ei = l) = 1/2. We assume that signals are
stochastically independent across designs.
After receiving the signal si, the expert updates—in accordance with Bayesian
rationality—her belief about design i’s technological feasibility. Using this refined in-
formation, the expert gives the firm an unverifiable recommendation ri ∈ {g, b}, which
states whether design i is considered to be technologically feasible (ri = g) or unfeasible
(ri = b).
4.3.2. The Firm’s Decisions
The ultimate goal of a firm is to maximize expected profits by selecting the most valuable
design for its product while minimizing the costs of a delegated testing process. For this
problem to be relevant, we assume that qivi ≥ K ≥ (1− qi)vi for all i ∈ N . Otherwise,
4The sole purpose of this assumption is to reduce the complexity of our mathematical exposition.
From a structural standpoint, all our results continue to hold for arbitrary prior probabilities.
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the firm’s decision would be a trivial one: if qivi < K then the firm could safely exclude
design i from consideration because of the economic irrationality of developing such a
design; at the other extreme, if (1 − qi)vi > K then design i is so promising that the
firm would develop it even without prior testing.
Designing an optimal testing process requires that the firm determine the testing
strategy and also a scheme for compensating the experts. With regard to the former
decision, we assume that the firm can select among three different testing strategies:
parallel testing, multi-expert sequential testing, and single-expert sequential testing.
Under a parallel testing strategy, the firm first decides on the number |IP | and identity
IP ⊆ N of design alternatives to test; it then assigns a separate expert to each design i ∈
IP , and all testing processes are carried out simultaneously. After reviewing the experts’
recommendations, the firm decides which design (if any) to develop. Under a multi-
expert sequential testing strategy, the firm again decides on the number (here, |IM |) and
identity (IM ⊆ N ) of design alternatives to test—but it also determines the order in
which the different designs will be tested. The firm then assigns a different expert to
each design i ∈ IM and the designs are tested, one after the other, in the order specified.
After each design test, the firm can choose to stop the testing process and develop the
latest design alternative; we assume that the firm always does so after receiving a good/
feasible recommendation for the current design alternative. An intuitive consequence of
this assumption is that, once a firm in this position continues with the testing process,
it can no longer implement any previously tested design.5 Throughout the modeled
testing process, all payments are discounted at a constant rate of δ ∈ (0, 1] after each
design test. Under a single-expert sequential testing strategy, the firm makes the same
decisions as in the multi-expert case (viz., deciding on |IS|, on IS ⊆ N , and on the
order of tested designs); the only difference here is that just one expert is assigned to
perform all the tests. As before, the firm can stop the testing process after each design
test and develop the latest design alternative (which always occurs if the firm is given a
good recommendation) yet does not have the option of developing any formerly tested
design.
5As discussed in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.6, this assumption greatly reduces mathematical complexity yet
has almost no bearing on the generalizability of our results. Furthermore, if the firm were unwilling
to develop favorably recommended designs, then experts would have no motive to expend effort
testing design alternatives.
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As regards the firm’s schemes for compensating the experts, we allow the firm to
offer asymmetric and nonlinear contracts that include any combination of action- and
evidence-based payments.6 An action-based payment is contingent on a specific action
taken by the firm—for instance, developing design i.7 In contrast, an evidence-based
payment depends on a design’s true technological feasibility Θi. In practice, any pay-
for-performance contract must be action-based and/or evidence-based; the reason is that
only such criteria are verifiable and thus enforceable by courts. In our model, then, an
expert who is testing design i is eligible for the following payment types: (i) a “success
bonus” uig if the firm successfully develops design i (i.e., Θi = G); (ii) an “allowance” uib
if the firm’s development of design i fails (i.e., Θi = B); (iii) a “consolation award” uia
if the expert tested design i but the firm did not choose it for development; and (iv) a
“termination bonus” uit if none of the available design alternatives is chosen for develop-
ment. We assume throughout that the firm must make all wage payments immediately
when due; that is, it cannot hold back any wages. It is intuitive that the evidence-based
payments uig and uib incentivize an expert to test the design thoroughly and also to
recommend the design’s development in the event of a favorable signal. In contrast, uia
and uit reflect the firm’s tolerance for failure. That is to say, the firm appreciates an
expert’s testing efforts even in the case of negative testing outcomes; hence this payment
incentivizes experts to refrain from recommending a bad design for development.
Given such compensation schemes, the utility pii received by an expert for testing
design i is the (discounted) sum of all his wage payments net of his effort costs. We
follow the principal–agent literature in assuming that all experts are risk neutral and
protected by limited liability; in other words, the compensation of each expert must
be nonnegative at all times. The firm is risk neutral, too, and its profit Π consists of
the realized value of the developed design (net of any development costs) minus the
compensation paid to experts.
4.4 Incentives for Delegated Testing
In this section we characterize the optimal compensation schemes, for the different test-
ing strategies, given that the set of design alternatives I ⊆ N (with |I| = n ≥ 1)
6Note that, without loss of optimality, we do not need to consider fixed wages because in optimum,
such a fixed wage must be zero as experts are shielded by limited liability.
7Payments cannot depend on the expert ’s action because such actions cannot be verified.
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is exogenously fixed.8 In line with the revelation principle, we limit our attention to
contracts that incentivize all experts to evaluate design(s) thoroughly and to reveal
test outcomes truthfully. We begin by identifying the optimal compensation scheme for
parallel testing (Section 4.4.1), after which we characterize the optimal contract for
multi-expert sequential testing and derive the optimal testing order (Section 4.4.2). Fi-
nally, we examine the optimal incentive scheme and testing order for the single-expert
sequential testing strategy (Section 4.4.3).
4.4.1. Parallel Testing
Under a parallel testing strategy, the firm assigns a different expert to each design i ∈
I = {1, . . . , n}, and all experts then perform their testing activities simultaneously. This
setup allows the firm to receive refined information on each design’s value and to use this
information to select, ex post, the most promising alternative for development. The firm’s
overarching goal is to maximize expected profits, which amount to the expected market
value of the developed design net of development costs and compensation paid to experts.
Formally, the firm solves the following optimization problem P (whose mathematical
derivation, along with all other formal proofs, has been relegated to Appendix C):
P : max
u,y
Π :=
n∑
j=1
1
2j
(
n∑
i=1
[y
(j)
i (qivi − qiuig − (1− qi)uib − (2j − 1)uia − 2j−nuit)]−K
)
(4.1)
s.t. y
(j)
i (qiuig + (1− qi)uib) ≥ y(j)i (uia + 2j−nuit) ∀i, j ∈ I (4.2)
y
(j)
i ((1− qi)uig + qiuib) ≤ y(j)i (uia + 2j−nuit) ∀i, j ∈ I (4.3)
y
(j)
i (uig − uib) ≥ y(j)i 2j+1c/(2qi − 1) ∀i, j ∈ I (4.4)
y
(j)
i [qi(vi − uig)− (1− qi)uib −
∑
k 6=i
uka]
≥ y(j)i
n∑
l=1
y
(j+1)
l [ql(vl − ulg)− (1− ql)ulb −
∑
k 6=l
uka] ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ I\{n}
(4.5)
8We endogenize the firm’s choice of design alternatives in Section 4.5.1.
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n∑
i=1
y
(j)
i = 1,
n∑
j=1
y
(j)
i = 1, y
(j)
i ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j ∈ I (4.6)
uig, uib, uia, uia + uit ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I (4.7)
Although complex at first sight, this optimization problem P has an intuitive struc-
ture. As a starting point, note that y
(j)
i is an indicator variable that reflects whether
design i is the firm’s jth most preferred alternative (constraint (4.6) ensures that this
mapping is indeed one-to-one). That is, if y
(j)
i = 1 then the firm chooses design i for
development only if it receives an unfavorable recommendation for all designs with a
lower ranking j′ < j. Clearly, a design’s attractiveness is not exogenously given and in-
stead depends endogenously on the offered compensation scheme. This fact is reflected
by (4.5), which guarantees that the firm makes an ex post optimal selection decision.
Conditions (4.2)–(4.4) represent each expert’s incentive compatibility constraints, which
depend on the relative attractiveness of the design she has been assigned to evaluate.
Thus (4.2) and (4.3) ensure that each expert truthfully reveals, respectively, a “good”
and a “bad” signal. These constraints eliminate the adverse selection problem during
the recommendation phase. Condition (4.4) similarly negates the moral hazard problem
during the design-testing phase because it ensures that each expert prefers high-effort to
low-effort testing. Finally, experts are protected by limited liability; hence (4.7) ensures
that all wage payments are nonnegative. The following proposition characterizes—under
mild conditions on the properties of designs in I—the optimal incentive structures for
parallel testing and the resulting firm profits.9
Proposition 4.1. Suppose the designs in I can be ordered such that qivi ≥ qi+1vi+1 +
2i+1c[qi/(2qi− 1)− 2qi+1/(2qi+1− 1)]+ for all i ∈ I\{n}, where [x]+ = max{0, x}. Then
the following statements hold.
(i) Under a parallel testing strategy, the optimal contract that induces truth telling
and high-effort testing for each design satisfies uig = 2
i+1c/(2qi − 1), uib = 0, uia = 0,
and uit = 2
n+1(1 − qi)c/(2qi − 1) for all i ∈ I. Moreover, uit/uig = 2n(1 − qi)/2i <
2n−i−1 ≤ 2n−2 for all i ∈ I.
(ii) Ex ante, the firm’s expected profit is ΠP =
∑n
i=1((qivi −K)/2i − 2c/(2qi − 1)).
9The condition in Proposition 4.1 holds unless I contains a design for which the test is of exceptionally
low efficiency.
71
IV. Managing Delegated R&D Testing
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this proposition is the simplicity of the
optimal contract’s structure. For each design (and thus for each expert) i ∈ I, the firm
need offer only two payments: a success bonus uig if design i is successfully developed,
and a termination bonus uit if none of the design alternatives is chosen for development
(i.e., if test outcomes indicate that all designs are technologically unfeasible). But what
respective roles do these payments play in the firm’s incentive system? As (4.4) reveals,
the primary purpose of uig is to motivate expert i to engage in high-effort testing. Put
differently, uig is a purely individual incentive that resolves each expert’s moral hazard
concern. In contrast, uit is a common (or shared) incentive that collectively compensates
the experts if all designs are considered to be technologically unfeasible. It therefore
decreases the likelihood of an expert giving a positive recommendation despite receiving
a negative test outcome—and thereby induces truth telling; see constraint (4.3).
It is intuitive that, when effort becomes less rewarding (i.e., effort costs c increase)
and recommendations become less reliable (the signal quality qi decreases), expert i
becomes more reluctant to invest high effort and to report test outcomes truthfully.
Under these circumstances, the firm must provide stronger incentives; this explains why
uig and uit are increasing in c and decreasing in qi. Conversely, in the extreme case
of perfect testing (qi = 1), expert i has no incentive to misrepresent the test outcomes
because such a false recommendation would be easily detected by the firm and so would
not benefit him. It follows that if testing is perfect then the firm can forgo payment of
any shared incentives (uit = 0).
Whereas neither uig nor uit depends directly on a design’s inherent economic po-
tential vi, these terms are affected by the total number n of designs to be tested and by
a design’s relative value, which we also index via i. In particular, uig increases with i
because, with a higher index i, it becomes more likely for tests to indicate that a design
with a smaller index is technologically feasible—which would render futile the expert’s
testing efforts. Similarly, with a higher n it becomes less likely that all n designs are
technologically unfeasible; hence the termination bonus uit is correspondingly less likely
to be paid out. To compensate the experts for this reduced payment probability, the
firm must offer a higher uit.
Proposition 4.1(i) also sheds light on the severity of adverse selection—as compared
with moral hazard—when the firm employs a parallel testing strategy. For designs that
are extremely promising ex ante (i.e., those with a small index i), the ratio uit/uig is
high; the implication is that, for these designs, the firm’s central concern is to incentivize
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truth telling. For ex ante less promising designs (those with a large index i) the ratio is
low; in that event, the firm becomes relatively more concerned with incentivizing experts
to exert high effort. This shifting priority of the optimal compensation scheme has an
appealing explanation. From an expert’s perspective, admitting that her own testing
outcome is bad increases the odds of receiving no payments. This conclusion follows from
the extreme unlikelihood of all tested designs being pronounced technologically unfeasi-
ble. The firm’s concern on this point is especially strong for designs that show the most
promise. At the same time, an expert assigned to a promising design has a significant
intrinsic motivation to exert high effort because the potential rewards from receiving a
good test outcome are high. In contrast, an expert assigned to a less promising design
fears that her efforts are futile because, in all probability, a more promising design will
receive a good recommendation and so the results of her testing could be irrelevant to
the firm. Therefore, relatively higher individual incentives must be offered to the experts
who are assigned to test less promising designs.
Finally, Proposition 4.1(ii) reveals that the firm’s expected profit is decreasing in c
and increasing in qi. The reason is that, with a higher c and a lower qi, expert i is
less willing to exert high effort and to disclose the test outcomes truthfully. Hence the
incentive misalignment between the firm and expert i widens, which enables the expert
to extract higher information rents.
4.4.2. Multi-Expert Sequential Testing
Under a multi-expert sequential testing strategy, the firm assigns a different expert to
test each design i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n} and announces the testing sequence; then the experts
carry out their design tests one after the other. A sequential testing approach allows the
firm to stop the testing process when it receives a positive recommendation (i.e., so it
can start developing that design) or to test the next viable alternative when it receives
a negative recommendation.
For a given I and any testing order, the firm must solve the following optimization
problem to derive the optimal compensation schemes. For expositional simplicity, we
relabel the design alternatives such that a design’s index i is identical to its position
in the testing order; thus design i = 1 is tested first, i = 2 second, and so on. The
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optimization problem M is expressed formally as follows:
M : max
u
Π(u) :=
n∑
i=1
δi−1
2i
(qivi −K)−
n∑
i=1
δi−1
2i
(qiuig + (1− qi)uib + uia + 2i−nδn−iuit)
(4.8)
s.t. qiuig + (1− qi)uib ≥ uia + 2i−nδn−iuit ∀i ∈ I (4.9)
(1− qi)uig + qiuib ≤ uia + 2i−nδn−iuit ∀i ∈ I (4.10)
uig − uib ≥ 4c
2qi − 1 ∀i ∈ I (4.11)
uig, uib, uia, uit ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I\{n}, ung, unb, una + unt ≥ 0 (4.12)
The structure of the optimization problem M is similar to the firm’s optimization
problem P under a parallel testing strategy. Specifically, constraints (4.9) and (4.10)
ensure that all experts truthfully reveal their testing outcomes, (4.11) guarantees that
each expert engages in high-effort testing, and (4.12) accounts for the experts’ limited
liability. In the next proposition we derive the firm’s optimal compensation schemes,
describe the optimal testing order, and state the resulting firm profits for a multi-expert
sequential testing strategy.
Proposition 4.2. (i) Under a multi-expert sequential testing strategy and for any given
testing order, the optimal contract that induces truth telling and high-effort testing by
all experts satisfies, for all i ∈ I: uig = 4c/(2qi − 1), uib = 0, uia = 4(1− qi)c/(2qi − 1),
and uit = 0. In addition, uia/uig = 1− qi < 1/2.
(ii) It is optimal to test the designs in I in decreasing order of Ri ≡ qivi−4c/(2qi−1).
(iii) Ex ante, the firm’s expected profit is ΠM =
∑n
i=1 δ
i−1(qivi−K−4c/(2qi−1))/2i.
As in the optimal contract for parallel testing, there are only two payments in
the optimal compensation scheme for multi-expert sequential testing. To resolve each
expert’s moral hazard, the firm must again reward expert i with a success bonus uig in
the event design i is developed successfully. Yet in this case the firm does not rely on
shared incentives to induce truth telling; that is, uit = 0. Instead the firm provides an
individual consolation award uia to reimburse expert i for his effort costs whenever the
firm dismisses the design he tested owing to the subsequent unfavorable recommendation.
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This focus on purely individual incentives has two immediate consequences. First,
the optimal payments depend not on a design’s position in the testing order but only
on its informational quality qi: the higher the informational quality, the more aligned
are the interests of firm and experts and so the lower is the compensation offered.
Second, as the ratio uia/uig indicates, if testing is sequential then moral hazard is a
much greater concern than adverse selection, especially when qi is high. This finding may
be better understood if one notes that, from an expert’s perspective, recommending a
technologically unfeasible design for development leads to zero income (uib = 0). So once
an expert has invested high effort in testing, there is hardly any point in trying to pass
off a technologically unfeasible design as a good one. Even so, motivating the expert to
engage in high-effort testing at the outset requires a high effort incentive (high uig).
The optimal testing order is given in part (ii) of Proposition 4.2, the essence of
which is that the firm should test designs in decreasing order of their expected net
contribution Ri. This result is in the spirit of Weitzman’s (1979) reservation price rule
but extends it to include the costs of delegation. That is, the testing order depends not
only on the designs’ expected values qivi but also on the experts’ information rents. Since
these information rents are decreasing in qi and invariant with respect to vi, it follows
that the firm—as compared to the reservation price rules advocated by Weitzman (1979),
Adam (2001), and Erat and Kavadias (2008)—more strongly prefers first to test designs
of high informational quality. The structure of Ri indicates that the firm’s optimal testing
order is myopic: a design’s expected net contribution depends only on its own properties
and so is independent of other design alternatives.
Recall our argument that an expert’s information rents are decreasing in the quality
of her information and increasing in her effort costs. From these relations it clearly
follows that the firm’s expected profit should be increasing in qi and decreasing in c.
Proposition 4.2(iii) confirms this intuition and also underscores how the firm’s profit is
adversely affected when δ, the time value of money, is low.
Finally, we emphasize that the compensation scheme and testing order presented in
Proposition 4.2 remain optimal even if the firm is allowed to develop formerly tested (yet
rejected) design alternatives, that is, if the firm can test “with recall”. To see this, note
that if the firm receives a good recommendation for some i ∈ I then it can immediately
realize an expected profit of qivi−K−4qic/(2qi−1) by developing design i right away. If
instead the firm chooses to test the next design alternative, then the optimal ordering in
Proposition 4.2(ii) implies that the firm’s expected continuation profit is strictly smaller.
75
IV. Managing Delegated R&D Testing
We conclude that, as soon as the firm receives a good recommendation for a particular
design, it is optimal to develop this design at once—rendering a recall option superfluous.
4.4.3. Single-Expert Sequential Testing
Under a single-expert sequential testing strategy, the firm assigns a single expert to test
in sequence the design alternatives in I. It is easy to see that—as compared with a multi-
expert strategy—such reliance on the testing efforts of only a single expert will have a
strong bearing on the required incentives. On the one hand, a single expert is much more
inclined (than is one in a group of experts) to acknowledge an unfavorable test outcome
because there is always the chance of finding a technologically feasible design later in the
testing process. On the other hand, it is extremely difficult to continue incentivizing an
expert to exert high testing efforts. Thus an expert’s behavior during the testing process
is strongly affected by his anticipation of future actions and payments.
For a given I and any testing order, the firm’s incentive design problem is as follows.
As in the preceding section, we relabel the design alternatives such that a design’s index i
is identical to its position in the testing order. The incentive design problem S is then
S : max
u
Π(u) :=
n∑
i=1
δi−1
2i
(qivi −K)−
n∑
i=1
δi−1
2i
(qiuig + (1− qi)uib + uia) (4.13)
s.t. qiuig + (1− qi)uib ≥ uia + δpˆii ∀i ∈ I (4.14)
(1− qi)uig + qiuib ≤ uia + δpˆii ∀i ∈ I (4.15)
uig − uib ≥ 4c
2qi − 1 ∀i ∈ I (4.16)
pˆii−1 = (qiuig + (1− qi)uib + uia − 2c+ δpˆii)/2 ∀i ∈ I
pˆin = 0
(4.17)
uig, uib, uia ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I (4.18)
Some peculiarities of the optimization problem S warrant further discussion. First,
with a single expert it is unnecessary to have an additional termination bonus ut that
compensates her when none of the design alternatives is developed. In fact, such a
payment can—without loss of optimality—be folded into the expert’s consolation award
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for testing the last design alternative (una). This follows because both payments have the
same requirements and are executed simultaneously. Second, pˆii−1 as defined in (4.17) is
the expert’s expected continuation utility immediately before testing design i. Since the
expert’s decision-making process accounts for her own future utility, it is only natural
for pˆii to become an integral part of her incentive constraints; see (4.14) and (4.15).
More precisely: as compared with a multi-expert sequential testing strategy, a single
sequentially testing expert is more (resp. less) likely to report an unfavorable (resp.
favorable) signal truthfully. Our explanation is that the expert may enjoy additional
information rents by artificially keeping the testing process alive (i.e., by concealing
a signal of feasibility). As shown by Proposition 4.3, that possibility has important
consequences for the optimal compensation scheme.
Proposition 4.3. (i) Under a single-expert sequential testing strategy and for any given
testing order, the optimal contract that induces truth telling and high-effort testing for
all designs satisfies, for all i ∈ I: uig = 4c/(2qi − 1) + [δpˆii/qi − 4c/(2qi − 1)]+, uib = 0,
and uia = [4(1− qi)c/(2qi − 1)− δpˆii]+. Moreover, uia/uig ≤ 1− qi < 1/2.
(ii) If the design alternatives in I can be ordered such that qivi ≥ qi+1vi+1, qi ≥ qi+1,
and (1 − qi)4c/(2qi − 1) ≤ δpˆii ≤ 4qic/(2qi − 1) for all i ∈ I\{n}, then it is optimal to
test in increasing order of i.
(iii) Ex ante, the firm’s expected profit is ΠS =
∑n
i=1 δ
i−1(qivi−K−max{4qic/(2qi−
1), δpˆii, 4c/(2qi − 1)− δpˆii})/2i.
Although the optimal contract for a single-expert sequential testing strategy is struc-
turally similar to that for a multi-expert strategy, there are some important differences.
First of all, under single-expert sequential testing, the firm needs to place more empha-
sis on motivating high-effort testing and less on inducing experts to report truthfully.
Correspondingly, the success bonus uig is higher under single-expert than multi-expert
sequential testing while the consolation award uia is substantially lower. In fact, it may
be optimal for the firm to offer no consolation award at all (uia = 0). That would be
the case for sufficiently large values of pˆii, the expert’s expected continuation utility.
Here the single expert anticipates substantial future payments if the testing process
continues; therefore, under sequential testing, that expert will always truthfully report
an unfavorable signal. This dynamic has the effect of eliminating the adverse selection
problem.
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Second, and in contrast to the multi-expert strategy detailed previously, the optimal
payments related to each design i are not myopic in the single-expert setting; instead
those payments depend on the informational quality of all designs tested after design i.
This result is a natural and direct consequence of the expert’s strategic behavior, and as
such it bears implications for the optimal testing order. Following the logic of Weitzman
(1979) and Proposition 4.2(ii), one might well suppose that it is still optimal to test the
designs in decreasing order of their expected net contribution. However, that supposition
is not true in general. We can see from Proposition 4.3(ii) that such a testing order is
optimal only if the expert anticipates a moderate level of continuation utilities (i.e., only
if (1 − qi)4c/(2qi − 1) ≤ δpˆii ≤ 4qic/(2qi − 1)). However, if continuing with the testing
process promises continuation utilities that are exceptionally high or low, then the firm
should not test the designs in decreasing order of attractiveness. It might rather be
optimal to test the least promising designs first—with the goal of reducing the expert’s
strategic rent extraction.
Finally, Proposition 4.3(iii) gives the firm’s expected profit under a single-expert
sequential testing strategy and yields a rather surprising result. Unlike the other testing
strategies, under single-expert sequential testing the firm’s expected profit need not
increase with quality qi. Because of the expert’s strategic behavior, a higher qi for one
design might result in the expert extracting higher information rents from the other
designs being tested; this would, of course, reduce the firm’s overall profits.
4.5 Comparison of Testing Strategies
So far, we have characterized the optimal incentive structure for the three different
testing strategies given that the set of design alternatives was exogenously fixed. As
a next step, we relax this assumption and determine the optimal number and identity
of designs to test for each of the three testing strategies (Section 4.5.1). We then build
on these results by deriving the optimal testing strategy as a function of our main
contextual parameters (Section 4.5.2). Finally, we offer some insights regarding the
question of how delegation, which entails information asymmetry, alters the relative
ranking of testing strategies—that is, from the ranking in an otherwise identical setting
but without information asymmetry (Section 4.5.3).
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4.5.1. Optimal Set of Design Alternatives
In Section 4.4 we derived optimal compensation schemes for the different testing strate-
gies while assuming that the firm intended to test a fixed set I ⊆ N of design alterna-
tives. A more realistic scenario is one in which the set of designs to test is not given
exogenously but instead is chosen by the firm. In this section, then, we characterize the
optimal sets of designs to be tested for the different testing strategies. Our results reveal
that these sets vary considerably across those strategies.
Proposition 4.4. (i) Under a multi-expert sequential testing strategy, the optimal set
of designs to be tested is IM = {i ∈ N | qivi −K − 4c/(2qi − 1) ≥ 0}.
(ii) Under a parallel testing strategy, the optimal set of designs to be tested satisfies
IP ⊆ IM .
(iii) Let IS be the optimal set of designs to be tested under a single-expert sequential
testing strategy, and let n be the last design in the optimal testing order. If qnvn −K −
4c/(2qn − 1) ≥ 0 and if qnvn ≤ qivi and qn ≤ qi for all i ∈ IS\{n}, then IS ⊆ IM .
Part (i) of this proposition offers a detailed characterization of the optimal identity
(i ∈ IM) and number (|IM |) of designs to test under a multi-expert sequential testing
strategy. In particular, the firm should test any design i ∈ N for which the expected
value qivi exceeds the sum of (a) the expert’s information rents 4c/(2qi− 1) and (b) the
development costs K. That is, the firm should test only those designs that promise
ex ante a positive contribution margin.
A similar argument applies to the optimal set of designs to be tested under a
parallel testing strategy IP . However, as indicated by Proposition 4.1(iii) and Proposi-
tion 4.2(iii), the experts’ information rents under parallel testing are much higher than
under sequential testing, which explains why the firm always tests fewer designs than
under a multi-expert sequential testing strategy. There are two reasons for this differ-
ence. First, under parallel testing the firm does not have the option to stop the testing
process prematurely. Second, experts testing a relatively undesirable design know that
the firm will probably consider their recommendations to be irrelevant; it is therefore
costly for the firm to motivate these experts to exert high testing efforts. Whereas the
first dynamic has been well established by previous academic work (see, e.g., Loch et al.
2001), little attention has been paid to the second source of inefficiency.
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Finally, Proposition 4.4(iii) derives some properties of the optimal set of designs
to be tested under a single-expert sequential testing strategy. A few observations merit
discussion here. We note that if the last design in the testing order is also the least
promising alternative—yet still offers a positive contribution margin—then the firm al-
ways tests fewer designs than under a multi-expert sequential testing strategy. In other
words, the expert’s strategic behavior induces the firm to make reductions in the number
of designs to test. Yet this generalization does admit some exceptions. In some instances,
it might be profitable for the firm to include an ex ante unprofitable design in its test
set IS for the sole purpose of influencing the expert’s continuation utility and thereby
reducing his strategic behavior. In such cases, qnvn −K − 4c/(2qn − 1) < 0 and so the
firm may find it optimal to increase the number of designs to test: IS ⊃ IM .
In sum: the firm tests only ex ante profitable designs under both the parallel and
multi-expert sequential testing strategy; under single-expert sequential testing, however,
it may be optimal for the firm to test ex ante unprofitable designs in order to curtail
rent extraction by experts.
4.5.2. Optimal Testing Strategy
Given the optimal contract structures and the optimal set of design alternatives for the
different testing strategies, we can now turn to our main research question: What is
the firm’s optimal testing strategy under delegation? Propositions 4.1–4.3 have already
indicated that the answer to this question depends mainly on two contextual parameters:
the costs of effort (c) and the informational quality of test outcomes (qi). It seems clear
that these two parameters determine how much information rent the firm must sacrifice
in order to align the experts’ interests with the firm’s agenda. The next proposition
confirms this intuition.
Proposition 4.5. Let Π∗P = ΠP (IP ), Π∗M = ΠM(IM), and Π∗S = ΠS(IS). Then the
following statements hold.
(i) If δ < 1, then there exists a c > 0 such that Π∗P > max{Π∗M ,Π∗S} for all c < c.
(ii) Let IP be the optimal set of designs to be tested under a parallel testing strategy.
If those designs can be ordered such that qivi ≥ qi+1vi+1+2i+1c[qi/(2qi−1)−2qi+1/(2qi+1−
1)]+ for all i ∈ IP\{n}, then max{Π∗M ,Π∗S} > Π∗P provided that c > c ≡
∑
i∈IP ((1 −
δi−1)(qivi −K)/2i)/
∑
i∈IP ((2(1− (δ/2)i−1)/(2qi − 1)).
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(iii) Let IM be the optimal set of designs to be tested under a multi-expert sequen-
tial testing strategy, and let those designs be optimally ordered according to Proposi-
tion 4.2(ii). Then Π∗S ≥ Π∗M provided that qi+1 ≥ qi ≡ 1/2 + δ(2qi− 1)/(4qi− δ(2qi− 1))
for all i ∈ IM\{n}. Moreover, qi ≤ min{qi, 5/6}.
In Figure 4.1, the left panel illustrates the key properties of the optimal testing
strategy. First, a parallel testing strategy is undertaken only when the testing costs are
sufficiently small (c < c). Otherwise, the burden of paying all experts immediately for
their testing efforts is greater than the value of information received; in that case, the
firm decides to implement a sequential testing strategy. Thus design tests that are more
expensive—and the resulting higher information rents—make sequential testing more
economical. In this respect, parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 4.5 extend previous findings
of Loch et al. (2001) to testing processes that are prone to information asymmetry.
However, it remains an open question exactly how the firm should implement a
sequential testing strategy. That is, should the firm hire multiple experts to test the
different design alternatives, or should it rather assign all testing activities to a single
expert? Proposition 4.5(iii) shows that this question’s answer is closely tied to the test
efficiency, qi, of the different designs. Relying on a single expert is especially beneficial
when the informational quality of the different design tests is relatively homogeneous
(i.e., when qi+1 ≥ qi). In contrast, if test efficiency is heterogeneous across designs then
the firm is better-off assigning a different expert to each design alternative. The explana-
tion for this finding is instructive. When the designs’ test efficiencies are very different,
then the firm prefers testing the designs of highest informational quality first and testing
those of lowest quality last (cf. Proposition 4.3(ii)). However, the informational rents
extracted from the firm by a single expert increase with any decline in the informational
quality of a design test. Hence the expert tries to keep the testing process alive as long
as possible—even if that requires reporting a negative assessment of what is actually
a good design. There can be no question that exposure to such strategic behavior is
suboptimal for the firm, which should therefore rely instead on multi-expert sequential
testing.
The left panel of Figure 4.1 also shows the role that the discount factor δ plays in the
firm’s choice of an optimal testing strategy. As expected, sequential testing strategies
are preferable when the time factor is less critical for the firm—that is, as δ increases.
Less obvious, though, is δ’s effect on the firm’s preferred sequential testing strategy. We
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Figure 4.1.: The Firm’s Optimal Testing Strategy.
Notes: The graphs plot, for an example with N = 2 design alternatives, the firm’s optimal
testing strategy under delegation (left panel) and first-best (right panel) conditions. Under a
parallel testing strategy it is optimal to test both designs simultaneously. Under any sequential
testing strategy (i.e., multi-expert, single-expert, or first-best) it is optimal to test design i = 1
first and i = 2 second. The other parameter values are v1 = 1000, v2 = 400, q1 = 0.9, K = 200,
and δ = 0.9.
find that a higher δ facilitates the single expert’s strategic extraction of rent because
prolonging the testing process is then less costly for her. It follows that the size of the
region in which the firm prefers multi-expert to single-expert sequential testing increases
with δ (cf. the sensitivity of q
i
as given in Proposition 4.5(iii)).
Finally, Proposition 4.5 and Proposition 4.4 together reveal an interesting non-
monotonicity in the optimal number of designs to test. For very low testing costs c, the
firm pursues a parallel testing strategy and simultaneously tests a moderate number |IP |
of designs. As c increases, the firm moves to a sequential testing strategy and, in so doing,
increases the number of designs to test (recall that |IM | ≥ |IP | by Proposition 4.4(ii)).
Yet when c becomes too large, design testing becomes so costly that the firm is impelled
to reverse course and reduce the number of design tests. These results contradict the
conventional wisdom—which is true in the absence of information asymmetry—that
lower testing costs unequivocally lead to more design tests.
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4.5.3. Costs of Delegation
Our aim in this section is to discover precisely how information asymmetries distort
the firm’s design-testing process. We start by describing, as a basis for comparison, the
firm’s first-best testing strategy: one in which both experts and firm behave as a single
entity. Then, in Proposition 4.6, we compare this first-best strategy with the optimal
testing strategy under delegation.
If the incentives of experts and the firm are aligned, then the latter need not pay
any action- or evidence-based bonuses to motivate the former to engage in high-effort
testing and to reveal their testing outcomes truthfully. So absent incentive misalignment,
the firm can simply reimburse the experts for their testing efforts by paying them their
effort costs c for each design test conducted. Given the resulting lack of information
asymmetry, the firm’s first-best (fb) expected profit under a sequential (seq) testing
strategy is given by Πfbseq =
∑
i∈Ifbseq δ
i−1(qivi − K − 2c)/2i; here I fbseq = {i ∈ N | qivi −
K − 2c ≥ 0} is the optimal set of designs to be tested, and the firm tests the designs
in decreasing order of qivi. Analogously, the firm’s first-best expected profit under a
parallel (par) testing strategy is Πfbpar =
∑
i∈Ifbpar((qivi − K)/2i − c); here the designs
in I fbpar are ordered in decreasing order of qivi, and I fbpar ⊆ I fbseq. Our final proposition
leverages these insights to identify how information asymmetry affects the firm’s optimal
testing strategy.
Proposition 4.6. (i) Under delegated sequential testing, the optimal set of designs to
be tested is a subset of the first-best set : IS, IM ⊆ I fbseq.
(ii) Under delegated parallel testing, the firm may choose a completely different set of
designs to test than under first-best conditions; thus there are cases in which IP∩I fbpar = ∅.
(iii) Suppose qi = q for all i ∈ N . If Πfbseq ≥ Πfbpar, then max{Π∗M ,Π∗S} ≥ Π∗P ;
however, the converse is not true in general.
The main finding of Proposition 4.6 is that information asymmetry has fundamen-
tally different effects on parallel than on sequential testing. Consider first the implica-
tions of delegation on the optimal design of a sequential testing strategy. Part (i) of the
proposition shows that—as expected—the presence of information asymmetry results
in a suboptimal testing process. In particular, the firm is testing too few designs and
therefore stops the testing process too early; that is, IS, IM ⊆ I fbseq. This result reflects
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that an expert’s information rent makes design testing unequivocally more expensive
(for the firm) than under first-best conditions.
One might suppose a similar reasoning to apply also with regard to parallel testing.
In this respect, however, part (ii) of Proposition 4.6 holds a surprise. Note that even
though the firm tests too few designs under a sequential testing strategy, it does still
test those designs that are also the most promising ones under first-best conditions.
Yet this statement does not necessarily hold for a parallel testing strategy. In fact,
Proposition 4.6(ii) reveals that the optimal sets of designs to be tested with and without
information asymmetry may be disjoint; under delegation, then, the firm may test an
entirely different set of design alternatives. How can we explain this split? Recall from
our discussion after Proposition 4.1 that the information rents extracted from the firm by
experts are decreasing in the quality of those experts’ information. Hence the firm never
tests designs that offer relatively poor information quality—that is, with almost complete
disregard for their economic potential vi. In contrast, under first-best conditions the
firm’s testing costs are constant and thus do not depend on a design’s informational
quality; in that case, it makes sense for the firm always to test those designs promising
the highest expected value qivi. Evidently, these different priorities under first-best and
delegated testing can lead to disjoint optimal test sets. This phenomenon is most likely
to occur when some design alternatives are of exceptionally high economic value vi but
low test efficiency qi.
Finally, Proposition 4.6(iii) hints at an important managerial insight: delegation
strongly favors sequential testing. This result is also clearly illustrated in the right panel
of Figure 4.1, which plots the firm’s optimal testing strategy vis-a`-vis the first-best
benchmark. Under symmetric test efficiencies (qi = q for all i ∈ N ), we can demonstrate
formally that if the firm prefers sequential testing under first-best conditions then it does
so under delegation as well. Although we are unfortunately not able to generalize this
result analytically to heterogeneous test efficiencies, our numerical experiments confirm
that the claim does indeed hold much more generally; see the right panel of Figure 4.1,
which allows for such heterogeneity. Our finding has implications both for the academic
literature and for practice. It questions at a fundamental level the claims of those (e.g.,
Dahan and Mendelson 2001, Loch et al. 2001) who have praised the effectiveness of
parallel testing strategies. In the presence of information asymmetry, the benefits of such
a parallel approach may be outweighed by high agency costs. This result finds further
support in practice. In recent years, testing costs have declined significantly owing
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to technological advancements in the realms of robotics, virtualization, and computer-
assisted test systems (among others). Following conventional wisdom—and previous
academic insights—these developments should have led firms to focus more strongly on
parallel testing strategies. However, there is no substantial evidence to date that such
a general trend is underway (though the software industry is a notable exception). Our
results offer a plausible and straightforward explanation for this observation: firms are
reluctant to incur the high costs of delegation that come with parallel testing.
4.6 Conclusions
Design testing is an integral part of virtually any new product development initiative
because it enables firms to identify the best possible designs for their new products. In
reality, however, managing such testing processes is a daunting challenge. The reason
is that in most cases the firm does not itself conduct the desired testing activities and
so has no direct accesses to the precious information; the firm must instead rely on the
recommendations of experts, who may be pursuing their own agendas. This delegated
nature of the testing process gives rise to information asymmetry between the firm and
the experts, which can result in a worrisome misalignment of objectives. The primary
goal of this paper is to understand how the firm can set up an effective testing process
that will reliably select the best design alternative—that is, notwithstanding the adverse
consequences of delegation. More precisely, our main contribution is to provide insights
on the questions of (i) which testing strategy the firm should choose and (ii) how the
firm can optimally incentivize the experts it hires.
It is remarkable that, regardless of the chosen testing strategy, the optimal com-
pensation scheme—one that motivates experts to test their designs with high effort and
to reveal their test outcomes truthfully—always involves but two payments: a success
bonus if an expert’s design is developed and turns out to be technologically feasible,
and a reward that reimburses an expert for his efforts in case the firm dismisses the
design he is testing or terminates the testing process altogether. We show in addition
that the balance between these two payments is fundamentally different for designs with
different levels of test efficiency. Designs that can be tested with high precision require
a strong focus on individual success bonuses, whereas designs that are evaluated with
lower quality demand a stronger emphasis on consolation awards.
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Our findings have immediate managerial implications. Although design testing is
a complex organizational process, the structure of the optimal compensation schemes is
fairly simple. As a result, the optimal contracts derived in this paper should be relatively
easy to implement in practice. Regarding the relative sizes of the two payments, we
emphasize that the firm must carefully adjust its contracts to reflect the quality of
test outcomes. Firms that adopt a one-size-fits-all approach cannot help but sacrifice,
eventually, their testing effectiveness.
As for the firm’s optimal testing strategy, we find that two parameters critically
determine the firm’s optimal choice: testing costs and the quality of information. In line
with previous research, we show that a parallel testing strategy is optimal only when
testing costs are sufficiently small. In contrast, the higher the testing costs, the more
beneficial a sequential testing strategy becomes. Yet it is an unanswered question just
how the firm should set up its sequential testing strategy. Should it mandate a single
expert to carry out all test activities, or should it rather assign a different expert to
each design test? Our results indicate that the former approach is optimal when the
informational quality of the different design tests is relatively homogeneous. When test
efficiency is very heterogenous across designs, however, the firm should hire multiple
experts because in that case a single expert might artificially keep the testing process
alive in order to receive ongoing payments—to the firm’s obvious detriment.
These results have clear consequences for practice. We identify two levers the firm
can use when designing an effective testing strategy: the order of the different design
tests (parallel vs. sequential), and the number of experts to employ. Whereas the former
option has been extensively discussed in the academic literature, the latter option has yet
to receive serious attention. It is important to recognize that the two levers address two
different concerns. The choice of whether to use a parallel or sequential testing strategy
depends on the testing costs, whereas the ideal number of experts depends on the extent
to which the efficiency of tests (for the different designs) is heterogeneous.
Finally, we show how the presence of information asymmetry affects the various
testing strategies. Overall, our results point to the same conclusion: the delegation of
testing leads to a suboptimal testing process whose information asymmetries are signif-
icantly more harmful to parallel than to sequential testing strategies. In other words,
our findings indicate that parallel testing may be less effective than usually claimed in
the academic literature (Dahan and Mendelson 2001, Loch et al. 2001) when the testing
process involves information asymmetries. This finding may also explain the practical
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observation that, even though technological advancements have lowered testing costs in
recent years, no significant shift toward parallel testing efforts is evident.
To maintain tractability and develop a parsimonious model, we necessarily made
some assumptions about the specific trade-offs inherent to a sequential testing strategy.
In particular, we assumed that the design alternatives are sufficiently different that the
firm cannot exploit any between-design learning effects. Also, we did not allow the
firm to choose previously tested designs for development. Both assumptions clearly lead
to an underestimate of the performance of sequential testing strategies, from which it
follows that relaxing these assumptions could only strengthen our main message that
delegation favors sequential testing. Furthermore, one can readily verify that the opti-
mal contract structures would remain relatively intact even without these assumptions;
hence our results are applicable to a wide range of practical scenarios. With regard to
the firm’s choice of testing strategy, we focused on “polar” cases: fully parallel versus
fully sequential testing, and a single expert versus n experts. In reality, firms are free to
use any mixture of parallel and sequential testing strategies, and they may also hire any
arbitrary number of experts. Whether such hybrid strategies can improve the efficacy of
delegated testing processes is an important question for future research. Another inter-
esting research possibility is for empirical studies to examine the relationship between a
firm’s chosen testing strategy and the severity of its agency issues. Our own theoretical
results lead us to conjecture that firms (and industries) with relatively strong agency
problems are much more likely to use sequential than parallel testing strategies.
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Appendix A
Proofs of Chapter II
Lemma A.1. There exists a unique pure-strategy second-round equilibrium for any feed-
back policy.
Proof of Lemma A.1. Observe that each Nash equilibrium satisfies ei2 ∈ [0,
√
A/c] be-
cause ui2(0, ej2) ≥ 0 ≥ ui2(
√
A/c, ej2) > ui2(ei2, ej2) for any ej2 and all ei2 >
√
A/c.
Hence to prove existence and uniqueness of the second-round equilibrium, we can replace
the original contest by a modified contest where each solver’s effort choice is restricted
to [0,
√
A/c]. These two contests have the same Nash equilibria because each Nash equi-
librium satisfies ei2 ∈ [0,
√
A/c], ui2 is continuous, and each solver’s strategy space is an
interval of R. Also, straightforward differentiation shows that ui2 is strictly concave in
ei2 for given ej2. Hence, by Theorem 1.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), there exists a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the original contest.
It remains to show that this equilibrium is also unique. However, once we observe
that ∂2ui2/∂e
2
i2 +2c = −∂2ui2/∂ei2∂ej2, and ∂Eζ1 [g∆ζ2(vi1 + keei2 − vj1 − keej2)|fi] /∂ei2
∈ [−ke/a2, ke/a2] for any feedback fi, this is just a simple application of Theorems 2
and 6 in Rosen (1965).
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Without feedback between round one and two, solver i’s opti-
mization problem is equivalent to a utility maximization problem with simultaneous
decisions on ei1 and ei2. Moreover, since performance is linear in effort, while the
costs are strictly convex, equilibrium effort levels must be the same in both rounds.
Thus, in equilibrium, ei1 = ei2 = e
no
i , and solver i’s equilibrium effort has to solve
enoi ∈ argmaxei A · Eζ1 [G∆ζ2(2keei + ζi1 − 2keej − ζj1)] − 2ce2i . Since this is a strictly
concave maximization problem, enoi is given by the following first-order optimality con-
dition:
2Ake · Eζ1
[
g∆ζ2(2kee
no
i + ζi1 − 2keenoj − ζj1)
]
= 4cenoi . (A.1)
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By the symmetry of g∆ζ2 around zero, it follows readily that the unique solution to the
solvers’ optimality conditions is symmetric; that is enoi = e
no
j . Inserting this information
in (A.1) yields enoi = Ake/(2c) · Eζ1 [g∆ζ2(ζi1 − ζj1)] = Ake/(2c) ·
∫ a
−a g∆ζ2(z)g∆ζ1(z)dz =
Ake/(2c) ·
∫ a
−a g∆ζ1(z)
2dz = Ake/(3ac).
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Given public feedback, solvers perfectly learn v1 after round
one. As such, solver i’s second-round equilibrium effort solves epubi2 ∈ argmaxei2 A ·
G∆ζ2(vi1 + keei2 − vj1 − keej2) − ce2i2, and the corresponding necessary and sufficient
first-order optimality condition is given by
Ake · g∆ζ2(vi1 + keepubi2 − vj1 − keepubj2 ) = 2cepubi2 . (A.2)
By the symmetry of g∆ζ2 around zero, the unique second-round equilibrium is symmetric:
epubi2 = e
pub
j2 .
In the first round, solver i’s equilibrium effort has to solve epubi1 ∈ argmaxei1 A ·
Eζ1 [G∆ζ2(keei1 + ζi1 − keej1 − ζj1)]− ce2i1 −Eζ1
[
c(epubi2 )
2
]
, and the corresponding neces-
sary first-order optimality condition is given by
Ake · Eζ1
[
g∆ζ2(kee
pub
i1 + ζi1 − keepubj1 − ζj1)
]
− 2cepubi1 −
∂
∂ei1
Eζ1
[
c(epubi2 )
2
]
= 0. (A.3)
Note that the first two terms in (A.3) capture the direct effect of epubi1 on solver i’s
expected utility, whereas the third term captures the indirect effect of epubi1 on i’s second-
round effort epubi2 . In equilibrium, this indirect effect must be zero. To see this, note that
(A.3) reveals that epubi1 has no strategic effect on e
pub
j2 . By the symmetry of the second-
round equilibrium, this implies that, in equilibrium, the strategic effect of epubi1 on e
pub
i2 has
to be zero as well. Yet, this is true if and only if epubi1 = e
pub
j1 ; i.e., first-round equilibrium
efforts are symmetric. Inserting this information in (A.2) and (A.3) shows that the
unique PBE under public feedback is given by epubi2 (∆ζ1) = Ake/(2c) · g∆ζ2(∆ζ1) =
Ake/(2a
2c) · (a− |∆ζ1|), and epubi1 = Eζ1
[
epubi2 (∆ζ1)
]
= Ake/(3ac).
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Given private feedback, solver i perfectly learns vi1 after round
one, but receives no additional information on vj1. As such, solver i’s second-round
equilibrium effort solves eprii2 ∈ argmaxei2 A ·Evj1 [G∆ζ2(vi1 +keei2−vj1−keej2)|vi1]− ce2i2,
and the corresponding necessary and sufficient first-order optimality condition is given
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by
Ake · Evj1 [g∆ζ2(vi1 + keeprii2 − vj1 − keeprij2 )|vi1] = 2ceprii2 . (A.4)
Lemma A.1 ensures that the second-round equilibrium defined by (A.4) is unique. Next,
we establish the uniqueness of the first-round equilibrium. In the first round, solver i’s
equilibrium effort has to solve eprii1 ∈ argmaxei1 A ·Eζ1 [G∆ζ2(ke(ei1 + eprii2 ) + ζi1− ke(ej1 +
eprij2 ) −ζj1)]− ce2i1−Eζ1
[
c(eprii2 )
2
]
, and the corresponding necessary first-order optimality
condition is given by
Ake·Eζ1
[
g∆ζ2(ke(e
pri
i1 + e
pri
i2 ) + ζi1 − ke(eprij1 + eprij2 )− ζj1) ·
(
1 +
∂eprii2
∂ei1
− ∂e
pri
j2
∂ei1
)]
−2ceprii1
− Eζ1
[
2ceprii2 ·
∂eprii2
∂ei1
]
= 0. (A.5)
Clearly, solver j’s second-round effort cannot be influenced by solver i’s first-round ef-
fort, because solver j does not receive any information on vi1. Therefore, ∂e
pri
j2 /∂ei1 =
0. Rewriting (A.5) yields AkeEζ1 [g∆ζ2(ke(e
pri
i1 + e
pri
i2 ) + ζi1 − ke(eprij1 + eprij2 ) − ζj1)] −
2ceprii1 + Eζ1 [(Akeg∆ζ2(ke(e
pri
i1 + e
pri
i2 ) + ζi1 − ke(eprij1 + eprij2 )− ζj1)− 2ceprii2 ) · ∂eprii2 /∂ei1] = 0,
where the third term is zero because Eζ1 [(Akeg∆ζ2(ke(e
pri
i1 + e
pri
i2 ) + ζi1 − ke(eprij1 + eprij2 )−
ζj1)− 2ceprii2 )∂eprii2 /∂ei1] = Evi1 [Evj1 [(Akeg∆ζ2(ke(eprii1 + eprii2 ) + ζi1 − ke(eprij1 + eprij2 )− ζj1)−
2ceprii2 )∂e
pri
i2 /∂ei1|vi1]] = Evi1 [∂eprii2 /∂ei1 ·Evj1 [Akeg∆ζ2(ke(eprii1 + eprii2 ) + ζi1− ke(eprij1 + eprij2 )−
ζj1)−2ceprii2 |vi1]] = Evi1 [∂eprii2 /∂ei1 ·(AkeEvj1 [g∆ζ2(vi1+keeprii2 −vj1−keeprij2 ))|vi1]−2ceprii2 )] =
0. The first equality follows from the law of iterated expectations, the second equality
is true because solver i’s second-round effort choice is independent of vj1, the third
equality follows from rearranging terms, and the last equality follows from solver i’s
second-round optimality condition (A.4). Thus, the first-order optimality condition
of solver i is Ake · Eζ1
[
g∆ζ2(ke(e
pri
i1 + e
pri
i2 ) + ζi1 − ke(eprij1 + eprij2 )− ζj1)
]
− 2ceprii1 = 0,
and by the symmetry of g∆ζ2 around zero, it follows readily that the unique solu-
tion to the solvers’ optimality conditions is symmetric; that is eprii1 = e
pri
j1 . Moreover,
epri1 = Evi1
[
eprii2 (vi1)
]
= Eζi1
[
eprii2 (ζi1)
]
.
We now proceed with deriving the solvers’ second-round equilibrium effort. We
conjecture that the unique second-round equilibrium is symmetric in the sense that
eprii2 (ζi1) = e
pri
2 (ζi1) and e
pri
j2 (ζj1) = e
pri
2 (ζj1), and that v
pri(ζi1) = ζi1 + kee
pri
2 (ζi1) increases
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in ζi1. We will demonstrate in retrospective that these claims are true. Together with
(A.4), the above properties imply that the equilibrium effort function epri2 (·) solves the
following integral equation: Ake · Eζj1 [g∆ζ2(ζi1 + keepri2 (ζi1) − ζj1 − keepri2 (ζj1))|ζi1] =
2cepri2 (ζi1), or equivalently,
Ak2e · Eζj1 [g∆ζ2(vpri(ζi1)− vpri(ζj1))|ζi1] = 2c
(
vpri(ζi1)− ζi1
)
. (A.6)
Because g∆ζ2(v
pri(ζi1) − vpri(ζj1)) is positive only if vpri(ζi1) − vpri(ζj1) ∈ [−a, a], we
distinguish three cases:
(I) If vpri(ζi1) − vpri(ζj1) ∈ [−a, a] for all ζj1, then ζi1 ∈ [ζu, ζo]. In this case, (A.6)
is given by∫ ζi1
−a
2
(a− vpri(ζi1) + vpri(ζj1))dζj1 +
∫ a
2
ζi1
(a+ vpri(ζi1)− vpri(ζj1))dζj1
= 2aκ(vpri(ζi1)− ζi1),
(A.7)
and differentiating both sides with respect to ζi1 leads to the first-order ordinary differen-
tial equation
(
vpri(ζi1)
)′
= aκ/(ζi1 + aκ), with canonical solution v
pri(ζi1) = aκ ln((aκ+
ζi1)/γ3). It is easy to verify that v
pri(a/2)− vpri(−a/2) = aκ ln((2κ+ 1)/(2κ− 1)) > a,
implying that [ζu, ζo] ⊂ [−a/2, a/2].
(II) For ζi1 ∈ [−a/2, ζu], (A.6) becomes∫ ζi1
−a
2
(a− vpri(ζi1) + vpri(ζj1))dζj1 +
∫ v−1(vpri(ζi1)+a)
ζi1
(a+ vpri(ζi1)− vpri(ζj1))dζj1
= 2aκ(vpri(ζi1)− ζi1),
(A.8)
and differentiating both sides with respect to ζi1 leads to the differential equation
(vpri(ζi1))
′[2ζi1 + 2aκ + a/2 − v−1(vpri(ζi1) + a)] = 2aκ, which is a Bernoulli equation
in v−1(·) whose implicit solution is
v−1(vpri) = Ce
1
aκ
vpri − a
(
κ+
1
4
)
− 1
2aκ
e
1
aκ
vpri
∫
e−
1
aκ
vpriv−1(vpri + a)dvpri. (A.9)
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(III) In a similar vein, we can show that for ζi1 ∈ [ζo, a/2], the implicit solution to
(A.6) is given by
v−1(vpri) = C ′e
1
aκ
vpri − a
(
κ− 1
4
)
− 1
2aκ
e
1
aκ
vpri
∫
e−
1
aκ
vpriv−1(vpri − a)dvpri. (A.10)
Combining (A.9) and (A.10) allows us to derive closed-form solutions. With (A.10),
(A.9) becomes v−1(vpri) = Ce
1
aκ
vpri − a (3
2
κ+ 1
8
) − C ′ 1
2aκ
e
1
κ e
1
aκ
vprivpri
+
(
1
2aκ
)2
e
1
aκ
vpri
∫∫
e−
1
aκ
vpriv−1(vpri)d(vpri +a)dvpri. Note that v−1(vpri)−2aκ(v−1(vpri))′+
(aκ)2(v−1(vpri))′′ = v−1(vpri)/4 − a(3κ/2 + 1/8). This is an equation of damped vi-
brations with canonical solution v−1(vpri) = γ4e
3
2aκ
vpri + γ5e
1
2aκ
vpri − a (1
6
+ 2κ
)
. In
an identical way, we can derive the canonical solution for ζi1 ∈ [ζo, a/2]: v−1(vpri) =
γ1e
3
2aκ
vpri + γ2e
1
2aκ
vpri + a
(
1
6
− 2κ). Thus, the canonical solution to (A.6) is given by
v−1(vpri) =

γ4e
3
2aκ
vpri + γ5e
1
2aκ
vpri − a (1
6
+ 2κ
)
if vo − a ≤ vpri < vu
γ3e
1
aκ
vpri − aκ if vu ≤ vpri ≤ vo
γ1e
3
2aκ
vpri + γ2e
1
2aκ
vpri + a
(
1
6
− 2κ) if vo < vpri ≤ vu + a,
(A.11)
where vu = v
pri(ζu), vo = v
pri(ζo), vo− a = vpri(−a/2), and vu + a = vpri(a/2). With the
substitution u = exp (v/(2aκ)) we can represent v−1(vpri) as a set of cubic equations,
which we can solve for vpri(ζi1) with standard mathematical tools (Olver et al. 2010, p.
131) to gain
vpri(ζi1) =

2aκ · ln
(√
−4γ5
3γ4
· sin
(
1
3
· sin−1
(√
−3γ4
γ5
· a(1+12κ)+6ζi1
4γ5
)))
if − a
2
≤ ζi1 < ζu
aκ · ln
(
ζi1+aκ
γ3
)
if ζu ≤ ζi1 ≤ ζo
2aκ · ln
(
1
6
· 3√z(ζi1)− 2 · γ2γ1 · 13√z(ζi1)
)
if ζo < ζi1 ≤ a2 .
(A.12)
It remains to determine the integration constants. From (II), it follows readily that γ4 =
−γ1n3 and γ5 = γ2n. Moreover, (A.6) satisfies all requirements of the Implicit Function
Theorem. Therefore, vpri(ζi1) is continuously differentiable. From the continuity of(
vpri(ζi1)
)′
, it follows that γ2n = 2γ3xy(n
3x + y)/(n2x2 + y2), and 3γ1n = 2γ3(ny −
x)/(n2x2 + y2). Additionally, the continuity of vpri(ζi1) implies that ζu = γ3x
2 − aκ,
ζo = γ3y
2 − aκ, γ3 = 3a(κ + 1/6)(n2x2 + y2)/(x2(3y2 − n2x2 + 4n3xy)), and γ3 =
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3a(κ− 1/6)n(n2x2 + y2)/(y2(3n3x2− ny2 + 4xy)). Equating these two expressions leads
to (2.6). Finally, the integral equation (A.6) becomes a/(6κ)− a(κ− 1/6) ln(y)− a(κ+
1/6) ln(x) − aκ + 2γ1((y/n)3 − x3)/3 + γ3(y2 + x2)/2 = 0, which is the same as (2.7).
As a last step, we need to verify that our initial conjecture that vpri(ζi1) increases in ζi1
is true. Note that because 0 < x < y, and n > 1, we have γ1, γ2, γ3 > 0. Thus, it is
obvious that vpri(ζi1) increases in ζi1 for ζi1 ≥ ζu. For ζi1 < ζu, we have (v−1(vpri))′ > 0
if 3γ4x
2 + γ5 = 2γ3x > 0, which is true. Therefore, v
pri(ζi1) increases in ζi1, which
concludes the proof.
Note on our solution methodology : The crucial step is to transform the integral
equation (A.6) into an ordinary differential equation (ODE) by differentiating both sides
of the equality with respect to ζi1. Clearly, the unique solution to (A.6) also solves the
ODE. However, the ODE may have solutions that do not solve (A.6). To circumvent this
problem, we identify the ODE’s canonical solution (A.11), which defines the solution to
(A.6) up to certain constants. These constants are, in turn, uniquely defined by the
properties of (A.6).
Proof of Corollary 2.1. Let x˜ = e−(κ−1)/(4κ
2) = n−(κ−1)/(2κ) and y˜ = e(κ+1)/(4κ
2)
= n(κ+1)/(2κ). We now show that (x˜, y˜) is the solution to the system of equations
(2.6)-(2.7) as κ → ∞. Inserting x˜ and y˜ in (2.6) reveals that the left-hand side is
equal to −2n2/κ · (2 + n2 +m(1 + 2n2)), which converges to zero as κ → ∞ because
limκ→∞ n = 1, and limκ→∞m = −1. Similarly, the left-hand side of (2.7) is given by
(1− 6κ2)/(κ(1 + 6κ)) + (m + 1)/(4κ) + (m− 1)/(4κ2) + 3(1 + n2)/(2(1 + 2n2)), which
clearly converges to zero as κ→∞. Moreover, limκ→∞ vu = limκ→∞ 2aκ ln(x˜) = −a/2,
and limκ→∞ vo = limκ→∞ 2aκ ln(y˜) = a/2. From (2.5), it follows that only the middle
sector persists as κ → ∞. Also, by inserting x˜ and y˜ in the formula for γ3 in Propo-
sition 2.3, limκ→∞ γ˜3 = limκ→∞ γ3. Taken together, this implies that limκ→∞ e˜2(ζi1) =
limκ→∞ e
pri
2 (ζi1) for all ζi1.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. (i) From Propositions 2.1 and 2.2, it follows readily that eno1 =
epub1 . It remains to show that e
no
1 > e
pri
1 . Note that (A.4) reveals that e
pri
2 (ζi1) <
Ake/(2ac) for all ζi1. Thus, 0 ≤ epri1 = Eζi1
[
epri2 (ζi1)
]
< Ake/(2ac). It follows that
lima→∞ eno1 = lima→∞ e
pri
1 = 0. Furthermore, ∂e
no
1 /∂a = −eno1 /a, and ∂epri1 /∂a =
−epri1 /a + ∂(aepri1 )/∂a > −epri1 /a. As a result, eno1 = epri1 = 0 for a→∞, but ∂epri1 /∂a >
∂eno1 /∂a; i.e., e
pri
1 decreases less steeply than e
no
1 . This implies that e
no
1 > e
pri
1 if a becomes
an  > 0 smaller. But if eno1 > e
pri
1 , then e
pri
1 decreases even less steeply compared to e
no
1 .
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By an inductive argument, it follows that eno1 − epri1 > 0, and this difference decreases in
a.
(ii) The result is a direct consequence of (i) in combination with Propositions 2.1 -
2.3.
(iii) By (i) and (ii), it follows that Πpubavg = E[v
pub
i2 + v
pub
j2 ]/2 − A =
(epub1 + E∆ζ1 [e
pub
2 (∆ζ1)])− A = (eno1 + eno2 )− A = Πnoavg > Πpriavg = (epri1 + Eζi1 [epri2 (ζi1)])−
A.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. (i) The result follows directly from comparing the firm’s ex-
pected profits under the two different feedback policies: Πnobest =
E [maxi{ζi1 + ζi2 + 2keenoi }]−A = 2keeno1 +E [maxi{ζi1 + ζi2}]−A = a(2/(3κ)+7/30)−A;
and Πpubbest = E[maxi{ζi1 + ζi2 +keepub1 +keepub2 (ζ1)}]−A = 2keepub1 +E [maxi{ζi1 + ζi2}]−
A = Πnobest, where we made use of the well-known fact that max{a, b} = (a+b+ |a−b|)/2.
(ii) Let κ = 1. Then, Πpribest ≈ 0.889a−A < 0.9a−A = Πpubbest, and by the continuity
of Πpubbest and Π
pri
best, it follows that there exists a κ > 1, such that Π
pri
best < Π
pub
best for all
κ < κ.
(iii) The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we establish a lower bound for the
firm’s expected profits under a private feedback policy, Πpribest < Π
pri
best, and show that
Πpribest > Π
pub
best if γ3 is sufficiently low. Last, we verify that there exists a κ such that γ3
becomes sufficiently low for all κ > κ.
Lower bound. The firm’s expected profit is Πpribest = kee
pri
1 + E[maxi{ζi1 + ζi2 +
kee
pri
2 (ζi1)}]−A. Clearly, for any effort function e2(ζi1) with e2(ζi1) ≤ epri2 (ζi1) for all ζi1,
we have Πpribest = kee
pri
1 + E [maxi{ζi1 + ζi2 + kee2(ζi1)}] − A ≤ Πpribest. In the remainder,
we set e2(ζi1) ≡ − ζi1ke + aκke ln(ζi1 + aκ) − aκke ln(γ3). To see that this is indeed a lower
bound on epri2 (ζi1), note that e2(ζi1) solves the integral equation (A.7) for all ζi1. By
doing so, however, we ignore the fact that for some ζi1 and ζj1, we have ζi1 + kee2(ζi1)−
ζj1 + kee2(ζj1) /∈ [−a, a]. This implies that the left-hand side of (A.7) is extended by
negative terms compared to the correct solution outlined in Proposition 2.3. Now, since
the left-hand side is smaller, it follows by equality that the right-hand side is smaller as
well, thereby implying e2(ζi1) ≤ epri2 (ζi1).
With e2(ζi1), Π
pri
best = a · (−κ3(κ2 + 14)(e
1
κ − e− 1κ ) + κ4(e 1κ + e− 1κ ) + κ(κ2 − 2κ +
1
4
) ln(2κ−1
2κ+1
)+ 1
2
κ ln(a4(2κ−1)(2κ+1)3)+ 5
6
κ2−2κ(1+ln(2)+ln(γ3))+ 112), and Πpribest > Πpubbest
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if and only if γ3 < γ3, with
γ
3
=
a
2
e
−κ2
2 (κ2+
1
4)
(
e
1
κ−e− 1κ
)
e
κ3
2
(
e
1
κ+e−
1
κ
)
·
(
2κ− 1
2κ+ 1
) 1
2(κ2−2κ+ 14)
4
√
(2κ− 1)(2κ+ 1)3e 512κ−1− 340κ− 13κ2 .
(A.13)
Taking the limit. To test whether γ3 < γ3, we will first derive an upper bound on γ3,
and then show that this upper bound is smaller than γ
3
. As a preliminary step, define
the function Γ(x, y) = 2γ3/(a(1 + 6κ)) = (n
2x2 + y2)/(x2(3y2 − n2x2 + 4n3xy)), which
decreases in x and y. Since x ∈ [e−1/(4κ), e−1/(4κ)·(1−1/κ)] and y ∈ [e1/(4κ), e1/(4κ)·(1+1/κ)],
it follows that Γ(x, y) ∈ [Γ,Γ] = [e1/(2κ)/((1 + 2e1/κ)e1/(2κ2)), e1/(2κ)/(1 + 2e1/κ)]. Given
the monotonicity of Γ(x, y), we can build the inverse function of Γ(x, y) with respect to
y:
y(x,Γ) =
nx
1− 3Γx2 ·
(
2n2Γx2 −
√
4(1 + n4)Γ2x4 − (Γx2 − 1)2
)
. (A.14)
Inserting (A.14) in (2.6) and (2.7) allows us to eliminate y from the system of equations,
and to represent it in variables x and Γ. Now, Πpribest ≤ Πpubbest if and only if the transformed
system of equations has a solution for Γ in the interval [Γ3,Γ], and x arbitrary, where
Γ3 = 2γ3/(a(1 + 6κ)). We proceed to show that for sufficiently large κ, such a solution
does not exist; but before doing so, we derive some important properties.
Let l1(x, y) be the left-hand side of (2.6), and l2(x, y) be the left-hand side of
(2.7). Straightforward differentiation verifies that there exists a κ such that for all
κ > κ, l1(x, y) increases in x and decreases in y, whereas l2(x, y) decreases in x and
y. Furthermore, denote by x1(y) (resp. x2(y)) the solution to l1(x1(y), y) = 0 (resp.
l2(x2(y), y) = 0) for any y. Applying the Implicit Function Theorem reveals that
x1(y) increases in y, while x2(y) decreases in y for κ > κ. In a next step, we transfer
these results to the transformed system of equations, which we denote by l′1(x,Γ) = 0
and l′2(x,Γ) = 0. Analogously to above, let x
′
1(Γ) (resp. x
′
2(Γ)) be the solution to
l′1(x
′
1(Γ),Γ) = 0 (resp. l
′
2(x
′
2(Γ),Γ) = 0) for any Γ. Moreover, note that by the Inverse
Function Theorem, y(x,Γ) decreases in Γ, because Γ(x, y) decreases in y. Therefore,
by total differentiation, it follows that ∂x′1(Γ)/∂Γ = ∂x1(y)/∂y · ∂y(x,Γ)/∂Γ < 0, and
∂x′2(Γ)/∂Γ = ∂x2(y)/∂y · ∂y(x,Γ)/∂Γ > 0 for κ > κ.
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We are now well-equipped to complete the proof. We want to show that there
exists a κ such that for all κ > κ, the transformed system of equations l′1(x
∗,Γ∗) = 0
and l′2(x
∗,Γ∗) = 0 admits no solution with Γ∗ ∈ [Γ3,Γ]. We do so by verifying that for all
κ > κ, l′2(x,Γ) > 0 for any x and Γ ∈ [Γ3,Γ]. Note that for κ > κ, l′2(x,Γ) decreases in
x, and increases in Γ. This is true because ∂l′2(x,Γ)/∂Γ = ∂l2(x, y)/∂y ·∂y/∂Γ > 0, and,
by the Implicit Function Theorem, ∂l′2(x,Γ)/∂x = −(∂l′2(x,Γ)/∂Γ)/(∂x′2(Γ)/∂Γ) < 0.
Therefore, for κ > κ, l′2(x,Γ) ≥ l′2(x,Γ3), where x = e−1/(4κ)·(1−1/κ). It remains to
demonstrate that l′2(x,Γ3) > 0, or equivalently, l2(x, y(x,Γ3)) > 0 for κ > κ. We will
conclude this final step with the help of a two-step Taylor series expansion. As a starting
point, we substitute 1/κ by z. This substitution allows us to develop the Taylor series at
zˆ = 0. Now, as a first step, the Taylor series of y(x,Γ3) at zˆ = 0 is given by y
Taylor(z) =
1 + z/4− 3z2/32− 1177z3/4480− 611z4/14336 +O(z5). In a second step, we can now
derive the Taylor series of l2(x, y(x,Γ3)) = l2(x, y
Taylor(z)) at zˆ = 0. After resubstitution,
this Taylor series becomes lTaylor2 (x, y(x,Γ3)) = 11/(3360κ
2) − 23/(960κ3) + O(1/κ4).
Since the first term is positive, we can conclude that there exists a κ < ∞ such that
lTaylor2 (x, y(x,Γ3)) > 0 for all κ > κ.
Proof of Proposition 2.6. (i) Suppose that both solvers have invested arbitrary first-
round efforts e1. Each solver will make his submission decision so as to maximize his
expected continuation utility.
Case (a): If both solvers submit their intermediate solutions, they perfectly learn
v1. According to (A.2), each solver will invest a second-round effort of e
ss
2 (v1) = Ake/2c ·
g∆ζ2(vi1−vj1). As a result, each solver’s expected continuation utility before submission
is ussic = A · Ev1 [G∆ζ2(vi1 − vj1)]− Ev1 [cess2 (v1)2].
Case (b): If only solver i submits his intermediate solution, both solvers only learn
vi1. The solvers’ equilibrium second-round effort is e
sn
2 (vi1) = Ake/2c · Evj1 [g∆ζ2(vi1 −
vj1)|vi1], and each solver’s expected continuation utility is usnic = A ·Ev1 [G∆ζ2(vi1−vj1)]−
Evi1 [cesn2 (vi1)2].
Case (c): If no solver submits his solution, then no feedback is transmitted and ac-
cording to (A.1), the solvers’ equilibrium second-round effort is enn2 = Ake/2c·Ev1 [g∆ζ2(vi1−
vj1)], which yields the following expected continuation utility for solver i: u
nn
ic = A ·
Ev1 [G∆ζ2(vi1 − vj1)]− c(enn2 )2.
By symmetry, case (c) is an equilibrium if and only if unnic > u
sn
ic , or equiva-
lently, Evi1 [esn2 (vi1)2] > (enn2 )2. This is true because Jensen’s inequality implies that
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Evi1 [esn2 (vi1)2] > (Evi1 [esn2 (vi1)])2 = (enn2 )2. To show that case (c) is the unique equilib-
rium we verify that case (a) is not an equilibrium: usnjc > u
ss
jc follows from Jensen’s
inequality because Evi1 [esn2 (vi1)2] = Evi1 [Evj1 [ess2 (v1)|vi1]2] < Evi1 [Evj1 [ess2 (v1)2|vi1]] =
Ev1 [ess2 (v1)2].
(ii) In the case of private feedback, a solver’s submission decision is unobservable
to the other solver. Hence it is sufficient to verify that a solver’s expected utility from
submitting is larger than from not submitting for any mixed strategy of solver j and
arbitrary e1. Let qj be solver j’s probability of submitting, and let e
s
j2 and e
n
j2 be his
second-round efforts if he submits or not, respectively (Lemma A1 guarantees unique-
ness).
Solver i’s expected utility when submitting his intermediate solution and receiving
feedback vi1 is u
s
i2(ei2, vi1) = qj(A · Evj1 [G∆ζ2(vi1 + keei2 − vj1 − keesj2)|vi1]− ce2i2) + (1−
qj)(A · Evj1 [G∆ζ2(vi1 + keei2 − vj1 − keenj2)|vi1]− ce2i2). Let usi2(ei2) = Evi1 [usi2(ei2, vi1)] be
his corresponding expected continuation utility, and note that his expected continuation
utility from not submitting is uni2(ei2) = qj(A ·Ev1 [G∆ζ2(vi1 +keei2−vj1−keesj2)]−ce2i2)+
(1− qj)(A · Ev1 [G∆ζ2(vi1 + keei2 − vj1 − keenj2)]− ce2i2). Furthermore, let esi2(vi1) and eni2
be solver i’s optimal effort choices if he submits or not, respectively, his intermediate
solution. Then it is true that usi2(e
s
i2(vi1)) = Evi1 [usi2(esi2(vi1), vi1)] > Evi1 [usi2(eni2, vi1)] =
uni2(e
n
i2), which proves the claim.
Proof of Proposition 2.7. Let A1 = αA and A2 = (1−α)A, α ∈ [0, 1], be the awards for
the first- and second-round winner, respectively, and note that Proposition 2.6 implies
that α must be sufficiently large to incentivize solvers to submit their intermediate
solutions. Clearly, if α is not large enough then a milestone award only reduces the
overall contest incentives, which cannot be optimal. In contrast, if α is large enough,
then solvers submit their intermediate solutions. In this case, following the same steps
as in the proof of Proposition 2.2, it is straightforward to show that the unique PBE
is symmetric and that the solvers’ equilibrium efforts are eint1 = (1 + α/2)e
pub
1 and
eint2 (∆ζ1) = (1−α)epub2 (∆ζ1). It follows that eint1 +E[eint2 (∆ζ1)] = (2−α/2)epub1 , implying
that the firm’s expected profits decrease in α. Thus the firm always chooses α = 0 in
optimum.
Proof of Proposition 2.8. Suppose that after round one, the firm truthfully reveals the
solvers’ ranking, but not v1; and wlog suppose that solver i is currently the leader.
Hence both solvers know that ∆v1 = vi1 − vj1 > 0. Solver i’s second-round equilibrium
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effort solves eri2 ∈ argmaxei2 A · Ev1 [G∆ζ2(vi1 + keei2 − vj1 − keej2)|∆v1 > 0] − ce2i2,
and the corresponding necessary and sufficient first-order optimality condition is Ake ·
Ev1 [g∆ζ2(vi1 +keeri2−vj1−keerj2)|∆v1 > 0] = 2ceri2. By the symmetry of g∆ζ2 around zero,
the unique second-round equilibrium is symmetric, eri2 = e
r
j2. In the first round, solver
i’s equilibrium effort solves eri1 ∈ argmaxei1 A ·Eζ1 [G∆ζ2(ζi1 +keei1− ζj1−keej1)]− ce2i1−
Eζ1 [c(eri2)2], with necessary optimality condition Ake ·Eζ1 [g∆ζ2(ζi1 +keeri1−ζj1−keerj1)]−
2ceri1 − ∂∂ei1Eζ1 [c(eri2)2] = 0. By the very same argument as in the proof of Proposition
2.2, the first-round equilibrium is also unique and symmetric; that is eri1 = e
r
j1. Hence,
er1 = Ake/(2c) · E∆ζ1 [g∆ζ2(∆ζ1)] = Ake/(3ac) and er2 = Ake/(2c) · E∆ζ1 [g∆ζ2(∆ζ1)|∆ζ1 >
0]. Since g∆ζ1|∆ζ1>0(u) = 2g∆ζ1(u) for u > 0 and 0 otherwise, it follows that e
r
2 =
Ake/(3ac).
Proof of Proposition 2.9. (i) Upon learning v1 under a noisy public-feedback policy,
solver i chooses his second-round equilibrium effort by solving enoii2 ∈ argmaxei2 qA ·
G∆ζ2(vi1 + keei2 − vj1 − keej2) + (1 − q)A · Ev1 [G∆ζ2(vi1 + keei2 − vj1 − keej2)] − ce2i2.
Applying Lemma A1 shows that the second-round equilibrium is unique and symmet-
ric. Hence, by the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 2.2, the first-round
equilibrium is also unique and symmetric. In particular, equilibrium efforts are given
by enoi1 = E∆ζ1 [enoi2 (∆ζ1)] = Ake/(3ac), and enoi2 (∆ζ1) = Ake/(2c) · (qg∆ζ2(∆ζ1) + (1 −
q)E∆ζ1 [g∆ζ2(∆ζ1)]). Finally, using the same methodology as in the proofs of Proposition
4A(ii) and 4B(i) shows that Πpubavg and Π
pub
best are invariant in q.
(ii) In a way identical to the proof of Proposition 2.3, it can be shown that the
equilibrium under a noisy private-feedback policy is unique and symmetric. Moreover,
enoi1 = Eζi1 [enoi2 (ζi1)], and enoi2 (ζi1) solves qEζj1 [g∆ζ2(ζi1 + keenoi2 (ζi1)− ζj1 − keenoi2 (ζj1))] +
(1 − q)Eζ1 [g∆ζ2(ζi1 + keenoi2 (ζi1) − ζj1 − keenoi2 (ζj1))] = 2cenoi2 (ζi1)/(Ake). Let epri2 (ζi1, κ)
be the effort function defined in (2.5) for given κ. Then, enoi2 (ζi1) = e
pri
2 (ζi1, κ/q) +
(1 − q)Ake/(2c) · Eζ1 [g∆ζ2(ζi1 + keepri2 (ζi1, κ/q) − ζj1 − keepri2 (ζi1, κ/q))]. Having derived
the equilibrium efforts we can follow exactly the same procedure as in the proof of
Proposition 4B(iii) to gain the required Taylor series lTaylor2 (x, y(x,Γ3)) = 11q/(3360κ
2)−
23/(960κ3) +O(1/κ4). Since the first term is positive: for any fixed q > 0, there exists
a κ <∞ such that lTaylor2 (x, y(x,Γ3)) > 0 for all κ > κ.
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Appendix B
Proofs of Chapter III
Appendix B contains three different parts. Section B.1 discusses some preliminary tech-
nical results which are essential for our analysis. Section B.2 characterizes the Perfect
Bayesian equilibria of the different contest formats. Last, Section B.3 provides the de-
tailed proofs for our mathematical results.
B.1 Technical Preliminaries
The Skew-Normal Distribution.
Following Azzalini (1985), we refer to a random variable X with probability density func-
tion ψ(x;α) = 2Φ(αx)φ(x), x ∈ R, as a Skew-Normal random variable with parameter
α ∈ R. The cumulative distribution function of X is given by Ψ(x;α) = ∫ x−∞ ψ(y;α)dy.
Below we derive some important properties of Skew-Normal random variables.
Lemma B.1. (i) ψ(x; 0) = φ(x) for all x ∈ R.
(ii) Define Ik(α) ≡
∫∞
−∞Ψ(x;α)
kψ(x;α)2dx for k ≥ 0. Then, Ik(α) strictly de-
creases in α for α < 0 and strictly increases for α > 0.
(iii) (k + 1)(k + 2)Ik(0) = µ(k+2) for all k ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma B.1. (i) See Property A in Azzalini (1985).
(ii) Taking the first-order derivative and exploiting properties of the Normal distri-
bution yields
dIk(α)
dα
=
2α
pi(1 + α2)
∫ +∞
−∞
φ(
√
2 + α2x)Ψ(x;α)k (αxΦ(αx) + φ(αx)) dx. (B.1)
Since αxΦ(αx) + φ(αx) > 0 for all x, α ∈ R, we have dIk(α)/dα < 0 for α < 0 and
dIk(α)/dα > 0 for α > 0.
(iii) Ik(0) =
∫∞
−∞(k + 1)Φ(x)
kφ(x)2dx/(k + 1) =
∫∞
−∞ xφ(x)Φ(x)
k+1dx/(k + 1) =∫∞
−∞ x(k + 2)φ(x)Φ(x)
k+1dx/((k + 1)(k + 2)) = µ(k+2)/((k + 1)(k + 2)).
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A Generalization of Slepian’s Inequality.
In this section, we establish a generalization of Slepian’s Inequality, whose basic formu-
lation can be found in, e.g., Theorem 2.1.1. in Tong (1980).
Lemma B.2. Let X = (X1, X2), Y = (Y1, Y2) follow a bivariate Normal distribution
with marginal distributions X1, Y1 ∼ N(µ1, σ21), X2, Y2 ∼ N(µ2, σ22) and correlation ρX ,
ρY , where ρY > ρX . Then,
(i) P(X1 ≤ u1, X2 ≤ u2) < P(Y1 ≤ u1, Y2 ≤ u2) for all u1, u2 ∈ R.
(ii) P(X1 ≥ u1, X2 ≥ u2) < P(Y1 ≥ u1, Y2 ≥ u2) for all u1, u2 ∈ R.
Proof of Lemma B.2. (i) P(X1 ≤ u1, X2 ≤ u2) = P(X1 ≤ u1 − µ1, X2 ≤ u2 − µ2) <
P(Y 1 ≤ u1 − µ1, Y 2 ≤ u2 − µ2) = P(Y1 ≤ u1, Y2 ≤ u2) for all u1, u2 ∈ R, where the
strict inequality follows from Theorem 2.1.1. in Tong (1980) and the fact that Xj, Y j,
j = 1, 2, are centered Normal random variables.
(ii) This result is an immediate consequence of part (i).
B.2 Derivation of Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium
In this section, we derive symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) for the most
general version of our model; that is, k ≥ 1 and ζi = (ζi1, ζi2) follows a bivariate Normal
distribution with correlation ρ ∈ [0, 1) and marginal distributions ζi1 ∼ N(0, σ2) and
ζi2 ∼ N(0, k2σ2). We start with the case of technological substitutes and then proceed
to technological complements.
B.2.1. PBE for Technological Substitutes
Note that given our assumption of a sufficiently large performance shock (i.e., σ >
σsub), each supplier i always participates in any contest. This is true because supplier
i can always guarantee himself a strictly positive expected utility by participating and
exerting zero effort. Hence we can derive the suppliers’ equilibrium efforts by solving
their incentive compatibility (IC) constraints.
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System contest.
In a system contest, supplier i’s IC constraint is:
(esysi1 , e
sys
i2 ) ∈ argmax
ei1,ei2
ui(ei1, ei2)
≡ AEζi1,ζi2
∏
k 6=i
Fζk1+ζk2
 ∑
j∈{1,2}
r(eij) + ζij − r(ekj)
− c(ei1)− c(ei2).
(B.2)
Using straightforward differentiation and the law of iterated expectations, we find that
any symmetric pure-strategy PBE satisfies the following optimality condition for j = 1, 2:
c′(esysj )
r′(esysj )
=
A(n− 1)In−2(0)
σ
√
1 + k2 + 2kρ
=
Aµ(n)
nσ
√
1 + k2 + 2kρ
, (B.3)
where µ(n) is the expected value of the maximum order statistic of n standard Normal
random variables. Since c′/r′ is strictly increasing, c′(0) = 0 and c′(∞)/r′(∞) = ∞, it
follows that (esys1 , e
sys
2 ) is the unique solution to (B.3). Define η(x) = (r ◦ (c′/r′)−1)(x)
for all x ≥ 0. Then the buyer’s equilibrium expected profit is
Πsyssub = 2η
(
Aµ(n)
nσ
√
1 + k2 + 2kρ
)
+ σµ(n)
√
1 + k2 + 2kρ. (B.4)
Component contest.
Given p, supplier i’s IC constraint in each component contest j ∈ {1, 2} is:
ecpoi1 ∈ argmax
ei1
ui(ei1) ≡ pAEζi1
[∏
k 6=i
Fζk1 (r(ei1) + ζi1 − r(ek1))
]
− c(ei1) (B.5)
ecpoi2 ∈ argmax
ei2
ui(ei2) ≡ (1− p)AEζi2
[∏
k 6=i
Fζk2 (r(ei2) + ζi2 − r(ek2))
]
− c(ei2), (B.6)
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yielding the following optimality conditions for a symmetric PBE:
c′(ecpo1 )
r′(ecpo1 )
=
pA(n− 1)In−2(0)
σ
=
pAµ(n)
nσ
(B.7)
c′(ecpo2 )
r′(ecpo2 )
=
(1− p)A(n− 1)In−2(0)
kσ
=
(1− p)Aµ(n)
nkσ
. (B.8)
Again, since c′/r′ is strictly increasing, c′(0) = 0 and c′(∞)/r′(∞) = ∞, (ecpo1 , ecpo2 ) is
the unique symmetric PBE. Given suppliers’ equilibrium efforts, the buyer chooses p to
maximize expected profits:
p∗ ∈ argmax
p
Πcpo(p) = η
(
pAµ(n)
nσ
)
+ η
(
(1− p)Aµ(n)
nkσ
)
+ σµ(n)(1 + k). (B.9)
Assumption 3.2 ensures that η is a strictly concave function, and therefore Πcpo(p) is
strictly concave in p, implying that p∗ is unique. Moreover, the necessary and sufficient
first-order condition ∂Πcpo(p)/∂p = 0 reveals that p∗(k = 1) = 1/2 and limk→∞ p∗(k) =
1, and we let Πcposub ≡ Πcpo(p∗).
B.2.2. PBE for Complementary Components
As before, the assumption that σ > σcml ensures that each supplier i always participates
in any contest. Hence we can derive the suppliers’ equilibrium efforts by solving their
incentive compatibility (IC) constraints.
System contest.
In a system contest, supplier i’s IC constraint is:
(esysi1 , e
sys
i2 ) ∈ argmax
ei1,ei2
ui(ei1, ei2) ≡ AEζi1,ζi2
[∏
k 6=i
Fsk(si)
]
− c(ei1)− c(ei2), (B.10)
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where si = min{vi1, vi2}, and since vi1 ∼ N(r(ei1), σ2) and vi2 ∼ N(r(ei2), k2σ2) we have
fsi(x) =
2∑
j=1
1
kj−1σ
φ
(
x− r(eij)
kj−1σ
)
Φ
(
1
σ
√
1− ρ2
(
ρ(x− r(eij))
kj−1
− x− r(ei,3−j)
k2−j
))
,
(B.11)
Fsi(x) = Φ
(
x− r(ei1)
σ
)
+
∫ ∞
(x−r(ei1))/σ
Φ
(
x− r(ei2)− ρkσu
kσ
√
1− ρ2
)
φ(u)du (B.12)
by eq. (46.77)-(46.78) in Kotz et al. (2000). Using straightforward differentiation and
the law of iterated expectations, we find that any symmetric pure-strategy PBE satisfies
the following optimality condition for j = 1, 2:
c′(esysj )
r′(esysj )
= A(n− 1)
·
∫ ∞
−∞
fs(r(e
s
j) + x)Fs(r(e
s
j) + x)
n−2(1− Fζ3−j |ζj(r(esj)− r(es3−j) + x))fζj(x)dx.
(B.13)
Case A: k = 1. If k = 1, then there exists a solution to (B.13) with esys1 = e
sys
2 , and
this solution is given by
c′(esysj )
r′(esysj )
=
A(n− 1)
2σ
· In−2
(
−
√
1− ρ
1 + ρ
)
, (B.14)
j = 1, 2.
Case B: k →∞. By (B.13), we have the following upper bound on esys2 :
c′(esys2 )
r′(esys2 )
≤ A(n− 1)
∫ ∞
−∞
fs(r(e
s
2) + x)fζ2(x)dx (B.15)
≤ A(n− 1)
σ2
∫ ∞
−∞
(
φ
(
r(es2)− r(es1) + x
σ
)
+
1
k
φ
( x
kσ
)) 1
k
φ
( x
kσ
)
dx (B.16)
≤
√
2A(n− 1)
kσ
√
pi
. (B.17)
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It follows that limk→∞ c′(e
sys
2 )/r
′(esys2 ) = 0, and thus, given the properties of c and r,
limk→∞ e
sys
2 = 0. We now turn to e
sys
1 :
lim
k→∞
c′(esys1 )
r′(esys1 )
=
A(n− 1)
σ
·
∫ ∞
−∞
[
Φ
(
ρy√
1− ρ2
)
φ(y)
]2 [
Φ(y) +
∫ ∞
y
Φ
(
− ρu√
1− ρ2
)
φ(u)du
]n−2
dy
(B.18)
=
A(n− 1)
2nσ
∫ ∞
−∞
[
1 + Ψ
(
y;
ρ√
1− ρ2
)]n−2
ψ
(
y;
ρ√
1− ρ2
)2
dy (B.19)
=
A(n− 1)
2nσ
n−2∑
l=0
(
n− 2
l
)
Il
(
ρ√
1− ρ2
)
, (B.20)
where the first equality is an application of Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem.
We note that the solution (esys1 , e
sys
2 ) is unique as k →∞.
Component contest.
Equilibrium efforts in a component contest (ecpo1 , e
cpo
2 ) are again given by (B.7) and
(B.8) because each component contest is run separately, so the technological relationship
between components does not affect the suppliers’ equilibrium behavior. The buyer’s
optimal choice of p solves:
p∗ ∈ argmax
p
Πcpo(p) = E[min{r(ecpo1 ) + max
i
{ζi1}, r(ecpo2 ) + max
i
{ζi2}}]. (B.21)
By Assumption 3.2, r(ecpoj ), j = 1, 2, is strictly concave in p, and since concavity is
preserved under the pointwise minimization and expectation operators, it follows that
Πcpo(p) is strictly concave in p. Moreover, the necessary and sufficient first-order con-
dition ∂Πcpo(p)/∂p = 0 reveals that p∗(k = 1) = 1/2 and limk→∞ p∗(k) = 1, and we let
Πcpocml ≡ Πcpo(p∗).
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B.3 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1. (ia) The result follows directly from (B.9) and the discussion there-
after.
(ib) For k = 1 and ρ = 0, (B.3) implies that c′(esys1 )/r
′(esys1 ) = c
′(esys2 )/r
′(esys2 ) =
Aµ(n)/(
√
2nσ), and (B.7)-(B.8) imply that c′(ecpo1 )/r
′(ecpo1 ) = c
′(ecpo2 )/r
′(ecpo2 ) =
Aµ(n)/(2nσ). Since c′/r′ is a strictly increasing function, it follows that esys1 = e
sys
2 >
ecpo1 = e
cpo
2 .
(iia) The result follows directly from (B.9) and the discussion thereafter.
(iib) For ρ = 0, as k → ∞, (B.7)-(B.8) together with p∗ = 1 imply that
c′(ecpo1 )/r
′(ecpo1 ) = Aµ
(n)/(nσ) and c′(ecpo2 )/r
′(ecpo2 ) = 0, yielding e
cpo
1 > 0 and e
cpo
2 = 0.
Furthermore, (B.3) reveals that limk→∞ c′(e
sys
1 )/r
′(esys1 ) = limk→∞ c
′(esys2 )/r
′(esys2 ) = 0,
and thus limk→∞ e
sys
1 = limk→∞ e
sys
2 = 0 by the properties of r and c.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. For ρ = 0, the buyer’s expected equilibrium profits in a system
and component contest regime are Πsyssub = 2η(Aµ
(n)/(
√
1 + k2nσ)) +
√
1 + k2σµ(n) and
Πcposub = η(p
∗Aµ(n)/(nσ)) + η((1− p∗)Aµ(n)/(nkσ)) + (1 + k)σµ(n), respectively (see (B.4)
and (B.9)). Define ∆(σ, k) = Πsyssub −Πcposub, which is a continuous function in σ and k for
σ > 0 and k ≥ 1.
(i) Given k = 1, ρ = 0 and the results of Lemma 3.1 the buyer’s expected equilibrium
profits in a system and component contest regime simplify to Πsyssub = 2η(Aµ
(n)/(
√
2nσ))+√
2σµ(n) and Πcposub = 2η(Aµ
(n)/(2nσ))+2σµ(n), respectively. Since η is strictly increasing
and η(0) = 0, it follows that limσ→0 ∆(σ, k = 1) > 0 and limσ→∞∆(σ, k = 1) < 0. By the
Intermediate Value Theorem, there exist thresholds σsub, σsub, with 0 < σsub ≤ σsub <∞,
such that ∆(σ, k = 1) > 0 for all σ ∈ (0, σsub), and ∆(σ, k = 1) < 0 for all σ > σsub. The
result now follows from the continuity of ∆(σ, k), the fact that a continuous mapping
from a connected subset of a metric space to another metric space yields a connected
image set (Ok 2007, p. 220), and by integrating our assumption that σ > σsub (note that
σsub may be larger than σsub, in which case the interval (σsub, σsub) is empty). To see
how σsub behaves for large n, note that limn→∞∆(σ, k = 1) = −(2−
√
2)σ limn→∞ µ(n),
and therefore σsub → 0.
(ii) Fix any σ > σsub. Then, limk→∞∆(σ, k) < 0, and thus, by the Intermediate
Value Theorem, there exists a threshold ksub <∞ such that ∆(σ, k) < 0 for all k > ksub.
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(iii) Fix any k ≥ 1. Then, limσ→∞∆(σ, k) < 0, and thus, by the Intermediate Value
Theorem, there exists a threshold σsub <∞ such that ∆(σ, k) < 0 for all σ > σsub.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. (ia) The result follows directly from (B.21) and the discussion
thereafter.
(ib) For k = 1 and ρ = 0, (B.7)-(B.8) imply that c′(ecpo1 )/r
′(ecpo1 ) = c
′(ecpo2 )/r
′(ecpo2 ) =
A(n − 1)In−2(0)/(2σ), and (B.14) implies that c′(esys1 )/r′(esys1 ) = c′(esys2 )/r′(esys2 ) =
A(n− 1)In−2(−1)/(2σ). By Lemma AB.1(ii), In−2(−1) > In−2(0), and therefore esys1 =
esys2 > e
cpo
1 = e
cpo
2 > 0.
(iia) The result follows directly from (B.21) and the discussion thereafter.
(iib) For ρ = 0, as k → ∞, (B.8) and (B.17) reveal that ecpo2 = 0 and esys2 = 0,
respectively. By (B.20) and (B.7), we have
lim
k→∞
c′(esys1 )
r′(esys1 )
=
A(n− 1)
2nσ
n−2∑
l=0
(
n− 2
l
)
Il(0) = A
n2nσ
n−2∑
l=0
(
n
l + 2
)
µ(l+2) (B.22)
<
Aµ(n)
n2nσ
n∑
l=2
(
n
l
)
=
Aµ(n)
nσ
(
1− n+ 1
2n
)
<
Aµ(n)
nσ
= lim
k→∞
c′(ecpo1 )
r′(ecpo1 )
. (B.23)
Since c′/r′ is strictly increasing it follows readily that limk→∞ e
sys
1 < limk→∞ e
cpo
1 . Last,
we note that as k → ∞, (B.22) reveals that the right-hand side of the optimality
condition does not depend on esys1 and e
sys
2 . Taken together with the properties of c
′/r′,
this implies that (esys1 , e
sys
2 ) is unique as k →∞.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. For ρ = 0, the buyer’s expected equilibrium profits in a system
and component contest regime are Πsyscml = E[maxi∈{1,...,n}{minj∈{1,2}{r(esysj ) + ζij}}] and
Πcpocml = E[minj∈{1,2}{maxi∈{1,...,n}{r(ecpoj ) + ζij}}], respectively. Define ∆(σ, k) = Πsyscml −
Πcpocml, which is a continuous function in σ and k for σ > 0 and k ≥ 1.
(i) Given k = 1, ρ = 0 and the results of Lemma 3.2, the buyer’s expected
equilibrium profits in a system and component contest regime are Πsyscml = η(A(n −
1)In−2(−1)/(2σ)) + σE[maxi∈{1,...,n}{minj∈{1,2}{Xij}}] and Πcpocml =
η(A(n−1)In−2(0)/(2σ))+σE[minj∈{1,2}{maxi∈{1,...,n}{Xij}}], respectively, where Xij are
independent standard normal random variables. Since η is strictly increasing, η(0) = 0,
In−2(−1) > In−2(0), and E[minj∈{1,2}{maxi∈{1,...,n}{Xij}}] >
E[maxi∈{1,...,n}{minj∈{1,2}{Xij}}], it follows that limσ→0 ∆(σ, k = 1) > 0 and
limσ→∞∆(σ, k = 1) < 0. By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exist thresholds
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σcml, σcml, with 0 < σcml ≤ σcml <∞, such that ∆(σ, k = 1) > 0 for all σ ∈ (0, σcml), and
∆(σ, k = 1) < 0 for all σ > σcml. The result now follows from the continuity of ∆(σ, k),
the fact that a continuous mapping from a connected subset of a metric space to another
metric space yields a connected image set (Ok 2007, p. 220), and by integrating our as-
sumption that σ > σcml (note that σcml may be larger than σcml, in which case the inter-
val (σcml, σcml) is empty). To see how σcml behaves for large n, note that limn→∞∆(σ, k =
1) = −σ limn→∞[E[minj∈{1,2}{maxi∈{1,...,n}{Xij}}] − E[maxi∈{1,...,n}{minj∈{1,2}{Xij}}]],
and therefore σcml → 0.
(ii) Fix any σ > σcml. For k → ∞, Lemma 3.2 implies that Πcpocml =
E[minj∈{1,2}{maxi∈{1,...,n}{r(ecpoj ) + ζij}}] > E[minj∈{1,2}{maxi∈{1,...,n}{r(esysj ) + ζij}}] >
E[maxi∈{1,...,n}{minj∈{1,2}{r(esysj ) + ζij}}] = Πsyscml. Thus, limk→∞∆(σ, k) < 0, and by the
Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a threshold kcml < ∞ such that ∆(σ, k) < 0
for all k > kcml.
(iii) Fix any k ≥ 1, and define r = minj∈{1,2}{r(ecpoj )} and r = maxj∈{1,2}{r(esysj )}.
It follows that Πcpocml ≥ r + σE[min{maxi∈{1,...,n}{Xi1},maxi∈{1,...,n}{kXi2}}] and Πsyscml ≤
r+ σE[maxi∈{1,...,n}{min{Xi1, kXi2}}], where Xij are independent standard normal ran-
dom variables. Since E[min{maxi∈{1,...,n}{Xi1},maxi∈{1,...,n}{kXi2}}] >
E[maxi∈{1,...,n}{min{Xi1, kXi2}}], and r as well as r are bounded in value, it follows
that limσ→∞∆(σ, k) < 0, and thus, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a
threshold σcml <∞ such that ∆(σ, k) < 0 for all σ > σcml.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. (i) This result follows immediately from (B.9) and the fact
that µ(n) and thus also p∗ do not depend on ρ.
(ii) To prove the result, we need to show that the buyer’s equilibrium expected
profit Πcpocml(p
∗(ρ); ρ) increases in ρ, where p∗(ρ) is the optimally chosen p for given ρ, and
equilibrium efforts are given by (B.7)-(B.8). We do so by verifying that Πcpocml(p
∗(ρ1); ρ1) ≤
Πcpocml(p
∗(ρ1); ρ2) ≤ Πcpocml(p∗(ρ2); ρ2) for any fixed 0 ≤ ρ1 < ρ2 < 1. Clearly, the last
inequality follows from the optimality of p∗, so it remains to prove the first inequality.
For any given p, Πcpocml(p; ρ) = E[minj∈{1,2}{maxi∈{1,...,n}{vcpoij }}], where vcpoi =
(vcpoi1 , v
cpo
i2 ) follows a bivariate Normal distribution with correlation ρ and marginal distri-
butions vcpoi1 ∼ N(r(ecpo1 ), σ2) and vcpoi2 ∼ N(r(ecpo2 ), k2σ2) for all i. To conclude the proof,
we need to show that Πcpocml(p; ρ) increases in ρ for any fixed p. This is true if the random
variable V (ρ) ≡ minj∈{1,2}{maxi∈{1,...,n}{vcpoij }} first-order stochastically increases in ρ;
a property that we verify in the next step. Let Vj ≡ maxi∈{1,...,n}{vcpoij } for j = 1, 2.
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For any y ∈ R and fixed p, P(V (ρ) > y) = P(V1 > y) − P(V1 > y|V2 < y)P(V2 < y).
Clearly, only the term P(V1 > y|V2 < y) depends on ρ, and thus V (ρ) stochastically
increases in ρ if and only if this term decreases in ρ. Note that P(V1 > y|V2 < y) =
1− P(vcpoi1 < y, vcpoi2 < y)n/P(vcpoi2 < y)n, where the denominator is independent of ρ and
P(vcpoi1 < y, v
cpo
i2 < y) increases in ρ by Lemma B.2(i). Hence P(V1 > y|V2 < y) decreases
in ρ.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. (i) By (B.4), the buyer’s expected equilibrium profits are
Πsyssub(ρ) = 2η(Aµ
(n)/(nσ
√
1 + k2 + 2kρ)) + σµ(n)
√
1 + k2 + 2kρ. Taking the first-order
derivative of Πsyssub(ρ) with respect to ρ leads to dΠ
sys
sub(ρ)/dρ = kµ
(n)(nσ2(1 + k2 + 2kρ)−
2Aη′(Aµ(n)/(nσ
√
1 + k2 + 2kρ)))/(nσ(1 + k2 + 2kρ)3/2), and the result follows by com-
paring this expression to zero.
(ii) For given ρ, the buyer’s expected equilibrium profits are Πsyscml(ρ) =
E[maxi∈{1,...,n}{min{vsysi1 , vsysi2 }}], where (vsysi1 , vsysi2 ) follows a bivariate Normal distribu-
tion with marginal distributions vsysi1 ∼ N(r(esys1 ), σ2), vsysi2 ∼ N(r(esys2 ), k2σ2) and cor-
relation ρ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. To prove the claim, we will show that for k = 1 and σ
small, Πsyscml(ρ) decreases in ρ, and that Π
sys
cml(ρ) increases in ρ for k →∞ or σ →∞. The
result follows then directly from the continuity of Πsyscml(ρ) and the Intermediate Value
Theorem.
Case A: k = 1. By (B.14) we have esys1 = e
sys
2 , and hence Π
sys
cml(ρ) = r(e
sys
1 ) +
σE[maxi∈{1,...,n}{min{Xi1, Xi2}}], where (Xi1, Xi2) follows a standard bivariate Normal
distribution with correlation ρ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In addition, (B.14) together with
Lemma B.1(ii) implies that equilibrium efforts decrease in ρ, and thus dr(esys1 )/dρ < 0.
Therefore, limσ→0 dΠ
sys
cml(ρ)/dρ < 0.
Case B: k →∞ or σ →∞. Πsyscml(ρ) = E[maxi∈{1,...,n}{min{vsysi1 , vsysi2 }}] increases in
ρ if the random variable W (ρ) ≡ maxi∈{1,...,n}{min{vsysi1 , vsysi2 }} stochastically increases
in ρ, or equivalently, P(W (ρ) < u) = (1 − P(vsysi1 ≥ u, vsysi2 ≥ u))n decreases in ρ for all
u ∈ R. This is true if P(vsysi1 ≥ u, vsysi2 ≥ u) = P(vi1 ≥ u − r(esys1 ), vi2 ≥ u − r(esys2 ))
increases in ρ for all u ∈ R, where vi1 and vi2 are centered Normal random variables. For
fixed esys1 and e
sys
2 , this probability increases in ρ by Lemma B.2(ii); and for fixed ρ, it
increases obviously in esys1 and e
sys
2 . Since both sensitivities point in the same direction,
it remains to verify that esys1 and e
sys
2 weakly increase in ρ as k → ∞ (resp. σ → ∞).
For k → ∞, this is true because esys1 increases in ρ by (B.20) and Lemma B.1(ii), and
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esys2 = 0 by (B.17). For σ → ∞, esys1 = esys2 = 0 by (B.13), thereby concluding the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. (i) The proof follows by considering Πsyssub and Π
cpo
sub as given in
(B.4) and (B.9), respectively, and applying exactly the same argument as in the proof
of Proposition 3.1.
(iia) For k = 1 and σ small, Propositions 3.3(ii) and 3.4(ii) imply that Πcpocml increases
in ρ whereas Πsyscml decreases in ρ. Hence to verify that Π
sys
cml(ρ
sys) ≥ Πcpocml(ρcpo) for any
∆ρ ≥ 0 it is sufficient to establish that Πsyscml(ρ = 1) ≥ Πcpocml(ρ = 1). By (B.7), (B.8)
and (B.14) it follows that for k = 1 and ρ = 1, esys1 = e
sys
2 = e
cpo
1 = e
cpo
2 . As a result,
Πsyscml(ρ = 1) = r(e
sys
1 ) + E[maxi∈{1,...,n}{ζi1}] = r(ecpo1 ) + E[maxi∈{1,...,n}{ζi1}] = Πcpocml(ρ =
1), which proves the claim.
(iib) For σ → ∞, (B.7), (B.8) and (B.14) imply that esys1 = esys2 = ecpo1 =
ecpo2 = 0. It follows that Π
sys
cml(ρ
sys) = E[maxi∈{1,...,n}{min{ζi1, ζi2}}] and Πcpocml(ρcpo) =
E[minj∈{1,2}{maxi∈{1,...,n}{ζij}}]. Clearly, if ρsys = ρcpo then Πcpocml(ρcpo) ≥ Πsyscml(ρsys); and
if ρsys = 1 and ρcpo = 0 then Πsyscml(ρ
sys) = E[maxi∈{1,...,n}{ζi1}] > Πcpocml(ρcpo). The result
now follows immediately from the continuity of all involved functions in conjunction
with the fact that a continuous mapping from a connected subset of a metric space to
another metric space yields a connected image set (Ok 2007, p. 220).
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Appendix C
Proofs of Chapter IV
Proof of Proposition 4.1. To prove the claim, we first derive the firm’s optimization
problem P and then solve P to determine the optimal compensation scheme and the
firm’s expected profits.
The Optimization problem: By the revelation principle, we restrict attention to the
optimal contract that induces high-effort testing and truth telling by all experts. This,
however, requires several incentive constraints to be satisfied. To derive those, we need to
ensure that high-effort testing and truth telling is indeed optimal for each expert i ∈ I,
given the assumptions that all other experts exert high effort and report truthfully, and
that the firm chooses the ex post optimal design alternative.
After having received all recommendations, the firm chooses the design alternative
for development that offers the highest ex post expected net contribution and for which
there is a good recommendation (in case there is no good recommendation at all, the firm
develops none of the designs). Given ri = g, design i’s ex post expected net contribution
is qi(vi − uig) − (1 − qi)uib −
∑
k 6=i uka. Constraint (4.5) orders the designs according
to their maximum ex post expected net contribution and thus ranks them according to
their relative attractiveness to the firm; represented by the index j in y
(j)
i .
We now derive the incentive compatibility constraints for design i that is the jth
most attractive alternative. Given ei = h and upon receiving a good signal (si = g),
expert i receives an expected utility of piggij = (qiuig + (1− qi)uib)/2j−1 + (1− 1/2j−1)uia
when making a good recommendation (ri = g), and pi
bg
ij = uia + uit/2
n−1 when making
a bad recommendation (ri = b). Similarly, given ei = h and upon receiving a bad signal
(si = b), expert i receives an expected utility of pi
gb
ij = ((1 − qi)uig + qiuib)/2j−1 + (1 −
1/2j−1)uia when making a good recommendation (ri = g), and pibbij = uia+uit/2
n−1 when
making a bad recommendation (ri = b). Also, given truth telling, expert i’s expected
utility from exerting high effort is piij(h) = (qiuig+(1−qi)uib)/2j+(uia+(1/2)n−juit)/2j+
(1−1/2j−1)uia−c, and piij(l) = (uig/2+uib/2)/2j+(uia+(1/2)n−juit)/2j+(1−1/2j−1)uia
from exerting low effort. The incentive compatibility constraints follow from setting
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piggij ≥ pibgij , pibbij ≥ pigbij , and piij(h) ≥ piij(l) for all i, j ∈ I, and multiplying these inequalities
with y
(j)
i . Finally, because wages must be non-negative, we require uig, uib, uia, uia+uit ≥
0, and (4.6) follows from noting that each design i must be assigned to exactly one
attractiveness rank, and each rank j is hold by exactly one design.
The firm’s expected profit consists of the expected market value of the chosen design
net of development costs and the experts’ expected wages. Given y
(j)
i = 1, the firm
develops design i with probability 1/2j and receives an expected value of qivi −K. The
expected wage payments to expert i are uig with probability qi/2
j, uib with probability
(1− qi)/2j, uia with probability 1− 1/2j, and uit with probability 1/2n. Summing over
i, j ∈ I gives the firm’s expected profit Π.
(i) Suppose the designs in I can be ordered such that qivi ≥ qi+1vi+1+2i+1c[qi/(2qi−
1)− 2qi+1/(2qi+1− 1)]+ for all i ∈ I\{n}. To solve the optimization problem P , we first
derive the solution of a relaxed variant of P by dropping constraints (4.5), and then
show that this solution is also feasible—and thus optimal—in P .
Given the structure of P without (4.5), maximizing the firm’s expected profit is
equivalent to separately minimizing the wage payments associated with each design
i ∈ I whenever y(j)i = 1. Obviously, (4.4) implies that uig > uib, which allows us to
rewrite (4.2) and (4.3) as qiuig + (1 − qi)uib ≥ uia + 2j−nuit ≥ (1 − qi)uig + qiuib. It
follows that wage payments for design i with relative attractiveness j are minimized
when uia + 2
j−nuit = (1 − qi)uig + qiuib, and uig and uib are chosen as low as possible.
By (4.4) and (4.7), these minimal payments are uig = 2
j+1c/(2qi − 1) and uib = 0.
Moreover, (4.1) reveals that the firm prefers paying uit over uia; therefore uia = 0 and
uit = 2
n+1(1 − qi)c/(2qi − 1). Inserting these payments into (4.1) and using (4.6) gives
ΠP =
∑n
j=1
∑n
i=1 y
(j)
i (qivi/2
j)−∑ni=1 2c/(2qi−1)−∑nj=1K/2j. By the assumed ordering,
we have qivi ≥ qi+1vi+1, and it follows that in optimum y(i)i = 1 for all i ∈ I, and y(j)i = 0
for all i 6= j. Moreover, this candidate optimal solution satisfies (4.6) and is thus feasible.
It remains to show that the solution also satisfies (4.5). However, this is obvi-
ous because we can rewrite this condition by qivi − (2i+1qic/(2qi − 1)) ≥ qi+1vi+1 −
(2i+2qi+1c/(2qi+1 − 1)), which is true by assumption.
(ii) This result follows directly from (i).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. The optimization problem M can be derived in a similar way
to the proof of Proposition 4.1. In particular, for each i ∈ I, piggi = qiuig + (1 − qi)uib,
pibgi = pi
bb
i = uia + P (sj = b ∀j > i)δn−iuit, pigbi = (1− qi)uig + qiuib, pii(h) = (qiuig + (1−
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qi)uib)/2 + (uia + P (sj = b ∀j > i)δn−iuit)/2− c, and pii(l) = (uig/2 + uib/2)/2 + (uia +
P (sj = b ∀j > i)δn−iuit)/2. Since for design i = n, una and unt are paid simultaneously,
we only require una + unt ≥ 0 to ensure non-negative wages.
As for the firm’s profits, the firm develops design i with probability P (ri = g, rj =
b ∀j < i) and receives a discounted expected value of δi−1(qivi − K). The expected
wage payments to expert i are δi−1uig with probability P (Θi = G|si = g)P (si = g, sj =
b ∀j < i), δi−1uib with probability P (Θi = B|si = g)P (si = g, sj = b ∀j < i), δi−1uia
with probability P (si = b, sj = b ∀j < i), and δn−1uit with probability P (si = b, sj =
b ∀j 6= i). Summing over i ∈ I gives the firm’s expected profit Π.
(i) Given the structure of M , maximizing the firm’s expected profit is equivalent
to separately minimizing the wage payments associated with each design i. Note that
(4.11) implies that uig > uib, which allows us to rewrite (4.9) and (4.10) as qiuig + (1−
qi)uib ≥ uia + 2i−nδn−iuit ≥ (1− qi)uig + qiuib. It follows readily that uia + 2i−nδn−iuit =
(1 − qi)uig + qiuib, and uig and uib should be chosen as low as possible. By (4.11) and
(4.12), these minimal payments are uig = 4c/(2qi − 1) and uib = 0. Moreover, the firm
is indifferent between paying uia or uit, so without loss of optimality we can choose
uia = 4(1− qi)c/(2qi − 1) and uit = 0. Finally, uia/uig = 1− qi < 1/2 because qi > 1/2.
(ii)-(iii) Given the optimal contract, we can rewrite the firm’s expected profit as
ΠM =
∑n
i=1(δ
i−1/2i)(qivi−K− 4c/(2qi− 1)). Since (δi−1/2i) is decreasing in i, the firm
maximizes ΠM by testing the designs in decreasing order of qivi − 4c/(2qi − 1).
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Define the expert’s expected continuation utility before testing
design i ∈ I by pˆii−1 = (qiuig + (1 − qi)uib + uia − 2c + δpˆii)/2, with pˆin = 0. With
this definition, the derivation of S is identical to that of M as given in the proof of
Proposition 4.2. In particular, for each i ∈ I, piggi = qiuig + (1 − qi)uib, pibgi = pibbi =
uia + δpˆii, pi
gb
i = (1 − qi)uig + qiuib, pii(h) = (qiuig + (1 − qi)uib)/2 + (uia + δpˆii)/2 − c,
and pii(l) = (uig/2 + uib/2)/2 + (uia + δpˆii)/2, and limited liability enforces non-negative
wage payments.
As for the firm’s profits, the firm develops design i with probability P (ri = g, rj =
b ∀j < i) and receives a discounted expected value of δi−1(qivi − K). The expected
wage payments to expert i are δi−1uig with probability P (Θi = G|si = g)P (si = g, sj =
b ∀j < i), δi−1uib with probability P (Θi = B|si = g)P (si = g, sj = b ∀j < i), and
δi−1uia with probability P (si = b, sj = b ∀j < i). Summing over i ∈ I gives the firm’s
expected profit Π.
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(i) Using the definition of pˆi0, we can rewrite the firm’s expected profit as ΠS =∑n
i=1(δ
i−1/2i)(qivi−K− 2c)− pˆi0. Thus, maximizing ΠS is equivalent to minimizing pˆi0,
which we do in the following. As a first step, we derive the minimum feasible pˆii−1 for
given fixed pˆii.
Case (a): δpˆii < 4(1− qi)c/(2qi − 1). The optimal payments are uig = 4c/(2qi − 1),
uib = 0, and uia = 4(1−qi)c/(2qi−1)−δpˆii, and it follows that pˆii−1 = (3−2qi)c/(2qi−1).
Case (b): 4(1 − qi)c/(2qi − 1) ≤ δpˆii ≤ 4qic/(2qi − 1). The optimal payments are
uig = 4c/(2qi − 1), uib = 0, and uia = 0, and it follows that pˆii−1 = c/(2qi − 1) + δpˆii/2.
Case (c): δpˆii > 4qic/(2qi − 1). The optimal payments are uig = δpˆii/qi, uib = 0,
and uia = 0, and it follows that pˆii−1 = δpˆii − c
Taken together, Cases (a)-(c) imply that pˆii−1 is non-decreasing in pˆii for all i ∈ I.
As such, minimizing pˆi0 is equivalent to separately minimizing pˆii for each i ∈ I, starting
with pˆin = 0 and using Cases (a)-(c) for backwards induction. Thus, the optimal contract
satisfies uig = 4c/(2qi−1) + [δpˆii/qi−4c/(2qi−1)]+, uib = 0, and uia = [4(1− qi)c/(2qi−
1)− δpˆii]+ for all i ∈ I.
(ii) If the designs in I can be ordered such that qivi ≥ qi+1vi+1, qi ≥ qi+1 and
(1 − qi)4c/(2qi − 1) ≤ δpˆii ≤ 4qic/(2qi − 1) for all i ∈ I\{n}, then Cases (a) and (b)
imply that qiuig + (1− qi)uib +uia < qi+1ui+1g + (1− qi+1)ui+1b +ui+1a for all i ∈ I\{n}.
By (4.13) and the assumption that qivi ≥ qi+1vi+1 it follows readily that it is optimal to
test the designs in increasing order of i.
(iii) This result follows directly from inserting Proposition 4.3(i) in (4.13) and rear-
ranging terms.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. (i) By Proposition 4.2(iii), ΠM =
∑n
i=1(δ
i−1/2i)(qivi − K −
4c/(2qi − 1)), which reveals that the sign of the net profit contribution of each design
i ∈ N is independent of the number and identity of the other designs to be tested. As a
result, the firm finds it optimal to include all designs i ∈ N into the testing set IM for
which qivi −K − 4c/(2qi − 1) ≥ 0.
(ii) Consider the optimization problem P . By (4.2)-(4.4), we have uig ≥ 2j+1c/(2qi−
1) and uia + 2
j−nuit ≥ (1 − qi)uig for all i, j ∈ I such that y(j)i = 1. Hence, the profit
contribution of design i with relative attractiveness j is Π
(j)
i ≤ (qivi −K − qiuig − uia −
2j−nuit)/2j ≤ (qivi −K − uig)/2j ≤ (qivi −K)/2j − 2c/(2qi − 1). A necessary condition
for i ∈ IP is that (qivi −K)/2j − 2c/(2qi − 1) ≥ 0 for some j ∈ IP . However, this can
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only be true if qivi−K−4c/(2qi−1) ≥ 0. Comparing this condition with IM completes
the proof.
(iii) By Proposition 4.2 (ii) and (iii), it is optimal to have design n in the optimal
set of designs for testing since it is profitable to test and eventually develop this design
due to the stated condition qnvn − K − 4c/(2qn − 1) > 0. Furthermore, all designs
j with qj ≥ qn and vj ≥ vn belong to this optimal set because then, we also have
qjvj −K − 4c/(2qj − 1) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.5. (i) Suppose δ < 1. For c = 0, we have IP = IM = IS = N
and designs are tested in decreasing order of qivi. By Propositions 4.1-4.3, it follows
readily that Π∗P > Π
∗
M = Π
∗
S. Thus, by continuity of the expected profits in c, there
exists c > 0 such that Π∗P > max{Π∗M ,Π∗S} for all c < c.
(ii) Let IP be the optimal set of designs to be tested under a parallel testing strat-
egy, and assume that the designs in IP can be ordered such that qivi ≥ qi+1vi+1 +
2i+1c[qi/(2qi− 1)− 2qi+1/(2qi+1− 1)]+ for all i ∈ IP\{n}. Then, by Proposition 4.1(iii),
Π∗P =
∑
i∈IP ((qivi−K)/2i−2c/(2qi−1)). Now, if the firm fixes the identity and ordering
of designs, but instead uses a multi-expert sequential testing strategy, then ΠM(IP ) =∑
i∈IP δ
i−1(qivi − K − 4c/(2qi − 1))/2i. By comparing the different profits, we have
ΠM(IP ) > Π∗P if c > c ≡
∑
i∈IP ((1−δi−1)(qivi−K)/2i)/
∑
i∈IP ((2(1−(δ/2)i−1)/(2qi−1)).
Moreover, since IP need not be optimal under a multi-expert sequential testing strategy,
it follows that if c > c, then Π∗P < ΠM(IP ) ≤ Π∗M ≤ max{Π∗M ,Π∗S}.
(iii) Let IM be the optimal set of designs to be tested under a multi-expert sequential
testing strategy, with IM optimally ordered according to Proposition 4.2(ii). By Propo-
sition 4.2(iii) and 4.3(iii), we have Π∗M =
∑
i∈IM (δ
i−1/2i)(qivi −K − 4c/(2qi − 1)) and
ΠS(IM) =
∑
i∈IM δ
i−1(qivi −K −max{4qic/(2qi − 1), δpˆii, 4c/(2qi − 1)− δpˆii})/2i ≤ Π∗S.
Clearly, a sufficient condition for ΠS(IM) ≥ Π∗M is that δpˆii ≤ 4qic/(2qi − 1) for all
i ∈ IM .
By (4.17), we have δpˆin = 0 and δpˆii−1 increases in δpˆii for all i ∈ IM . Moreover,
if δpˆii = 4qic/(2qi − 1), then δpˆii−1 = δ(4qic/(2qi − 1) − c). Thus, by induction, if
δpˆii ≤ 4qic/(2qi − 1), then δpˆii−1 ≤ δ(4qic/(2qi − 1) − c), and δ(4qic/(2qi − 1) − c) ≤
4qi−1c/(2qi−1 − 1) if qi ≥ qi−1. Finally, it is easy to show that qi ≤ qi and qi ≤ 5/6.
Proof of Proposition 4.6. (i) Note that I fbseq = {i ∈ N | qivi −K − 2c ≥ 0}. Comparing
this with IM as given in Proposition 4.4(i) immediately yields IM ⊆ I fbseq. We next
show that for any i ∈ IS, qivi − K − 4qic/(2qi − 1) ≥ 0; implying that IS ⊆ I fbseq.
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Consider an arbitrary design i ∈ IS. By Proposition 4.3(i), if the firm receives a good
recommendation for this design, the expected value of developing it is given by qivi−K−
qiuig−(1−qi)uib ≤ qivi−K−4qic/(2qi−1). Obviously, the firm only develops design i if
the development generates a nonnegative expected value; i.e., qivi−K−4qic/(2qi−1) ≥
qivi − K − qiuig − (1 − qi)uib ≥ 0. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a design
i ∈ IS such that qivi − K − qiuig − (1 − qi)uib < 0. Obviously, the firm would never
develop this design as the firm’s outside option has zero, and thus greater value. In
equilibrium, the expert anticipates the firm’s development decision, and as a result, it is
impossible for the firm to motivate the expert to exert high testing efforts. Hence, since
design i will never be tested anyways, it is optimal for the firm to erase it from the set
of designs to be tested.
(ii) We prove the claim by example. Consider a setting with three design alternatives
and the following parameters: q1 = 0.55, q2 = 0.64, q3 = 1, v1 = 100, v2 = 85, v3 = 53,
K = 50, and c = 0.6. In this case, the optimal set of designs to be tested under first-
best conditions is I fbpar = {1, 2}, leading to an expected profit of Πfbpar = 2.4. In contrast,
under delegation, we have IP = {3} with an expected profit of Π∗P = 0.3. It follows that
IP ∩ I fbpar = ∅.
(iii) For brevity, let |IM | = nM , |IP | = nP , |I fbseq| = nseq, and |I fbpar| = npar. With
symmetric test efficiencies (i.e., qi = q for all i ∈ N ), under any sequential testing strat-
egy it is always optimal to test designs in decreasing order of vi, and under any parallel
testing strategy the designs attractiveness decreases in vi. It follows from Propositions
4.1-4.4 that IP ⊆ I fbpar, IM ⊆ I fbseq, and consequently, nP ≤ npar, nM ≤ nseq. Without
loss of generality, we relabel the designs such that vi ≥ vi+1 for all i ∈ N . Given these
preliminaries, we prove the result by showing that for any nP ≥ 0, Πfbseq ≥ Πfbpar implies
Π∗M ≥ Π∗P .
Case (a): nP = 0. Since it always holds that Π
∗
P = 0 ≤ Π∗M , the claim is trivially
satisfied.
Case (b): nP = 1. By Proposition 4.1(iii) and 4.2(iii), we have Π
∗
P = (qv1−K)/2−
2c/(2q − 1) = ΠM(n = 1) ≤ ΠM(nM) = Π∗M , where the inequality follows from the
optimality of nM .
Case (c): nP ≥ 2. Define ∆Π(x, y) = Π(x) − Π(y). With this notation, we can
rewrite the firm’s first-best expected profits as Πfbseq(nseq) = ΠM(nM)+∆ΠM(nseq, nM)+∑nseq
i=1 (c(δ/2)
i−1(3−2q)/(2q−1)), and Πfbpar(npar) = ΠP (nP )+∆Πfbpar(npar, nP )+
∑np
i=1(c(3−
2q)/(2q−1)). Hence Πfbseq ≥ Πfbpar is equivalent to ΠM(nM) ≥ ΠP (nP )+∆Πfbpar(npar, nP )−
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∆ΠM(nseq, nM)+c(3−2q)/(2q−1)(nP −(1−(δ/2)nseq)/(1−(δ/2))). The right-hand side
of this inequality is larger than ΠP (nP ), which proves the claim. To see this, note that
by optimality of npar and nM , we have ∆Π
fb
par(npar, nP ) ≥ 0 and ∆ΠM(nseq, nM) ≤ 0, and
finally, nP − (1− (δ/2)nseq)/(1− (δ/2)) ≥ nP − 2 ≥ 0 because nP ≥ 2 by assumption.
Last, we prove that the converse statement is not always true. We do this by
example. Consider a scenario with the following parameters: N = 4, v1 = 10, v2 = 8,
v3 = 6, v4 = 4, q = 1, δ = 0.8, K = 2, c = 0.2. Then Π
∗
P = 3.6 ≤ Π∗M = 3.82, but
Πfbpar = 4.2 ≥ Πfbseq = 4.14.
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